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An unprecedented variety of resources are shared, exchanged and traded within (social)
networks of users. In this context, the Social Cloud framework leverages existing relation-
ships between members of a social network for the exchange of resources. The design of a
Social Cloud comprises several challenges that need to be addressed to create a sustainable
platform. This ranges from the identification and provisioning of relevant incentives for
user participation to achieve a critical mass of users, the understanding and modeling of
the underlying trust concepts, the design of market mechanisms for resource allocation, to
implementation details that ensure the technical feasibility of the platform.
This thesis focuses on the design of coordination mechanisms to address two of these chal-
lenges, namely user participation incentives and resource allocation mechanisms. The the-
sis applies a simulation-based approach to design incentive schemes and allocation mech-
anisms. In the first part, based on the survey-based identification of relevant participation
incentives and their dependency on certain factors, two case studies show the usefulness
of applying simulations in the engineering of contribution schemes for Social Clouds. The
second part of the thesis advocates the use of two-sided matching for resource allocation
due to the social setting of the considered scenario. For this preference-based allocation,
heuristics are proposed and evaluated for one-to-one matching as a means to provide flex-
ibility with respect to diverse user preferences and objective functions, and to find high
quality solutions in settings for which no efficient exact or approximation algorithms ex-
ist.
The case studies and results of this thesis for user participation exemplify that a simulation-
based approach can be leveraged as complementary methodology to analytical modeling
and prototyping to find useful results with respect to the effects of contribution schemes
on different user types. Considering resource allocation, the proposed algorithms provide
an increased solution quality compared to existing algorithms, and have the advantage of
inherent flexibility with respect to changing requirements and matching goals as they can
be easily adapted to different preference or goal settings. The study of preference manip-
ulation shows that while there are cases where manipulation is beneficial, the expected
reward is comparably small, which indicates little space for practical manipulation in real
i
ii
scenarios. Furthermore, the thesis considers a dynamic allocation scenario showing that
continuous reallocation is necessary if the amount of supplied and demanded resources
fluctuates.
This work contributes to the field of incentive engineering by providing new insights in
relevant incentives for social resource sharing and through the application of simulation-
based approaches to design contribution schemes. The field of two-sided matching is ad-
vanced by showing that the proposed heuristics provide superior performance and flexi-
bility for preference-based resource allocation.
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“The Internet and especially Web 2.0 has brought about many new ways of sharing as well as
facilitating older forms of sharing on a larger scale.”
(Belk 2013)
RESOURCE allocation has always been one of the core foci of economic research.Whenever one group of people has access to, or can provide certain resources, and
another group is interested in consuming these resources, (economic) mechanisms can fa-
cilitate such an exchange. Over the years, several types of allocation mechanisms have
emerged as principle ways to trade, share and exchange resources, such as fixed-price
markets, auctions, and negotiations. In general, they can be categorized into mechanisms
where the exchange involves monetary transactions, and non-monetary mechanisms.
The advent of computers had drastic effects on resource exchange mechanisms. On one
hand, the emergence of computer-based and computer-mediated exchange platforms fun-
damentally changed the ways that resources are traded or shared, affecting the speed,
complexity and transparency of resource allocation in many areas. This ranges from a
rapid increase in speed through algorithmic traders on stock markets to internet-based
sharing platforms where cars1, skills2, travel accommodation3, and other resources are
shared between members of the platform. On the other hand, besides facilitating the ex-
change, computing resources (storage, computational power, etc.) represent a commodity
that is becoming increasingly important. As the generated data from research and busi-
nesses increases and computational models become more complex to solve, the demand
1http://www.zipcar.com/; https://www.stadtmobil.de/ – last accessed May 2014
2http://www.skillshare.com/ – last accessed May 2014
3http://www.couchsurfing.com/ – last accessed May 2014
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4 Introduction
for computational resources changes accordingly. The evolution of distributed comput-
ing paradigms such as Cluster Computing within an organization and Grid Computing
across organizations (Foster and Kesselman, 2003) reflect the necessity to provide access to
a larger set of computational resources. Over the last years, Cloud Computing emerged as
the dominant paradigm to provide various types of computational resources (such as com-
putational power or storage) on-demand (Armbrust et al., 2010). A multitude of different
exchange mechanisms have been suggested and are used for these paradigms. Especially
when the resource exchange involves different organizations, monetary mechanisms are
commonly used to gain access to the resources (see Buyya and Murshed (2002) for Grid
Computing and the large Cloud Computing vendors such as Amazon Web Services4 and
Rackspace5).
A prevalent economic argument for the Cloud Computing principle of on-demand access
to third-party computational resources is the “Capex to Opex” principle (converting capi-
tal expenses to operating expenses; Armbrust et al. 2010, p.53). Yet, it also exemplifies the
change from a property-dominated paradigm in which resource ownership was considered
important, to an access- and service-based paradigm (Rifkin, 2000; Vargo and Lusch, 2004).
This paradigm change is in line with the observation that the importance of the resource
sharing concept, although being far from new, has steadily increased over the past years
and receives considerable renewed interest in both research and media (see e.g. Levine
2009; Belk 2010). With the introduction of Web 2.0 technologies that facilitate the online
communication and interaction between people, the last years have seen a rise in the num-
ber of platforms that facilitate the sharing of certain resources. This ranges from the previ-
ously mentioned sharing of physical resources (cars, travel accommodation, etc.), to digital
or virtual goods as well as computation resources (files6, storage7, computational power8,
knowledge artifacts9, etc.). Two important concepts for online resource sharing in this con-
text are Peer-to-Peer (P2P) (sharing) networks in which resources are exchanged directly
between users of the network in a decentralized manner, and Volunteer Computing where
computational resources are donated to (scientific) projects.
As social connections and the trust inherent to them is a facilitator of economic exchange
(Granovetter, 2005), a potential reason for this renewed interest in sharing is the increasing
prevalence and importance of (online) social networks in people’s everyday lives. This not
4http://aws.amazon.com/ – last accessed May 2014
5http://www.rackspace.com/ – last accessed May 2014
6https://www.dropbox.com/ – last accessed May 2014
7http://friendstore.news.cs.nyu.edu/ – last accessed May 2014
8http://boinc.berkeley.edu – last accessed May 2014
9http://www.myexperiment.org, http://nanohub.org – last accessed May 2014
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only manifests itself in the rise of social network platforms such as Facebook with over a
billion users, but also in other (socially-driven) Web 2.0 driven platforms (such as YouTube,
Twitter, etc.) which thrive on user interaction and contributions. Considering resource ex-
changes, the increasing importance of social connections (in contrast to the mostly anony-
mous Web and platforms that emerged in the early years of the Internet) also does not go
unnoticed. The mentioned platforms for sharing physical or virtual goods are example of
platforms which leverage the social connections of users to facilitate resource exchanges.
In contrast to monetary-based markets in which resource exchange necessarily involves
certain types of payments, these new types of exchange platforms often implement non-
monetary based allocation mechanisms as a means to allocate resources. In particular, the
social context might induce incentives such as reciprocal or altruistic participation (Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006).
Combining these aspects, and considering the increased interest in security aspects, many
exchange platforms begin to focus on social, non-anonymous resource sharing. Exam-
ples are P2P cloud computing (Babaoglu et al., 2012), the sharing of computational storage
among friends (Tran et al., 2008), and even the sharing of insurance policies.10 Similarly,
Swamynathan et al. (2008) proposes a “social marketplace” which combines traditional on-
line marketplaces with social network features to enable purchases between friends and
friends of friends.
This amalgamation of online resource exchange and social networks is also the background
of this work. The Social Cloud paradigm (Chard et al., 2012) serves as the main use case of
this thesis, and is explained in detail in Section 2.1. In particular, a Social Cloud (SC) is
defined as the sharing of (computational) resources and services between members of an
underlying social network. The design of such a platform is far from trivial, and several
challenges need to be addressed for the creation of a successful Social Cloud platform.
These challenges are outlined in the next section.
1.1. Design Challenges
A Social Cloud is a form of electronic marketplace where users share and exchange re-
sources. As such, there are several design decisions that have to be addressed: the in-
teraction of users with the platform, the mechanism to exchange resources, the underlying
technical infrastructure, etc. The methodology of Market Engineering (Weinhardt et al., 2003;
10https://www.friendsurance.de/ – last accessed May 2014
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Neumann, 2004) provides the means to structure this design process. In particular, it fo-
cuses on the design of institutions to implement and facilitate the resource exchange. Start-
ing with the definition of the transaction object of the market (i.e., the types of resources that
are exchanged), Market Engineering considers several viewpoints of institutional design:
the definition of a market microstructure that specifies the economic mechanisms used to
determine resource allocations and transactions; the specification of an IT infrastructure to
host the electronic marketplace and its functionality; and a business structure that addresses
aspects such as business models and data ownership. The goal of Market Engineering is to
define these institutions such that they incentivize a certain user behavior that results in a
desired market outcome.
Using the Market Engineering approach, several challenges can be identified in the design
of a Social Cloud. This section provides an overview of the most relevant design chal-
lenges, gives an extended description of the respective challenges and specifies which of
the challenges are addressed by this thesis.
Trust
In the context of resource sharing, or online cooperation in general, the existence of trust is
a fundamental factor that facilitates the exchange (Granovetter, 2005). Arrow argues that
“[v]irtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”
(Arrow, 1972, p.357).
Trust and its relation to exchange platforms has been studied in various disciplines. Com-
puter science mainly focuses on the application of trust concepts in platforms for resource
exchange. Examples are the calculation of trust scores between users of a social network
(Golbeck, 2005), and various reputation systems that aim at establishing the trustworthi-
ness of users involved in resource exchanges (e.g., PeerTrust (Xiong and Liu, 2004), Pow-
erTrust (Zhou and Hwang, 2007), EigenTrust (Kamvar et al., 2003)). In economics, the con-
cept of social or other-regarding preferences tries to incorporate the effects of trust on user
behavior in resource exchanges, mainly through interpreting reciprocal actions as signs of
trust between users (Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). In sociology, trust is mainly
perceived as calculated risk taking in decision situations within social interactions (e.g.,
Coleman (1990)), and several layers of trust are distinguished (Endress, 2012). From an
interdisciplinary perspective, the roles of institution-based trust in the design of (online)
marketplaces are of importance (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004).
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Whereas trust is modeled as a single score in the previously mentioned reputation systems,
Endress (2012) argues that trust has multiple layers. There can be a baseline trust between
two users depending on their relationship, yet this can be superimposed by context-specific
trust, e.g., the perceived capability of providing a certain outcome or action. It might also
depend on the prior expectations of the interacting users. Hence, trust is a multi-faceted
concept that needs careful elaboration in the context of social resource sharing. Although
first steps into this direction have been taken by Caton et al. (2012), this challenge is not
focus of this thesis.
Volatile Resources and User Availability
Social resource sharing differs from both ownership-based resource usage as well as tradi-
tional payment-based resource usage. In contrast to resource ownership, users who request
resources have to take into account that resource availability depends on the user provid-
ing the resource, e.g., if the resource is currently already used, how long it can be used, etc.
Also, especially for computational resources the requested resources might not be as avail-
able and as reliable as resources provided by professional companies, and often involve a
best-effort type of usage policy. For example, storage or computational power provided by
users on a voluntary basis depends on how much storage is available on their system, how
long their machines are online, etc.
User availability and the corresponding volatile resources have certain consequences for
participating users. For example, if a user requests computational resources to store data
or use computational power, the unavailability of the providing user can cause serious con-
sequences. This challenge is also relevant from a technical point of view. If, for example,
users exhibit a pattern of availability and unavailability, and the platform wants to guar-
antee that data stored on other users’ machines is available at any time (or with a certain
probability), then techniques such as data replication have to be considered.
This challenge is partially addressed in the thesis. In particular, the thesis studies the ef-
fects of user availability and unavailability on the platform reliability in a case where the
resources required to run the platform are provided by the users themselves.
Technical Implementation
Every online platform depends on a sound technical implementation to ensure reliable
performance, achieve a high availability, and provide the necessary functionality for user
management and user interaction. This basic functionality includes databases to store rel-
evant data about users, transactions, and other information, as well as the definition and
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implementation of the user interface through which users interact with the platform. From
the perspective of a sharing community, the platform also has to facilitate the actual ex-
change of (computational) resources. This is a non-trivial technical challenge, as it requires
the consideration of different device technologies (e.g., mobile vs. static access), operating
systems, and changing network addresses.
For a Social Cloud, Chard et al. (2012) and Caton et al. (2014) provide examples how such a
platform can be implemented, and Seuken et al. (2010) specifically considers user interface
design for a computational storage sharing market. In this thesis, the implementation chal-
lenge is partially addressed by the description of an implemented Social Compute Cloud
for sharing Virtual Machines. Usability aspects, on the other hand, are not the focus of this
thesis and can be considered an interesting opportunity for future work.
User Participation
Once the technical infrastructure for the platform is implemented, the next challenge is
to attract users to participate on the platform. For online communities in general, and
sharing communities in particular, a commonly agreed upon challenge is to gain a critical
mass of participating users (Markus, 1987; Van Slyke et al., 2007; Westland, 2010) at which
point network effects can be harnessed. With an increasing number of users, the available
resources and thus potential utility from using the platform generally increases as well.
The design of appropriate incentives is specifically targeted to increase user participation.
The potential motivations of users to join and participate on an online (sharing) platform
can be diverse and heterogeneous, and not all users can be expected to exhibit the same
behavior when presented with particular incentives. Hence, an incentive scheme targeted
at increasing the number of actively participating users has to be aware of the potentially
heterogeneous user pool, and provide appropriate incentives (Vassileva, 2012).
Participation incentives encompass the first main part of this thesis. In the context of Social
Clouds, relevant motivations and incentives will be identified and discussed. Furthermore,
two case studies are presented that highlight the usefulness of a simulation-based approach
in the design of incentive schemes.
Resource Allocation
Platforms for resource sharing or exchange are characterized by the fact that some users
have resources to offer that can be used or consumed by other users. In such a context,
the decision about the type of (economic) mechanism that facilitates this exchange is fun-
damental. Platforms, in general, have a variety of options for such mechanisms. One
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possibility is to allow users to contact, negotiate and share resources in a decentralized
manner, leaving the decision process which users to contact solely to the users themselves.
Another possibility is to provide a certain form of centralized mechanism that determines
the transactions and potential remunerations between users.
There are two main challenges in the design of a suitable resource allocation mechanism
for Social Clouds, or online platforms in general. First, it has to be decided which type
of allocation mechanism is to be used, i.e., whether a decentralized mechanism is used
or a centralized mechanism with or without monetary transactions. Second, the chosen
type of mechanism has to be adapted for the specific scenario in order to guarantee certain
desirable criteria, such as efficiency or fairness. Ideally, the allocation mechanism is con-
gruent with the platform philosophy and is chosen according to its ability to reflect what
is important for the participating user types. For example, in social settings non-monetary
mechanisms might be preferred as monetary remunerations can affect the non-monetary
motivations of participating users (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003).
The design of a suitable resource allocation mechanism is the second main focus of the
thesis. For the first mentioned challenge, the findings of the relevant participation incen-
tives are used to identify the suitable type of allocation mechanism. Building on this, for
the second challenge of designing the mechanism according to the requirements of the
platform, algorithms to find good allocations according to several performance criteria are
introduced and evaluated.
User Behavior
Online communities generally have an etiquette that users should not engage in harmful
or malicious activities on the platform. Especially when resources are shared or exchanged,
the tampering or misuse of the resources can have serious negative effects on the resource
providing users, the resources, as well as the platform itself (e.g., with respect to platform
reputation). Besides misusing resources, the strategic provisioning of false information,
for example in resource exchanges, might be beneficial for certain users if the respective
exchange mechanism is not incentive compatible. As such misrepresentation of informa-
tion can be harmful to other users and for the system as a whole, it is generally deemed
desirable to implement mechanisms that do not allow users to gain through information
misrepresentation.
Although users might have to sign community guidelines when joining the platform, this
does not ensure that the rules are actually followed. Different approaches can be pursued
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to address this challenge. Through the design and provisioning of certain incentives, ma-
licious or harmful behavior can be made less appealing for users. The design of formal
agreements (similar to Service Level Agreements) is used by certain platforms to lay out
the terms of the resource exchange, and to specify actions if the agreement is not adhered
to. Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, if the expected gain from malicious behav-
ior or information misrepresentation is negative, then (rational) users have an (economic)
incentive to abstain from such behavior. Considering the technical implementation, addi-
tional security measures can be used to minimize the risk of exploitation.
Several aspects of strategic or malicious behavior are discussed throughout the thesis.
Specifically, in the context of resource allocations the thesis investigates if users can gain
from misrepresenting their private information.
1.2. Research Outline
For the design of a sharing platform such as a Social Cloud, the previously mentioned
challenges have to be addressed. This thesis contributes to this field by focusing on two
of these challenges: 1) User participation incentives, and 2) the design of non-monetary
resource allocation mechanisms.
Considering user participation incentives and contribution schemes, the thesis aims to an-
swer following research question:
RESEARCH QUESTION 1≺PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTION INCENTIVES What are
relevant user participation incentives for Social Clouds, and how can they be leveraged in the design
of tailored participation and contribution schemes?
The first step in the design of appropriate and effective incentive schemes is the identi-
fication of different participation stages that define how and to what degree (potential)
users interact with the platform. The existence of several distinct stages with specific re-
quirements for user integration and participation has already been identified for general
online communities (Jones and Rafaeli, 1999; Iriberri and Leroy, 2009). This is an important
consideration as the motivations and incentives might be different between stages. For ex-
ample, the motivation to join a platform can be different from the motivation to actively
contribute to the platform. However, Social Clouds have unique, potentially different re-
quirements for user participation as other online communities. This stems from the fact
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that (bilateral) resource exchange between users on the basis of existing social connections
might have an impact on the user behavior and the existing relationships. Therefore, re-
search question 1.1 is posed to identify the relevant participation stages in which the user
interacts with the platform.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.1 ≺INCENTIVE ENGINEERING What are the stages of participa-
tion and the corresponding relevant incentives that users exhibit in Social Clouds?
The results of research question 1.1 are necessary to design incentive schemes that take into
account the specific requirements of the different participation stages. Chapter 3 addresses
this research question by utilizing two approaches. On one hand, through a comparison
of related platforms and exchange systems as well as participation studies in online com-
munities, a conceptual model of the participation stages is constructed. Additionally, the
specific challenges within the separate stages are discussed in the context of a Social Cloud.
On the other hand, building on the previously derived model, a small-scale web-based sur-
vey aims to identify the relevance of certain incentives within the mentioned participation
stages. In particular, its goal is to find relationships between user characteristics and the
relative importance of certain incentives.
By design, the introduction of an incentive scheme can affect how users interact with other
users and the system, for example by providing incentives to increase one’s sharing ac-
tivity. Before being applied in practice, the effects of such a (potentially novel) incentive
scheme on the overall platform have to be predicted to ensure that the scheme achieves
its goals. Often, analytic modeling is used to predict said effects, or the scheme is intro-
duced for a subgroup of users and subsequently analyzed. However, both approaches are
not always feasible. For example, a realistic analytical model might be too complex for
formal evaluation, or the platform for which the incentive scheme is designed might not
exist yet. For these reasons, this thesis proposes and applies a simulation-based approach
as complementary methodology to study potential effects of incentive schemes on the sys-
tem. In particular, such an approach can yield predictions which are unattainable by the
other methods, such as dynamic effects on different user groups. To demonstrate how such
a simulation-based approach can augment the incentive scheme design, research question
1.2 studies the effects that can be predicted by such an approach.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.2 ≺INCENTIVE SCHEME DESIGN How can a simulation-based
approach be leveraged in the design of incentive schemes for participation?
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As an example for the design of an incentive scheme, the introduction of a participation
constraint in a Social Cloud is considered in a case study in Chapter 4. The aim of such a
participation constraint is to provide incentives for users to contribute resources to the sys-
tem. It is well-known that users might have different preferences to contribute resources
and can be distinguished into different types (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). Although the
potential effects of the constraint on the overall system have been studied before (see, e.g.,
Ranganathan et al. 2004), the implications on different user types, and the consideration of
system performance depending on the distribution of such user types, is a novel scenario
that requires investigation. Furthermore, from a purely analytical approach it is not clear
how the participation constraint will affect the resource contribution of the users dynami-
cally. Hence, research question 1.2 investigates the effects of such an incentive scheme on
different user groups and determines if the participation constraint achieves its purpose.
User participation incentives, as studied in research questions 1.1 and 1.2, are necessary to
create a sustainable platform with continuing and active user participation. From a tech-
nical point of view, such an online platform also requires certain technical infrastructure
resources to host the platform itself, e.g., for services such as user registration and man-
agement. Besides using dedicated third-party resources for the infrastructure, it is also
possible to let the users provide the necessary resources themselves. The concept of a co-
operative infrastructure, in this case, is defined as a platform where the resources that host the
platform are provided and owned by the users. As the feasibility of such an approach de-
pends on the contribution of the users, an incentive scheme needs to be designed such that
enough resources are provided to ensure a certain platform availability. Research question
1.3 considers this scenario and focuses on the feasibility of different incentive schemes.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.3 ≺CO-OPERATIVE INFRASTRUCTURES What are the effects
of different contribution schemes on co-operatively provided infrastructure resources for Social
Clouds?
To answer this research question, the previously described simulation-based approach is
used in a second case study in Chapter 4 to examine several different contribution schemes
for users. For example, a certain contribution to the infrastructure might be enforced for
all users who want to participate, or the decision to participate can be completely left to
the users themselves. Research question 1.3 studies how different contribution schemes
and assumptions about user type distributions affect the feasibility of such a co-operative
approach.
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The first main research question considers aspects of user participation and resource con-
tribution, which was identified as one of the key challenges in the design of a Social Cloud
platform. Given that users participate on the platform and provide resources, the second
key challenge is to find appropriate (matching) mechanisms that allocate resources in line
with the goals of the platform. As discussed, in many economic settings the allocation of
resources involves monetary transactions based on (private) valuations that the market par-
ticipants have for the resources. While such monetary-based mechanisms might be useful
for many exchange settings, there are also scenarios for which non-monetary mechanisms
are considered more useful. This is especially the case in settings where monetary-based
exchanges would be considered unsocial, unethical or illegal. Examples of such settings are
the matching of children to schools (School Choice Problem, see e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez, 2003) and the matching of college students to college spaces (College Admission
Problem, see e.g. Roth and Sotomayor, 1992).
Considering resource sharing platforms, especially ones with a social setting such as Social
Clouds, the use of non-monetary mechanisms can be observed frequently. Examples are
the use of credits and trophies on nanoHUB.org11 and myExperiment.org12 (called “nanos”
and “reputation points”, respectively) for sharing research artifacts as well as learning and
teaching materials; P2P platforms where users can exchange electronic goods; or storage-
sharing platforms where users can supply and use storage provided by other users with-
out monetary compensation (see e.g. Seuken et al., 2010). In these platforms, participants
(which can still be distinguished into resource providers and resource consumers) share
and consume available resources without the immediate goal of monetary gain. A charac-
teristic of such platforms is that in contrast to mostly anonymous platforms, users of such
“social” platforms often value non-monetary incentives (such as reciprocity, altruism, etc.)
higher than purely monetary remuneration when it comes to the sharing and exchange of
resources (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
In such a non-monetary setting, the theory of two-sided matching is well established as a
means to allocate resources. The key aspect of two-sided matching is that users specify a
preference ranking with whom they want to share and exchange their resources. Based on
these preferences, a matching mechanism tries to find an allocation with certain properties
(Roth, 2008). Depending on the structure of the preferences and the desired properties, sev-
eral algorithms have been developed to compute such an allocation. However, there are
some drawbacks with existing solutions: 1) there are scenarios for which the calculation of
11http://nanohub.org – last accessed May 2014
12http://www.myexperiment.org – last accessed May 2014
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an optimal solution is NP-hard and no suitable approximation algorithms with a guaran-
teed quality bound exist (Halldórsson et al., 2003). 2) Existing algorithms are all developed
for a given scenario and a certain combination of goals, thereby lacking the flexibility of
being applicable in different scenarios. 3) Existing algorithms concentrate on achieving a
stable solution, which infers that no user can be better of by deviating from the given so-
lution; due to an impossibility results (Roth, 1982), the corresponding mechanisms are not
incentive compatible, and the effects of strategic manipulation have to be considered. 4) Two-
sided matching algorithms are often considered in a static context, where the allocation is
calculated in a batch-like procedure, which does not reflect potential dynamics of a real
platform such as a Social Cloud.
This is the focus of the second part of the thesis, which aims to address these drawbacks
and considers algorithms for preference-based resource allocation13 as a means to combine
non-monetary mechanisms with the advantages of centralized, market-based allocation:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2 ≺RESOURCE ALLOCATION Which types of algorithms provide a
good combination of performance, flexibility, and strategic properties for preference-based resource
allocation?
As the allocation mechanism should have a certain flexibility to adjust to different goals
and scenarios, heuristics have been suggested to calculate allocations in preference-based
matching (Vien and Chung, 2006; Kimbrough and Kuo, 2010). This thesis follows a similar
direction and extends this work by developing heuristics that have the ability to handle
a variety of preference structures and goal combinations. As there might be a trade-off
between the flexibility and the achieved solution quality of such heuristics compared to ex-
isting algorithms, the performance of the heuristics is the focus of research question 2.1:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.1 ≺PERFORMANCE OF HEURISTICS What is the performance of
heuristics for preference-based matching compared to existing matching mechanisms?
Chapter 5 compares the performance of different algorithms and heuristics in several stan-
dard scenarios. As heuristics allow for more flexibility over existing algorithms with re-
spect to goals and preference structures, an equal or improved performance with respect
to certain goal metrics would show the general applicability of said heuristics and provide
a valuable contribution to the field of two-sided matching.
13In the remainder of the thesis, preference-based matching and two-sided matching will be used interchange-
ably.
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Besides pure performance and solution quality characteristics, there are additional con-
siderations that are of practical interest in preference-based matching. One such aspect is
the consideration of strategic behavior in a market. From the point of view of participat-
ing users, the question of how to interact with the matching mechanism arises. As the
mechanisms calculate solutions based on the preference rankings that are provided by the
users, they might have an incentive to manipulate their submitted preferences in the hope
to benefit from manipulation. In fact, the impossibility result of Roth (1982) shows that
for the standard set of goals in preference-based matching (if a stable solution has to be
guaranteed), there can be no incentive compatible mechanism, i.e., for which it is the best
strategy for all users to submit their true, non-manipulated preferences. This also applies
for heuristics if a stable solution is of interest.
In general, the manipulation of the submitted preferences can have several effects. Besides
the direct effects on the manipulating as well as non-manipulating users, which can either
gain or lose by such manipulation, it might also change the quality of the solution with
respect to the true preferences of users. For example, an optimal solution with respect to the
submitted preferences might not be optimal under the true, non-manipulated preferences,
and the effects of manipulation on solution quality is a largely unexplored field. Hence, the
focus of research question 2.2 is the potential effects of such manipulation:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.2 ≺INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY What are the effects of preference
manipulation on the manipulating users, non-manipulating users, and the solution quality?
Chapter 6.1 studies the effects of manipulation for considered preference-based matching
algorithms. In addition, it also considers the robustness of certain algorithms against po-
tential manipulation. This aspect is particularly interesting if participating users want to
learn a beneficial manipulation strategy. Both the likelihood of a successful manipulation,
as well as the average gains from manipulation are considered.
Besides flexibility, performance, and incentive compatibility, the fourth aspect that needs
to be addressed is the general setting of the matching calculation. Preference-based match-
ing mechanisms usually assume that the allocation is calculated in a batch-like procedure,
where participants submit their preferences to the algorithm once and are matched ac-
cording to the resulting solution. In realistic settings, however, the scenario can be more
complex. Instead of being matched only once, or at certain time intervals, requesting and
providing users might join and leave the system dynamically. This creates situations where
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new supply and demand arrives in between the allocation time-slots. Research question
2.3 targets this issue and studies options to deal with such dynamic supply and demand.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.3 ≺DYNAMIC ALLOCATIONS What are options to allocate dy-
namic supply and demand, taking into account potential existing matches?
Two straightforward strategies to deal with such dynamic supply and demand are either
recalculating the entire solution (taking into account the currently matched users), or leav-
ing the new supply and demand unallocated until the next allocation time-slot. The first
option might not always be possible for time- or technical constraints, e.g., if the calculation
of the solution takes too long or breaking up matched pairs is technically not feasible. The
latter option, however, will potentially leave a considerable amount of available resource
idle. Therefore, research question 2.3 studies the effects of such dynamic supply and de-
mand on preference-based resource allocation. Besides the two mentioned strategies, two
heuristics are considered as an approach to match otherwise idle resources without break-
ing up currently matched users.
1.3. Structure of the Thesis
The research outline as described in the previous section reflects the structure of the thesis,
which is comprised of four parts. Part I introduces the necessary concepts as well as the
main use case and methodology which is applied in the subsequent parts. The design of
participation incentive schemes is the focus of Part II, and Part III considers mechanisms
for resource allocation. Part IV concludes the thesis and highlights future research direc-
tions.
A high-level illustration of this thesis’ structure is shown in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 lays
the foundation for the subsequent chapters by establishing the common terminology and
main concepts used throughout the thesis. In particular, Section 2.1 describes the con-
cept of Social Clouds and provides details on an implemented prototype thereof. Section
2.2 discusses a simulation-based approach and the corresponding simulation tool as main
methodology in this thesis. The previously mentioned challenges of user participation and
resource allocation are further detailed in Section 2.3.
Building on these foundations, Chapter 3 tackles the challenge of providing incentives for
user participation by identifying different stages of user interaction and participation with
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Figure 1.1.: Structure of this Thesis
the platform. Additionally, the results of a web-based survey on the importance of different
incentives within these stages and their dependency on factors such as user type are pre-
sented. Chapter 4 consists of two case studies: the first case study investigates the effects of
a participation constraint on system and user behavior and the dependency on user char-
acteristics. The co-operative provisioning of infrastructure resources is focus of the second
case study, which compares different contribution schemes and their effectiveness based
on the distribution assumptions of user types.
In the third part of this thesis, Chapter 5 considers preference-based matching mechanisms
as a means to allocate resources in Social Clouds. Starting with an outline of the main
concepts and existing algorithms, it describes the proposed heuristics and evaluates their
performance for different preference structures and goal combinations. Chapter 6 presents
two additional topics of interest in the area of preference-based matching. First, the effects
of strategic manipulation of preferences are evaluated and discussed. Second, approaches
to handle dynamic allocations are considered. Chapter 7 summarizes the key contribu-




Parts of this thesis have been presented and published at four peer-reviewed international
conferences and workshops, as well as an international journal. This section provides an
overview of the published material and simultaneously outlines the development of the
work and the corresponding refinement and extension steps.
The identification and discussion of different stages of user participation during their inter-
action with a Social Cloud (Section 3.2) was presented in a workshop at the 11th IEEE/ACM
International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing (CCGrid 2011) (Haas
et al., 2011).
The simulation tool described in Section 2.2 which is used to facilitate the simulation-based
evaluations in the thesis, along with the case study about the introduction of a participa-
tion constraint and the corresponding evaluation (Section 4.2) were presented at the 8th
IEEE International Conference on eScience (eScience 2012) (Haas et al., 2012). The de-
scription and implementation of the simulation tool was extended to capture additional
scenarios, such as simulating preference-based resource exchanges. Furthermore, the case
study as presented in Section 4.2 additionally considers the comparison of different user
type distributions. The case study on co-operative infrastructures was presented at the 48th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’48) (Haas et al., 2013). The
corresponding Section 4.3 encompasses an additional contribution scheme that was added
as an extension for this thesis.
Considering the evaluation of preference-based matching heuristics and their comparison
to existing algorithms, the results for the first scenario (Section 5.4.3) were presented at
the 10th International Conference on Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems and Services
(GECON 2013) (Haas et al., 2013). The evaluation was then extended to cover additional
scenarios as well. The Social Compute Cloud prototype as described in Section 2.1.4, as well
as the consideration of dynamic allocations in the context of preference-based matching
in Section 6.2, was published in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing (Caton et al.,
2014).
Chapter 2.
Resource Sharing in Social Contexts
“The recent changes in our economic landscape have notably exposed and intensified a
phenomenon: an explosion in sharing, bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting, and
swapping.”
(Botsman and Rogers, 2010)
THIS chapter introduces the concepts and methodologies used throughout the thesis.Section 2.1 introduces the concept of Social Clouds, a resource sharing paradigm in
which resources are shared between members of existing social networks. The Social Cloud
concept will be used as unified use case throughout the thesis. Additionally, a prototype
of a Social Cloud for computational resources, along with its implementation details, is
presented. In conjunction with the prototype, a simulation tool was developed as comple-
mentary methodology to study various aspects of a Social Cloud. Section 2.2 describes the
simulation approach and corresponding tool that is used as the main evaluation methodol-
ogy in this thesis. Applying literature reviews and a comparison to similar systems, Section
2.3 discusses two coordination challenges that have to be addressed in the design of such
platforms. In particular the consideration of user participation incentives, as well as the
type of (economic) resource allocation mechanisms, are identified as the key challenges
which this work addresses. Finally, Section 2.4 closes the chapter with a summary of the
described concepts.
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2.1. The Concept of Social Clouds
This section describes the concept of a Social Cloud (Chard et al., 2010, 2012) as an example
of a social resource sharing platform. It will be used as a unifying use case that shows the
practical application of the mentioned topics and will serve as an example sharing platform
throughout this work.1 Section 2.1.1 defines the concept, describes the components and
discusses use cases for the application of a Social Cloud. Section 2.1.2 provides an overview
of related concepts, and Section 2.1.3 discusses challenges in the design and construction
of a Social Cloud. Section 2.1.4 focuses on a prototype system of a Social Compute Cloud
and provides implementation details.
2.1.1. Definitions
A Social Cloud is a dynamic environment through which (new) Cloud-like provisioning
scenarios can be established based upon the implicit levels of trust that transcend inter-
personal relationships digitally encoded within a social network (Chard et al., 2010, 2012).
The concept of a Social Cloud is defined as:
Definition 1 (Social Cloud, Chard et al., 2012 ). A Social Cloud is a resource and service shar-
ing framework utilizing relationships established between members of a social network.
The vision of a Social Cloud is motivated by the need of individuals or groups to access
specific resources they are not in possession of, but that can be made available by connected
peers. In simple words, Social Clouds use social networks as mechanisms for collaboration
and resource sharing. Moreover, Social Clouds rely on social incentives to motivate sharing
and non-malicious behavior, as users leverage their existing networks to share capabilities
and resources (Haas et al., 2013). A Social Cloud is a form of Community Cloud2, as the
resources are owned, provided and consumed by members of a social community.
There are several characteristics that distinguish a Social Cloud from other computing
approaches. In contrast to Volunteer Computing (VC), which is defined as “a form of
distributed computing in which the general public volunteers processing and storage re-
sources to computing projects” (Anderson and Fedak, 2006, p.73), users in a Social Cloud
1Therefore, the terms “platform” and “Social Cloud” are used interchangeably.
2NIST defines a Community Cloud as: “[...] The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by
a specific community of consumers from organizations that have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security
requirements, policy, and compliance considerations).” (Mell and Grance, 2011)
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cannot only donate but also consume different resources in exchange for their resource
provision. Furthermore, contrary to traditional P2P resource sharing which “allow a dis-
tributed community of users to share resources in the form of information, digital content,
storage space, or processing capacity” (Krishnan et al., 2006, p.32), the resources are pro-
vided by users with direct or indirect relationships in a social network. Hence, resources
are no longer offered by anonymous providers but by socially connected users, where the
existing relationships can be used to deduce some form of bi-lateral association or under-
standing of trust. Furthermore, it is also different from the definition of Cloud Comput-
ing:
Definition 2 (Cloud Computing, Mell and Grance 2011 ). Cloud computing is a model for
enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable com-
puting resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.
Whereas the NIST definition of Cloud Computing focuses on technical aspects such as on-
demand access, rapid provisioning and configurable resources, the Social Cloud paradigm
focuses on the utilization of the underlying social network for the sharing of a pool of re-
sources. Common aspects between the definitions are having such a pool of different types
of resources and services, and having (ideally) low management effort and interaction.
Another key aspect in the definition of a Social Cloud is the existence of an underlying
social network between the users. This is crucial as it has implications about which mecha-
nisms are used to facilitate resource sharing in such a system. As Granovetter (2005) shows,
social networks have an impact on market outcomes, and trust emerges on the basis of a
social network. Hence, the design of a Social Cloud has to take the social network of users
into account. This is elaborated in more detail in Chapter 3.
Figure 2.1 shows an example SC where users provide (potentially heterogeneous) re-
sources, and a clearinghouse determines the allocation of supply and demand. The connec-
tions between users show the underlying social network, and the numbered users indicate
that these users are part of the Social Cloud. Note that not only the resources, but also
the types of users, in a SC can be heterogeneous. Different types of users have different
resource capabilities and requirements. The potential heterogeneity of users and resources
also affects the interaction of the users with the SC clearinghouse as well as the appropriate
choice of a market mechanism (which is not restricted to preference-based matching for
general Social Clouds).
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Figure 2.1.: Example of a Social Cloud
Architecture
The general technical architecture of a Social Cloud is shown in Figure 2.2. The main com-
ponent is the Social Cloud platform, which consists of several modules. The Clearing-
house module includes the allocation mechanisms and relevant corresponding social and
economic protocols (e.g., social service level agreements that provide a formal description
of the exchanges). The Platform Manager provides administration functionality and is re-
sponsible for the tasks such as user management. Several databases are required to store
relevant data about user resources, allocations, and user preferences. For the technical fa-
cilitation, a Resource Middleware component enables the execution of the Social Cloud
platform on computational resources. The Social Cloud platform has two main interfaces.
The socio-technical adapter enables the extraction of social network data, and the user in-
terface defines how users communicate with the platform, e.g., through the specification of
sharing preferences.
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Figure 2.2.: General Architecture of a Social Cloud
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Application Scenarios for Social Clouds
The definition of a Social Cloud is flexible and allows for a range of potential application
scenarios. Based on Chard et al. (2012), the following list describes the potential scenar-
ios.
Social Storage Cloud In this scenario, users of a Social Cloud share storage space, for ex-
ample to backup data, share pictures, and store large data sets. Given certain security
requirements, this scenario is perhaps the simplest to implement. A prototype of a
Social Storage Cloud implemented as a Facebook application has already been devel-
oped in (Chard et al., 2012).
Social Compute Cloud Instead of storage, (virtualized) computational resources are
shared in this scenario, which targets the potentially large un- or underused com-
puting potential of personal computers. Such computational power can be used by
other members of the Social Cloud, or provided to scientific communities for complex
computations. This scenario is considered by John et al. (2011), who study different
incentive schemes to encourage contribution to such public research projects. A pro-
totype of a Social Compute Cloud is also presented in detail in Section 2.1.4.
Social Collaboration Cloud The mentioned platforms myExperiment.org and
nanoHUB.org are examples for this type of scenario. Here, members of a So-
cial Cloud participate due to some common collaborative task or goal, for example
the sharing of knowledge artifacts within a scientific community. A potential use
case is the sharing of large datasets within a scientific community using a social
content delivery network (Chard et al., 2012).
Social Cloud for Public Research Closely related to Social Compute Clouds, this sce-
nario considers Social Clouds for providing computational resources to Volunteer
Computing-like projects. Specifically, not only could the provided computational
power due to unutilized resources be potentially increased dramatically, research
projects can also be propagated through the network to friends and other members
in- and outside the network, thereby increasing the potential user base (Thaufeeg
et al., 2011).
Social Enterprise Cloud In contrast to the previous scenarios which focus on private
users, enterprises can also leverage specialized Social Clouds through their social net-
works. This would allow them to gain access to additional computational resources,
and at the same time increase the awareness of the enterprise/company with partici-
pating users.
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Trust
One of the fundamental assumptions of the Social Cloud paradigm is the existence of a
certain level of trust between the members of the social network. As mentioned in Section
1.1, however, different scientific disciplines have their own version of what constitutes the
notion of trust, which makes an interdisciplinary focus necessary. For this reason, Caton
et al. (2012) define trust in the context of a Social Cloud from the perspectives of economics,
computer science and sociology.
Definition 3 (Trust in Social Cloud, Caton et al., 2012 ). Trust is a positive expectation or as-
sumption on future outcomes that results from proven contextualized personal interaction histories
corresponding to conventional relationship types and can be leveraged by formal and informal rules
and conventions within a Social Cloud to facilitate as well as influence the scope of collaborative
exchange.
There are several important concepts addressed by this definition. The notion of positive
expectation on future outcomes is related to economic aspects such as expected reciprocity,
where another user is trusted to return a favor in the future. Proven contextualized personal
interaction means that the specific trust depends on the prior social context of previous
interactions, e.g., indicated by the relationship type between the users. Formal and informal
rules and conventions is another relevant aspect which indicates that trust can be facilitated
by explicit agreements (e.g., terms of collaboration), or informal norms that are enforced
by the community.
2.1.2. Related Concepts
There are several concepts similar to a Social Cloud as previously defined. Using the same
term, Mohaisen et al. (2011) propose a paradigm for trustworthy distributed computing on
social networks. In the context of federated Cloud systems, Elnaffar et al. (2013) describe a
model of a social network where several cloud systems form different types of relationships
with other clouds. Kourtellis et al. (2010) present a P2P based service (“Prometheus”) that
collects social information from different sources and allows social-based mapping and to
draw social inferences. Kourtellis (2012) argue that the vast amount of information present
in social network (platforms) can be leveraged to build socially-aware distributed systems
with various application scenarios, increasing aspects such as system response time.
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From a technical point of view, several distributed computing approaches such as ASPEN
(Curry et al., 2008) and PolarGrid (Guo et al., 2009) leverage information of social networks
in their applications. OpenSocial (Häsel, 2011) provides interface specifications that allow
access to social network information in order to create social web applications. P2P clouds
(Ranjan et al., 2010) aim to create (private) clouds on the basis of peer connections, yet do
not have the same assumptions about the underlying social network and the resulting trust
between members as in the concept of Social Clouds.
In particular (academic) domains, social networks are also used to build and coordinate
special-interest communities. Prominent examples are the previously mentioned platforms
myExperiment (De Roure et al., 2009) and nanoHUB.org (Klimeck et al., 2008). myExperi-
ment allows users to share (scientific) workflows, in order to determine commonalities and
increase the dissemination of popular workflows (e.g., for scientific experiments) to the
scientific community. nanoHUB.org is a large, world-wide community of researchers in
nanotechnology, and users can share teaching and research material among each other.
Another related field is Volunteer Computing through systems like BOINC (Anderson,
2004). In projects such as SETI@home (Anderson et al., 2002), users donate computational
resources to scientific projects which use the donated resources to run extensive calcula-
tions. In contrast to Social Clouds, Volunteer Computing is inherently unilateral as the
concept does not involve the notion of bilateral exchanges. Furthermore, the participat-
ing users do not have to belong to the same social network and can remain completely
anonymous, and social connections and relationships are not leveraged.
A prominent example of sharing computational resources is the exchange of electronic stor-
age between participating users. Examples of such a scenario are platforms like Friend-
Store3 (Tran et al., 2008), F2Box (Gracia-Tinedo et al., 2012), symform4, P2P storage sharing
(Seuken et al., 2010), or a Social Storage Cloud (Chard et al., 2010) in which registered users
can provide free storage space on their own machines for data backup and other purposes
to other users. In return, the contributing users are able to use the storage of other users
for their own backup. Such systems are alternatives to third-party storage and backup
solutions. Security measures such as encryption algorithms or sandboxing technologies
are important in this scenario to avoid unauthorized access of one’s data on other users’
machines, as well as protecting storage-providing users from malicious data.
3http://friendstore.news.cs.nyu.edu/ – last accessed May 2014
4http://www.symform.com/ – last accessed May 2014
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2.1.3. Design Challenges
There are many challenges in the construction of a Social Cloud that need to be carefully
considered. The following discussion considers four key challenges: the technical facil-
itation of the cloud platform, the inclusion as well as interpretation of social (network)
structures, the design and implementation of appropriate socio-economic models for the
facilitation of exchange, and the sustainability of the platform infrastructure.
Technical Facilitation To facilitate the exchange of resources, i.e., both provision and con-
sumption, the necessary technical infrastructure has to be provided. This includes the
handling of different types of users (e.g., mobile users with non-static IP addresses)
and resources (e.g., computational storage and Virtual Machines). In addition, even
though the Social Cloud paradigm assumes a certain level of trust between users,
certain security mechanisms such as sandboxing are required. Such security mecha-
nisms aim at protecting resources from potentially malicious users and also protect
user applications from potentially malicious resources. These aspects can be partially
addressed by virtualization, which also enables the support for different operating
systems.
Leveraging Social Structures Users of a Social Cloud are connected through an underly-
ing social network. To utilize the underlying social network structure for resource
sharing, Social Clouds rely on users to allow access to their social network and trust
the platform with the corresponding data. The data that is accessible on many social
network platforms, which often utilize a binary representation of a “friend” relation-
ship, might not be adequate to capture the multitude and complexity of the specific
relationships. Besides the relationship role, other factors such as (perceived) compe-
tency, the exchange context (i.e., being a provider or consumer), and trust also influ-
ence the relationships between users. Hence, a Social Cloud should provide the abil-
ity to augment standard social graphs with additional (meta-)data, which can then be
used to model relationships more adequately and to potentially extract preferences
of users towards one another.
Socio-economic Model The applied resource sharing mechanisms in Social Clouds have
to consider the application scenario as well as the relationships between users. De-
pending on the scenario, different mechanisms might be suitable, and the Social
Cloud should provide the necessary functionality to enable the respective mecha-
nism. In non-enterprise settings, where the focus is on sharing rather than sale
of resources, non-monetary mechanisms (in particular, preference-based matching)
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promise to align the social setting of the platform with the advantages of market-
based allocation of resources such as allocation efficiency and stability.5 Congruent
to the previous challenge, a Social Cloud has to provide the means for users to express
their sharing preferences.
Platform Facilitation A Social Cloud needs certain computational resources to provide a
basic set of functionality (such as user management) and to facilitate the actual re-
source exchange. The use of third-party resources to host the platform would require
a revenue model (or similar) to cover the expenses, and might contradict the concept
of voluntary resource sharing. An option to alleviate this challenge is to follow a
co-operative model which implies that users provide resources not only for sharing,
but also to support the platform itself in the form of infrastructure resources. Such a
co-operative infrastructure model is introduced in Chapter 4.3.
2.1.4. A Prototype Social Compute Cloud
In order to demonstrate the usefulness and viability of a Social Cloud, this section describes
a prototype of a Social Compute Cloud in which participating users can share virtualized
computing resources with friends of their social network (Caton et al., 2014). A Social
Compute Cloud is designed to enable access to compute capabilities in the form of Virtual
Machines provided by socially connected peers, and users are able to execute programs on
these contributed, virtualized resources.
Architecture and Implementation of a Social Compute Cloud
Building on the previously described general architecture of a Social Cloud (Figure 2.2),
and addressing the challenges mentioned before, Figure 2.3 shows the architecture of the
Social Compute Cloud and its core components. The Social Cloud Platform provides the
technical implementation details which are needed to facilitate the resource exchange. To
enable the actual sharing of virtualized resources, the Seattle framework is used as resource
middleware component as it largely provides the needed functionality such as sandboxing
(Cappos et al., 2009; Zhuang et al., 2013). Seattle is an open source P2P platform designed
to create a distributed testbed to easily create distributed applications. It was chosen as the
basis for the implementation due to its lightweight virtualization middleware that is used
5This is the focus of the second part of this thesis. Chapters 5 and 6 introduce and evaluate concepts of
preference-based sharing.
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to enable application execution on contributed resources, and its extensible clearinghouse
model.
Considering the socio-economic model that governs the resource exchange, a social clear-
inghouse encompasses the implementation of preference-based matching algorithms, as
well as a module to capture the user preferences. A new social clearinghouse that leverages
these connections is implemented as the original Seattle clearinghouse did not consider so-
cial connections and did not provide the functionality for preference-based allocation of re-
sources. The implemented algorithms are the matching algorithms described in Chapter 5.
For the specification of sharing preferences, the implementation provides an interface that
allows users to specify a preference rank for each user in their social network that is also
part of the Social Compute Cloud. Given the outcome of the matching algorithms, users
are assigned to contributed and available resources. For the access to underlying social
network, the platform uses a Facebook application to access a users’ social network data
(as well as providing a means for authentication). The platform also provides databases to
store social network data as well as data about the provided and requested resources.
















Figure 2.3.: Architecture of a Social Compute Cloud and its Core Components
The prototype has been evaluated in a proof-of-concept study in (Caton et al., 2014). As a
next step, the prototype should be studied as a test system with real users. The feedback
of the deployed system would then serve to potentially improve the implementation and
design of the Social Compute Cloud, and also to get data about how users interact with
the system and other users. Such feedback can provide additional insights in actual user
behavior, for example considering their incentives to participate on the platform and the
process how they specify their preferences.
A complementary methodology to study Social Clouds is to use a simulation-based ap-
proach. For this reason, the next section introduces a simulation tool that is used through-
out the thesis to model, simulate and analyze aspects of a Social Cloud.
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2.2. Simulating Social Clouds
As Social Cloud scenarios begin to become more commonplace, it is important to under-
stand the intricacies of the corresponding exchange system. A primary example is the be-
havior of the system as a product of its users’ actions and interactions, as these define how
the system performs. This is important, as resource exchange systems naturally include
a high level of complexity stemming from the dependencies between the decisions of sin-
gle users and the behavior of their peers and extended peers, i.e. friends of friends. This
challenge is aggravated by the different relationship types that can exist between users and
the social context that is attributed to a given relationship type by a user. These contexts
can also be different between users, but ultimately mean that a user’s behavior strongly
depends on the relationship types that exist within their resource sharing community and
the users they interact with. Therefore, in order to adequately design Social Clouds, many
experiments on user behavior and user management are required. Similarly, in the wider
context of computationally supported science (e-Science), a tool that can help in the de-
sign and study of resource exchange communities will aid in the understanding of their
dynamics, but also in the design of new mechanisms to improve different parts of their
performance.
Given the social setting and myriad of potential user profiles for Social Cloud platforms,
studying system behavior with a purely analytical approach may be inflexible or even un-
solvable. Instead, a simulation environment can be a suitable methodology to study the
behavior of complex systems. Doing so will allow not only the testing and analysis of new
aspects of these systems. It also enables the investigation of which aspects of underlying
social circles and communities are important in their design, and the identification of meth-
ods to capitalize upon these observations. A key opportunity that such a simulation tool
opens up is the ability to merge observations of exchange situations from existing systems
or lab experiments of usage. A simulation tool can help not only in the design of such sys-
tems, but also in identifying and pre-screening case studies and experiments to observe real
users as well as further analysis of completed user experiments to test and form hypothe-
ses about resource exchange in social settings. In other words, a simulation approach is
a useful complementary methodology in the study of dynamic, complex resource sharing
systems.
This section provides details of the simulation tool (Social Exchange Simulator (SES)) de-
veloped for this task. Application scenarios are described in Section 2.2.1, and Section 2.2.2
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provides a discussion of related work. Finally, Section 2.2.3 describes the architecture of the
simulation tool. The main parts of this section have been published in (Haas et al., 2012).
2.2.1. Purpose and Potential Applications
In the context of engineering, testing and introducing Social Cloud, the designer has to
anticipate the behavior of the platform under certain conditions. Several standard method-
ologies are applicable for this task in general.
1. Theoretical analysis of system properties.
2. Prototypical implementation and simulation of expected system behavior.
3. Empirical observation of user and system behavior.
The simulator targets the second methodology: based on certain assumptions about user
intelligence, behavior and certain system properties, it is able to study dynamic system be-
havior and, for example, the predicted response of users to certain changes on the system
rules. It is necessary to emphasize that such a simulation tool derives its value by being
complementary to other research methodologies. It cannot substitute the insights a sys-
tem designer can get from using the other methodologies, but rather provide additional,
complementary results that are helpful in the design of a resource sharing platform. For
example, the simulation tool can be used in a system that is complex enough that analytical
predictions are not feasible and at the same time is not implemented, leading to a lack of
data about actual user behavior.
In the context of designing a Social Cloud, there are various apparent use cases how sim-
ulation can benefit the development process. In particular, the SES can be used to study
following sample questions:
Incentive Schemes Do certain incentive schemes achieve more sharing activities? What
attributes of an incentive scheme are most useful for certain user types? How does an
incentive scheme have to be adjusted to reflect a change of user types in the system?
User Types and Network Structure What is the effect of user availability on system per-
formance? How is the exchange affected by different utility function distributions of
users (e.g., having more selfish users)? How does the network structure (e.g., random
versus small-world structures) affect collaboration? How many links between users
have to exist before the exchange activities are effective?
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Co-operative Infrastructures Is it feasible to let the users of a Social Cloud platform pro-
vide its infrastructure? What is the influence of the user characteristics, such as their
availability or inherent willingness to share, on the feasibility of this approach?
Resource Exchange and User Strategies How do users select if and how much they ex-
change? What effects have different exchange mechanism on the resource allocation?
What is the effect of different learning strategies on the resulting exchange behavior?
Resource Allocation Mechanisms Given a certain supply and demand of resources,
which allocation mechanisms yield the best outcome considering certain market ob-
jectives? What are the effects of different preference structures on the performance of
the considered algorithms?
In particular, several of the mentioned scenarios are also applied in this thesis. Chapter 4
presents case studies concerning the design of incentive schemes and co-operative infras-
tructures, and Chapters 5 and 6 apply the SES in the context of allocation mechanisms.
2.2.2. Requirements and Related Tools
The incorporation of aspects such as social network connections and relationship types
into resource exchange simulation yields specific requirements that the SES has to address.
Therefore, this section first defines the requirements for such a scenario. The second part
of the section compares relevant existing simulation tools and identifies why it is necessary
to create a new simulator that is suitable for social resource sharing settings.
Requirements for the Social Exchange Simulator
In order to facilitate the engineering process of Social Clouds, the SES has to be able to cor-
rectly model and adequately represent such a system. This involves the representation of
the users, their incentives, behavior, and relationships to other users; the underlying net-
work with its (potentially dynamic) topology; and the interaction and resource exchange
mechanisms that exist within the system.
Flexible User Model The scenarios of social resource sharing can be diverse, and this
needs to be reflected by the user model. In some cases, a user model might include
specific incentives for certain actions, in other cases characteristics such as user avail-
ability might be an important design aspect of the simulation. Hence, rather than
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predefining a certain type of user model, the SES should allow for a flexible specifi-
cation and at the same time provide the necessary classes to facilitate the modeling of
various user characteristics (such as availability).
Integration of Social Network Topologies The topology of an underlying social network,
and especially the position that a user has in the network, can have important con-
sequences on the behavior of both the system and the user. For example, the impor-
tance of a user in a network can depend on the respective position, such as being a
link between different groups that enables the dissemination of information. Another
example is the implementation of different feedback mechanisms, which can also be
affected by the specific network structure. For these reasons, the SES has to be able to
model different network topologies (such as random, small world, etc.), and compute
certain metrics based on the user position in the network.
Representation of Relationship Types As discussed earlier, relationships between users
can be of various types, and the types might affect the interaction between them (and
thereby affect the entire system). The relationship type, for example, can affect the
respective preference for sharing specific resources with another person, or can in-
fluence the level of trust towards that person. Therefore, the SES should provide the
means to model various types of relationships to study how specific types (or distri-
bution of types) can affect the interactions between users.
Implementation of Different Resource Exchange Mechanisms The exchange of re-
sources between users can be facilitated by many different mechanisms. The
simulator has to either model or provide the means to incorporate different types of
resource exchange mechanisms and allow for a seamless integration and switch of
the used exchange mechanism. In particular, due to the focus on preference-based
matching, it has to provide the means to compute allocations based on two-sided
matching algorithms.
Comparison to Other Simulation Tools
The design and development of simulators as general-purpose tools has been prevalent in
many adjunct areas. This section briefly outlines the most relevant work for the SES in
general.
Simulation tools can be broadly divided into two categories:
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1. Multi-purpose simulation tools that provide the tools and means to implement custom
simulations.
2. Specialized tools that focus on certain use cases and provide specialized functionalities
for these use cases.
Table 2.1.: Comparison of Simulation Tools


















Haas et al. (2012)
Table 2.1 shows an overview of the related simulation tools according to their category, and
the degree to which they fulfill the previously introduced requirements. The tools of the
first category all belong to the group of general-purpose simulation tools. Due to having
the best match with respect to the mentioned requirements, the tools RepastSimphony6,
NetLogo7, and MASON8 are selected for comparison. These tools represent a system as
collection of (often intelligent) agents with certain policies, and the system behavior is de-
termined by the interactions between these agents. Most related simulation tools provide
functionality for modeling networks, graphs, and interactions between users. The user
model is usually quite flexible and can be extended by adding custom extensions. How-
ever, whereas RepastSimphony, NetLogo, and MASON provide built-in social network
functionalities (which are, however, restricted to the provided libraries and not easily ex-
tendable), the inclusion of relationship types for interactions is only partially supported
and would need extensive customization. Furthermore, none of the three mentioned sim-
ulation tools has built-in support for resource allocation mechanisms, which are a central
requirement.
6http://repast.sourceforge.net/ – last accessed May 2014
7http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/ – last accessed May 2014
8http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/ – last accessed May 2014
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The second category includes specialized simulators such as GridSim (Buyya and Mur-
shed, 2002), SimGrid (Casanova et al., 2008), and CloudSim (Calheiros et al., 2011) for the
study of complex Grid and Cloud Systems, respectively. These simulators provide tools
specifically catered for the needs to represent complex Grid and Cloud system, including
resource allocation mechanisms. The extension of the user model would involve extensive
customization in both cases, as this was not the primary purpose of these tools. Unfortu-
nately, neither of these three tools provides support for including social network aspects or
the integration of relationship types between users. PeerSim (Montresor and Jelasity, 2009)
focuses on simulating (large) P2P systems. It provides modules to define the underlying
network topology, yet the user model is not very flexible and resource exchange mecha-
nisms are missing entirely. From a more technical point of view, OverSim (Baumgart et al.,
2007) is able to simulate P2P overlay networks, and was developed for the simulation of
overlay protocols. Although it provides functionality to model different types of under-
lying networks, due to the more technical use case it is not very suitable for simulating
social exchanges. Furthermore, the tool SIGVerse (Inamura et al., 2010) was developed to
model social interactions between humans. However, its focus is more on simulating direct
interactions between single humans (or artificial agents), and does not consider resource
exchange or underlying network connections.
From a comparison of the technical specifications of the mentioned simulation tools, as
presented in Table 2.1, it is apparent that no single simulation tool fulfills all the necessary
requirements for the given scenario. Based on this observation, two approaches can be
pursued: either the extension and customization of an existing tool, or building a separate
simulation tool. As the functionalities provided by existing tools is mostly limited to the
included libraries and customization would have to take the dependencies between new
and existing libraries into account, the design of a separate simulation tool was considered
to be the best decision.
As an agent-based representation is a very natural approach to model social systems, where
each user (agent) is assumed to have a certain level of intelligence, the principle of agent-
based simulation is adopted for the SES. Using existing libraries for social network inte-
gration, it provides its own libraries to model different relationship types and resource
exchange mechanisms, and is thus suited for addressing the design challenges for a sim-
ulator for social resource sharing. The next section provides details about the architecture
and implementation of the SES.
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2.2.3. Architecture
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Figure 2.4.: Layered Structure of the Social Exchange Simulator
Similar to comparable simulation tools (e.g. Buyya and Murshed (2002); Calheiros et al.
(2011)) the SES is built through a layered structure, as this permits the flexible usage and
exchange of single components. The implementation language is Java. Figure 2.4 shows
the package structure of the SES. The architecture distinguishes between three layers: the
component layer, the exchange layer, and the application layer. In addition, the SES con-
tains monitoring sensors in each layer to observe the state of the exchange network as a
whole and its entities, e.g. users, resources, collaboration and exchange mechanisms, etc.
Sensors can be triggered by events, such as a transaction on the market.
As a foundation, the component layer contains the core elements that are common to all
social resource sharing platforms and necessary for their representation. Examples include
the representation of users, resources, different relationship types and the ability to model
trust between users. This can be, for example, implemented through a context-specific
representation, i.e. considering the form of exchange as well as the real world relation-
ship between participating users. The component layer addresses the requirements for a
flexible user model as well as the specification of different relationship types. Above the
component layer, the exchange layer targets the requirement for resource exchange mech-
anisms and defines how the exchange of resources in the platform takes place. Examples
include the Mechanism for exchange (e.g., auctions, reciprocal exchanges, preference-based
matching, donations, and forms of volunteer computing), the Artifacts that represent the ex-
changed resources (single resources, resource bundles, etc.), and the Currency of exchange
(e.g. virtual/sharing credits, preferences, real world currencies, tokens, etc.). Along with a
basic Runtime utility class, which manages the component and the exchange layers, these
two layers form the base packages of the SES. On top of this base, an application layer
contains classes to aid the implementation of applications and scenarios. This includes
the implementation of different network types, such as small-world or random networks,
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in order to address the corresponding requirement. The code base is also not specific for
a simulation environment, and has been designed such that it could also support a real
world implementation of a Social Cloud through, for example, the inclusion of plugins for
social network platforms.
Due to the hierarchical approach, all core and exchange components are designed to be
interchangeable in a plug-and-play fashion. This is done via concrete interface definitions
(specified in an API) and dynamic class loading of interface implementations by the Run-
time. By doing this, users of the tool can flexibly exchange classes to study their depen-
dencies and influences on the system. Key examples here are Mechanisms, which have
a crucial impact on the resource exchange, and Users, who define whether exchange will
take place and in what forms. However, the general interfaces permit the definition of any
Mechanism or User type (e.g. free-rider or altruist, different utility functions, etc.), which
are then managed by the Runtime as plug-and-play components.
Throughout the thesis, the simulation tool will be used to address research questions 1.2,
1.3, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 stated in Chapter 1. For example, in Chapter 4 the SES is used to study
the effects of an incentive scheme on a given system, as well as on different user types.
In the second part of the chapter, the feasibility of a co-operative infrastructure approach
is studied through the SES. Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 use the SES to compare different
algorithms for preference-based resource allocation, their dependency on certain factors
and the effects of preference manipulation on the matching outcome.
2.3. Coordination Challenges in Social Clouds
Common to other sharing platforms, Social Clouds involve certain challenges that system
designers have to be aware of and that need to be addressed to create a sustainable and
successful sharing platform. Specifically, this thesis focuses on two key challenges: the in-
centivization of users, and the market-based allocation of resources. This section, therefore,
introduces and discusses these challenges.
2.3.1. Participation Incentives
The task of identifying and engineering incentives for online-based collaboration and ex-
change systems is challenging and requires a thorough understanding of the related con-
cepts. Active participation is crucial for the survival of a resource exchange platform, as
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computer-mediated communities (such as Social Clouds) require a certain minimum num-
ber of users (critical mass) for sustained activity (Markus, 1987). In contrast to anonymous
platforms, Social Clouds can leverage the connections between users to provide incentives
for continued participation.
To design participation incentives, it is necessary to understand the motivations for users
to participate in the considered system. Motivation theories have been developed that aim
at defining, categorizing, and explaining the types of motivations that act as underlying
drivers of human behavior in certain situations. This understanding of underlying motiva-
tions is crucial for the design of incentives, as participants might have different motivations
in different systems. For example, participants might be motivated through monetary pay-
offs in some systems, whereas more altruistically motivated in other systems, in which case
an incentive scheme should concentrate on monetary incentive in the first, and more in-
trinsic (non-monetary) incentives (such as social comparisons) in the latter case. Thus, this
section starts with an overview and categorization of motivation and incentive types. Sub-
sequently, incentive issues in the context of different scientific disciplines are discussed.
Types of Motivation and Incentives
One of the most common categorizations of motivation types differentiates between the
reasons that lead to a certain behavior or action. A prominent example, which has been
used in a variety of contexts and will also applied in this work, is the classification of
intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. According to Deci and Ryan (1985), these
two concepts can be described as follows:
• Intrinsic Motivation for a certain task means that users find the task itself enjoyable
or interesting (often lacking a directly observable, or separable, reward).
• Extrinsic Motivation stems from situations where the reason for a certain action is
based on a separable outcome, e.g. monetary gain.
Although this coarse distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is broadly used in the
literature, it is often extended to include sub-types of motivation within the two categories.
In contrast to the distinction of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, the classification of sub-
types of motivation and incentives into the two categories is not as clear and still subject
to debate. Additionally, the meaning of different sub-types might differ between different
disciplines and authors. For example, Ryan and Deci (2000) distinguish between four dif-
ferent types of extrinsic motivations depending on the “perceived locus of causality”, i.e.,
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based on the perception of where the motivation emanates from. To provide an overview of
the motivation types that are most relevant for this work, Table 2.2 shows several sub-types
and the their explanations.9
Table 2.2.: Overview of Incentive Classification and Types
Classification Incentive Type Sample Authors
Intrinsic
Altruism Clary et al. (1998)
Fun, Enjoyment Deci and Ryan (1985); Nov (2007)
Ideology Hars and Ou (2001); Lakhani and Wolf (2005);
Nov (2007)
Interest, Curiosity Ryan and Deci (2000); Bishop (2007)
Exchange of Knowledge and Experience Chan et al. (2004); Nov (2007)
Understanding, Learning Clary et al. (1998); Hars and Ou (2001)
Extrinsic
Reciprocity Kollock (1999)
Community Identity Hars and Ou (2001); Lakhani and Wolf (2005)
Reputation, Feedback Kollock (1999); Hars and Ou (2001); Rafaeli
and Ariel (2008)
Finding of and Interaction with Friends Antikainen (2011)
Own Demand, Influence on Development/Growth Hars and Ou (2001); Lakhani and Wolf (2005)
Human Capital, Self-Marketing Hars and Ou (2001); Lakhani and Wolf (2005)
Monetary Reward Hars and Ou (2001); Tedjamulia et al. (2005)
Within the intrinsic motivation types, altruism is one of the most commonly mentioned
types. In economics, altruism refers to “costly acts that confer economic benefits on other
individuals” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, p.785). An example of this motivation type is
the provisioning of resources for volunteer computing projects, in which case the provi-
sioning infers (energy and opportunity) costs for the providing users. Besides altruism,
fun and enjoyment as well as ideology are often mentioned, for example in the case of the
knowledge-sharing community Wikipedia (Nov, 2007). Other types of intrinsic motivation
also include interest and curiosity in the activity itself, the intention to share and exchange
experience, and the learning of new skills and knowledge (Hars and Ou, 2001).
Considering extrinsic motivation types, Table 2.2 splits this category into two subgroups.
The first group (sometimes considered a distinct motivation type besides intrinsic and ex-
trinsic: social motivation), subsumes motivations stemming from interactions with other
users. This includes reputation-based incentives to increase one’s standing within a com-
munity, the finding of and interaction with friends, and the identification with a particular
community. Reciprocation also falls in this category and refers to situations where partic-
ipants either take a certain action as response to a previous action of other users (such as
lending a resource after borrowing another resource from this user), or in anticipation of ac-
tions in the future (considering expected behavior). The second group focuses on extrinsic
motivations which are not directly community-based. This involves participating because
9This classification is not exhaustive, yet provides an overview of the most relevant motivation types for this
work.
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one needs or benefits from the project (for example in case of open source projects), the mar-
keting of one’s skills for career reasons, the increase in human capital, and also monetary
rewards from participation.
Considering the interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, there seems to be a com-
plex and context-dependent relationship between the two concepts which is not necessarily
linear. Having both types of incentives in a system, or adding additional incentives, does
not have to result in an increase in overall motivation, but rather to a reassessment of the
relative importance of the incentive types (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003).
A prominent example of this interplay is the motivation crowding(-out) effect, which shows
that adding extrinsic incentives (such as money) can as well undermine the relevance of
intrinsic incentives and thus affect the actions in an unexpected way (e.g., reducing over-
all participation, see Frey and Jegen (2001)). In the context of donating to charities, Ariely
et al. (2009) study the interaction of intrinsic, extrinsic and “image motivation” (similar to
social motivations), and focus especially on the interaction of image motivation and extrin-
sic motivation. They show that the relative importance of image motivation depends on the
visibility of the specific action, and is higher if other users are able to perceive the actions
of others. Furthermore, Tedjamulia et al. (2005) suggest a framework for user participation
that considers both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, yet do not provide an empirical eval-
uation of their model. Overall, however, the interplay of different types of motivations is
still subject of further research.
After the introduction of different motivation categories and types, approaches and theo-
ries from different scientific disciplines as well as their specific focus and assumptions are
discussed.
Motivation and Incentive Theories in Economics, Sociology, and Psychology
User participation is vital for many economic and social systems, and the incentivization
to induce desired or proper participation and behavior has been a main research focus
over a substantial period of time. Researchers from different fields and disciplines have
developed models of motivation and participation theory that try to classify and explain
the different types of motivations of users. Two views that are directly relevant to this work
are economics and (social) psychology, which try to describe and explain user participation
and behavior based on the respective theories.
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The Economic View: From Traditional to Behavioral Economics
In traditional economic theory, users are modeled as fully rational agents that maximize
their expected payoff/utility in a given scenario (homo economicus, Henrich et al. (2001)). If
rational users engage in a certain (economic) mechanism, e.g. an electronic marketplace, in
order to achieve a desired user behavior the mechanism has to provide appropriate incen-
tives to the rational users. This is the subject of the economic area of Mechanism Design10
which aims at designing mechanisms in a way that prescribes a certain behavior for ra-
tional users (Nisan and Ronen, 1999). For the modeling of such a mechanism, users are
commonly assumed to have certain private information, e.g. their valuations for outcomes
of the mechanism, and a certain range of actions they can take. They are able to formulate
strategies about which action to take depending on the current state of the system. De-
pending on the mechanism, it might not be best for users to reveal this private information
truthfully to the system. For example, they might not provide true information about their
valuations for a certain outcome of the mechanism. An important concept, closely related
to the design of incentives, is incentive compatibility, which is achieved if it is the best strat-
egy of a user to reveal their valuations truthfully. Hence, in Mechanism Design incentives
are provided through rules of the mechanism and the strategies that these rules prescribe
on the (rational) user.
There are various examples of the application of a Mechanism Design approach to pro-
vide certain incentives for participating users. For the design of online resource exchange
platforms, it has been applied in the design of (virtual) credit- or money-based electronic
exchange systems or marketplaces (Golle et al., 2001; Antoniadis, 2004; Anagnostakis and
Greenwald, 2004; Feldman et al., 2004; Ranganathan et al., 2004). For example, Golle et al.
(2001) introduce an exchange mechanism that uses micro-payments to incentivize users
to contribute in the P2P network. As a certain amount of credits is needed to consume re-
sources and credits can be gained by providing resources, such an incentive scheme aims to
encourage participation and resource sharing while at the same time preventing users who
only consume without contributing themselves (free-riders) from exploiting the system.
While such approaches fit nicely in the traditional economic theory and the corresponding
mechanisms have certain (theoretical) properties, over the years it has been shown that
there are several issues with these types of incentive schemes. On the one hand, despite
their nice theoretical properties there seem to be several reasons why especially (micro-)
payment-based schemes are not well accepted (Odlyzko, 2003). On the other hand, there is
substantial critique on the perfectly rational model of users. This is further exemplified by
10A formal notation of Mechanism Design is provided in Section 2.3.2.
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various experiments that show that users do not act purely based on monetary preferences
as usually assumed in traditional economics (see e.g. user behavior in economic games:
Andreoni and Miller (2002); Fehr and Schmidt (2006)).
In contrast to pure self-utility maximization, users might also be contributing to a platform
for other reasons, such as social or ideological reasons (Mowbray et al., 2006). The field
of Behavioral Economics aims at explaining the discrepancy between assumed and observed
behavior of participants in economic systems. Most theories in behavioral economics still
use the concept of utility-maximizing users, yet acknowledge that non-monetary incentives
might influence and explain the observed behavior. The most common approach is to aug-
ment the utility functions with additional factors that model non-monetary concepts. For
example, (expected) reciprocity tries to explain how individuals incorporate the expected
return from other users in their decision process, and inequality aversion assumes that users
want to avoid highly unequal payoffs. Examples for these theories are the theory of eq-
uity, reciprocity and competition (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), the theory of fairness and
reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 2000, 2006), and the concept of social preferences (Charness
and Rabin, 2000). These theories are successfully able to explain a large variety of observed
user behavior in different economic settings, and acknowledge the fact that different users
might put different emphasis on non-monetary motivations.
User Motivation Theories in Sociology and Psychology
Whereas economic theory commonly considers incentives based on the assumption of
utility-maximizing (rational) users, over the past decades (social) psychology has devel-
oped its own set of different motivation theories. Although a comprehensive review of
motivation theories is outside the scope of this section, some theories relevant for the prob-
lem at hand will be introduced.
One of the earliest works, which is still influential in incentive and learning theory, is the
work by Thorndike (1927) and Skinner (1953). Thorndike (1927) describes the “Law of Ef-
fect”, which states that given a certain set of potential actions, which are repeated over time,
the actions that are beneficial are chosen proportionally more often over time, whereas ac-
tions that are detrimental are chosen less often. Skinner (1953) builds on this fundamental
result, which is also the building block of Reinforcement Learning theory, and proposes the
“operant conditioning” theory. It states that actions are motivated by (different types of)
rewards, and differentiates whether the motivations are triggered exogenously (extrinsic
motivations, e.g. money) or endogenously (intrinsic motivations, e.g. fun). Closely related
is the “expectancy-value theory” which considers beliefs about abilities, expectancies for
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success as well as subjective task values as components determining motivation (Wigfield
and Eccles, 2000). According to Ryan and Deci (2000), research that builds on the operant
theory considers intrinsic motivation as a case where the task is the reward itself, and re-
lated research is mainly interested in studying what makes a task intrinsically interesting.
In contrast, research building on the learning theory, which considers a needs-based char-
acterization of motivations, aims at studying which (psychological) needs are addressed
by intrinsically motivated tasks.
Beside reward-based theories, another branch of motivation theory considers the social
fabrics involved in the resource exchange setting. The theories of social comparison (see
e.g. Festinger (1954) and Suls et al. (2002)) try to explain how the motivation of participants
depends on their comparison with their peers. The theory of “social loafing” argues that
users within groups tend to work less (have lower motivation to contribute) than if they
would work individually (Karau and Williams, 1993). Furthermore, the “Common Identity
Theory” and the “Common Bond Theory”, which describe the motivations of individuals
based on their connection to the (social) group, or other members of the (social) group,
respectively, have been applied in the context of designing online communities as well (Ren
et al., 2007). Other theories from sociology include the Resource Theory of Social Exchange
(Foa and Foa, 2012) which provides a framework for analyzing the exchange of several
types of resources, e.g. money or services, in social contexts. Similarly, the Social Exchange
Theory with its focus on organizational behavior considers issues such as reciprocity and
negotiations in social contexts (see e.g. Emerson (1976); Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005)).
Lastly, considering the participation in volunteer scenarios, the volunteering motivations
scale of Clary et al. (1998) distinguishes between six functions that help to explain volunteer
behavior in various settings. Given a volunteer task, value is related to altruistic concerns,
understanding addresses the ability to gain new skills and learning experiences, social con-
siders reputation and social comparison, career targets career-relevant beneficial effects of
participating in the task, protective is ego-related and explains volunteer participation to
avoid negative feelings and guilt, and enhancement focuses on personal development.
Summary
The focus of this section was to provide an overview of concepts and theories relevant
for user participation. First, different motivations to participate and contribute in sharing
and exchange scenarios were categorized. Afterwards, relevant theories from the field of
economics, sociology and psychology were discussed.
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Overall, it can be seen that the incentivization of user participation and the understand-
ing of underlying motivations is a multi-faceted topic with various theories in different
research fields. In particular, there seems to be a complex interrelationship between in-
centives and their relative importance in different scenarios. This also motivates that the
relevant user motivations and incentives have to be identified for the specific scenario at
hand.
Several of the important concepts described in this section will be used in Chapters 3 and
4, which study user incentives in Social Clouds. In particular, several of the mentioned
motivation types will be used to identify relevant incentives in such a setting.
2.3.2. Resource Allocation
Mechanism Design
From the perspective of economic theory, the general Social Cloud setting with users re-
questing and providing resources is an example of a microeconomic system. Given the
economic environment which consists of the participating users, their available resources
and preferences, a humanly-devised institution provides rules how participants can inter-
act with each other and the institution, and determines how the exchange of resources is
structured. Such an institution prescribes a certain behavior on participants and leads to an
economic outcome, e.g., how resources are allocated. The performance of the considered in-
stitution can then be evaluated through certain system performance metrics (Smith, 1982;
Weinhardt et al., 2003).
The previously mentioned task to find allocation mechanisms for Social Clouds is equiva-
lent to designing an institution that governs this exchange process. The field of Mechanism
Design provides the means to formalize this institution design process. A mechanism is de-
fined as “specification of a message space for each individual and an outcome function that
maps vectors of messages into social decisions and transfers” (Jackson, 2003, p.2). In the
realm of resource exchanges, the message space defines how the participants interact with
the market, e.g., how they specify their valuation for a certain resource. The outcome func-
tion then determines a certain allocation of resources, which is often accompanied with the
determination of certain transfers between participants (e.g., monetary transfers).
Formally, adopting the notation by Jackson (2003), participating users i, i ∈ {1, ..., N} have
private information (e.g., about motivations relevant to them). User i’s private information
is represented by its type θi, which is in the set Θi. This type determines agent i’s preference
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for a certain outcome o ∈ O, where O is the set of possible outcomes. The preference (or
valuation) is often modeled as utility function, where ui (θi,o) determines user i‘s utility for
a given outcome, given its type θi. For the comparison of two different outcomes, o1 and
o2, ui (θi,o1) > ui (θi,o2) indicates that outcome o1 is preferred to outcome o2.
From a system perspective, the allocation of resources would determine a certain outcome
which optimizes a desired goal, e.g., the maximization of total welfare. In other words,
given the (potential) types of users, the system designer can define a function f : Θ1× . . .×
ΘN →O that finds the best outcome given the user types (also referred to as Social Choice
Function). As the user types are private information, the system designer has to find a way
to incentivize users to reveal this private information in order to be able to find the best
outcome. This is the goal of the mechanism, which defines rules how users can interact
with the system. More specifically, the mechanism prescribes a certain strategy set Si on user
i, which represents the actions available to user i. It also defines an outcome rule that maps
the strategy set to a certain outcome. A mechanism is said to implement a social choice
function if, in equilibrium, the mechanism yields the same outcome as the social choice
function. A transfer function t:Θ → Rn determines the transfers that result from a given
outcome. As described subsequently, this transfer can have different implementations,
including monetary and credit transfers as well as the complete absence of transfers.
Types of Exchange Mechanisms
The allocation of resources is one of the key aspects of market design. Given a certain sup-
ply and demand of resources, an allocation mechanism determines which request is matched
to a given offer and vice versa. There are many examples where such mechanisms are ap-
plied, ranging from technical applications such as job and Virtual Machine (VM) schedul-
ing on compute infrastructures, to economic applications such as the allocation of products
to consumers. The types of allocation mechanisms that are used in the various settings
can be diverse as well. They range from monetary-based mechanisms like auctions or
fixed-price markets to dynamic negotiation that determines the details of the allocation
and exchange of goods and resources. The most relevant mechanisms can be categorized
as follows:
Monetary-based Mechanisms If the exchange and sharing of resources involves mone-
tary payments, traditional market-based approaches are often used. Examples are
fixed-price systems (such as Cloud Computing marketplaces like Amazon Web Ser-
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vices11) where resources are offered for a specified price, and auction mechanisms
where the price is determined dynamically depending on the current supply and de-
mand (such as auctions on eBay12). Such mechanisms assume that participating users
have a certain valuation for the resources they are interested in, and interact with the
mechanism according to this valuation.
Credit-based Mechanisms Similar to monetary-based mechanisms, platforms with (vir-
tual) credit-based mechanisms use valuation-based matching procedures. The dif-
ference between the two approaches is that credit-based systems do not necessarily
involve real money. For example, users can gain credit by providing resources for
other users, and use that credit to consume resources in return. A key challenge of
such credit-based systems is the management of the currency with respect to credit
value, specifically inflation and deflation due to leaving or arriving users (see e.g.
Irwin et al. (2005)).
Preference-based Mechanisms In many systems where the use of monetary mechanisms
is not feasible, not wanted, or morally/ethically not possible, preference-based mech-
anisms are applied to retain some of the advantages of a market-based resource
matching approach (Roth, 2008). In this case, resources are shared on the basis of
preferences that users have for other users, and the mechanism allocates the resources
with respect to certain criteria (e.g., overall welfare).
Best-effort and Volunteer Mechanisms In such mechanisms, resources are essentially
shared without involving credits or monetary exchanges, or even preferences for
other users. Examples are volunteer platforms without direct reward for resource
provisioning, and Trophy-based systems in which users can gain certain trophies for
sharing resources (such as the volunteer computing project BOINC, see Anderson
(2004)). In contrast to credit-based systems, however, such trophies or other rewards
are not used for the resource exchanges, but rather for the personal gratification and
satisfaction of the users.
Decentralized Approaches Another option is to leave resource allocation to the users
themselves, for example via distributed communication protocols (see e.g. Streit-
berger and Eymann (2009)). The downside of a decentralized self-organizing ap-
proach, however, is that users would most likely have to invest a significant amount
of time in the system trying to get “good” deals, negotiate and in general manage
11http://aws.amazon.com/ – last accessed May 2014
12http://www.ebay.com – last accessed May 2014
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their exchanges. The resulting emergent user behavior would be unpredictable and
potentially inefficient at the system level.
Note that the differentiation of mechanism types considers different implementations of
transfer functions. In monetary mechanisms, the transfer function specifies the monetary
amount that users have to pay or receive, given the determined allocation. For credit-based
systems, instead of monetary transfers the amount of exchanged credits is determined. In
case of preference-based mechanisms, there is no actual transfer of money, credits, or other
remuneration. Best-effort and Volunteer mechanisms also do not involve transfers, yet
also do not provide a market-based type of mechanism. The last example, decentralized
allocation approaches, does not fall into the above categorization as no central mechanism
is designed.
To decide which approach is promising in case of a Social Cloud, the advantages and dis-
advantages of the approaches can be compared. As mentioned before, the social context
and the complex interactions between monetary and intrinsic or social motivations sug-
gest that non-monetary mechanisms are most suitable. Furthermore, decentralized alloca-
tion systems can be problematic in terms of user interaction and feasibility, and can lead
to market failure (Roth, 2008). This leaves centralized, managed market mechanisms as
potential options. Considering credit-based systems, their ability to match resources ac-
cording to the valuations of users and relative supply and demand stands in contrast to
the significant challenges of managing the credit currency. The potentially high interac-
tion of users with the system to determine and submit their valuations for resources can
also be seen as a drawback. In contrast, volunteer or best-effort mechanisms which do not
encompass common market criteria such as system welfare or fairness might be easier to
manage, yet produce allocations that can be sub-optimal with respect to these criteria. Fi-
nally, preference-based matching can be seen as a compromise between market efficiency
and ease of use, which not only addresses the resource allocation problem, but also consid-
ers the social context of allocations.
Two-Sided Matching for Preference-based Resource Allocation
The field of two-sided matching markets is a successful and established means to allocate
resources based on preferences rather than monetary or credit-based valuations. Instead of
monetary valuations, it assumes that users have an ordinal preference ranking with whom
they want to share, i.e., both sides have preferences for the other side. Each side ranks
participants of the other side in an ordinal ranking (with rank 1 being the most preferred
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choice). The objective of two-sided matching is to guarantee that the solutions given by
such a market mechanism satisfy certain desirable characteristics, such as stability, fairness,
or (social) welfare.13
In the context of the previously introduced Mechanism Design notion, a two-sided match-
ing mechanism specifies a message space (users submit their preference rankings and get
the final match), and the outcome function (matching algorithm) matches the preferences
to a certain outcome (specifies which users are matched). The transfer function, in this case,
is not further specified as the mechanism does not use monetary transfers.
Overall, the designer of a Social Cloud platform has the objective to guarantee certain per-
formance criteria for the exchange. This raises an important question: Which economic
systems can be implemented for social resource sharing such that certain economic prop-
erties are still fulfilled? As the described two-sided matching approach is in line with the
social context of the resource exchange in Social Clouds, preference-based matching mech-
anisms will be the focus of Chapters 5 and 6.
2.4. Summary
This section introduced the basic concepts and foundations that are relevant for the the-
sis. First, Section 2.1 introduced Social Clouds as the unifying use case that is applied
throughout the thesis. Furthermore, the prototype of a Social Compute Cloud and details
of its technical implementation were presented. Section 2.2 described the simulation tool
that can be used as complementary methodology in the design of social research exchange
platforms. The simulation tool will be used for several evaluations throughout the thesis.
Finally, Section 2.3 discussed two relevant coordination challenges in the context of So-
cial Clouds: the incentivization of user participation as well as the allocation of available
resources, which are both considered in this thesis.
Based on these foundations, Part II considers the first challenge identified in Section 2.3:
the identification of relevant user participation incentives and the design of corresponding
incentive schemes. Part III of the thesis concentrates on the second challenge, resource
allocation in Social Clouds through preference-based matching.
13Exact definitions of the metrics are provided in Section 5.1.2.

Part II.




Incentives in Social Clouds
“The proliferation of online communities may suggest that the design of a community for a
particular purpose is straightforward. Unfortunately, this is not the case.”
(Cheng and Vassileva, 2006)
ONLINE communities, sharing platforms, and other network-based exchange sys-tems stand and fall by users actively participating on the platform. This seemingly
trivial observation has been a valuable, sometimes harsh lesson for many online communi-
ties during the past decades. A fitting example is the emergence of various social network
platforms and their struggle to achieve a critical mass of users that ensures the platform’s
sustainability (Westland, 2010). Over the course of several years only few of these plat-
forms survived, with Facebook emerging as the most prominent site. Others disappeared
due to a lack of actively participating users.
In the context of Social Clouds, the same important user incentive challenges remain. As
with all market platforms, a resource sharing mechanism such as a Social Cloud depends
on the active participation of its users in creating a sustainable resource exchange. Hence,
providing proper incentives for users throughout their interactions with the platform can
be seen as one of the fundamental challenges in the creation and management of sharing
platforms.
Whereas the importance of user participation is generally agreed on and incentive issues
have been studied for a wide variety of platforms and online communities, the study of
user motivation and incentivization in specific scenarios is still an area of active research.
User motivation can be quite complex and depends on the specific characteristics of the
scenario (see e.g. Ryan and Deci (2000)). For example, the disparity of free-riding behavior
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in (mostly anonymous) public goods markets (such as P2P platforms) stands in contrast
to the considerable quantity of charitable and volunteer activities in other settings (Ariely
et al., 2009). Furthermore, different participation activities such as passively consuming
information compared to active posting of information, are influenced by different factors
and thus require specific stimuli (Koh et al., 2007).
Section 2.3.1 categorized motivation into intrinsic and extrinsic types and discussed that
their interplay is far from trivial. In particular, the design of incentives within a partic-
ular system might have unexpected consequences on user participation (Frey and Jegen,
2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). It is therefore necessary to consider the motivation and
incentive issues in a platform-specific way through the identification and implementation
of incentives relevant for the considered scenario. This chapter introduces and analyzes
incentive challenges in Social Clouds. Its goal is to address research question 1.1 as stated
in Chapter 1.2.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.1 ≺INCENTIVE ENGINEERING What are the stages of participa-
tion and the corresponding relevant incentives that users exhibit in Social Clouds?
For the design of an incentive scheme, several steps must be taken. In the general con-
text of online communities, several distinct user participation stages have been previously
identified (Jones and Rafaeli, 1999; Iriberri and Leroy, 2009). These stages define how users
interact with the community or platform. On social resource sharing platforms such as a
Social Cloud, the interaction of users with the platform seems to consist of different stages
of participation. Starting with the discovery and registration on the platform, participation
can evolve into active contribution and sharing of resources. Hence, the first step is the
identification of different stages of participation during which a user interacts with and
participates in a Social Cloud. This is the focus of the first part of this chapter. This under-
standing of participation stages then helps in the identification of relevant incentives for
each stage, as the importance of certain incentives may change between stages. For exam-
ple, from a platform perspective the signing-up stage has a different goal than the active
participation stage, and different incentives might be necessary (Fogg and Eckles, 2007).
After identifying the relevant participation stages with their characteristics and challenges,
it is necessary to appropriately design and engineer specific incentives to stimulate user
participation in each of these stages. Such a process involves two steps: the identification of
relevant incentives in the particular stages, as well as the discovery of factors that influence
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the relative importance of said incentives. This is addressed in the second part of this
chapter.
Potential motivations and incentives have been discussed in Section 2.3.1. Among the fac-
tors that can have an influence on the perceived relevance of certain incentives for different
users are user characteristics (such as personality profiles), the type of resource that is ex-
changed, and the setting of the exchange (e.g., sharing between friends vs. sharing with
acquaintances).
After an introduction of important concepts and related work in Section 3.1, Section 3.2
identifies the different participation stages of user interaction with a Social Cloud and pro-
vides a discussion of their respective characteristics and challenges. In Section 3.3, the
results of a small-scale web-based survey are presented to demonstrate how relevant user
incentives in the different participation stages can be identified. Finally, Section 3.4 con-
cludes this chapter with a discussion of the findings and an outlook on future work in this
area.
3.1. Participation Incentives in Resource Sharing Platforms
As the need for proper incentivization is universally agreed upon (see Section 2.3.1) this
section extends the incentive concepts introduced in Chapter 2 by providing an overview
of the most relevant related work in the field of online and virtual communities, as well
as similar resource sharing systems. First, due to its close conceptual background, Section
3.1.1 discusses incentives to participate in online communities in general. Second, Section
3.1.2 summarizes incentivization problems in similar systems, among which P2P sharing
networks are a prominent example.
3.1.1. Incentives in Online Communities
Social resource sharing platforms such as Social Clouds are a special form of online (vir-
tual) community. Starting with the work of Rheingold (1993), online communities have
been considered as a type of community that uses and leverages computer technology for
communication among members of the community. The original definition is as follows:1
1The terms online community and virtual community are used interchangeably in this chapter.
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Definition 4 (Virtual Community, Rheingold 1993 ). Virtual communities are social aggrega-
tions that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough,
with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace.
Once online communities grew larger and more important over the years, researchers be-
came more interested in various concepts revolving around these communities. Hence, a
review of related literature is helpful in discussing the concepts that have been discovered
and studied since the beginning of online communities. Among the concepts being dis-
cussed here are perspectives on participation from different scientific disciplines, aspects
such as usability, as well as dependencies between incentives, participation stages, and
user types.
Online Communities from Different Research Directions From an economic viewpoint,
the emergence of cooperation among community members has been studied using con-
cepts such as public and digital goods. For example, Kollock (1999) applies this approach
and further discusses several potential motivations how the cooperation and contribution
of members can be explained, mentioning aspects such as reciprocity, effects on reputation,
and including the community good in the utility functions of its members. From a busi-
ness perspective, Williams and Cothrel (2000) argue that the creation and management of
virtual communities is paramount for successful online businesses. They present several
examples of successful online communities and discuss aspects that have been found to
be critical for the studied communities. Two important aspects are reaching a critical mass
of users and the design of appropriate (communication) tools for the community, which
are used to gain feedback of community members and use it for the development of the
community. Another frequently observed aspect is the recognition of different types of
user motivation for participation (see Section 2.3.1 for an overview), and the existence of
different user types with respect to their contribution (Bishop, 2007; van Dijck, 2009).
Besides economic and business perspectives, in recent years there is an increased effort
in trying to understand the social background of online communities. On one hand, re-
searchers are interested in how the ability to interact and socialize with other commu-
nity members affects the community itself (Preece and Maloney-Krichmar, 2003; Lazar and
Preece, 2002). On the other hand, from a viewpoint of social capital theory the effects of
underlying social networks on the community (considering interaction between and bene-
fits for members) have also been studied. For example, Ganley and Lampe (2009) find that
the structural properties of the social network can impact the perceived benefits for mem-
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bers. This is an interesting implication for Social Clouds, as the position of a user within
the social network might affect the decision to join and participate on the platform.
Usability From a technical perspective, usability has also been identified as important
concept related to participation in online communities (Preece and Maloney-Krichmar,
2003). Considering the relationship of motivation and usability, Wang et al. (2012) apply
a technology acceptance model and structural equation modeling to show that intrinsic
motivation significantly influences the perceived usefulness, the perceived ease of use, and
the actual use of the online community. Furthermore, guidelines and patterns have been
developed that try to encourage user participation and interaction with the platform (see
e.g. Porter (2010)). However, Vassileva (2012) argues that these best practices are gained in
retrospect from already successful platforms, whereas generalized recipes are not readily
available if a platform has to be developed from scratch.
Participation Incentives Considering the lifecycle of online communities and user partic-
ipation therein, it is also recognized that participation can be structured in separate phases
depending on the lifecycle stage in which the community is. Fogg and Eckles (2007) present
a model for a “behavior chain” for user participation. They distinguish between three
phases: discovery, superficial involvement, and true commitment. They illustrate their
model in the context of different web services and discuss implications for the designer of
such a service. Users (or user groups) might also require different incentives depending on
the participation stage that they are in (Jones and Rafaeli, 1999). In other words, incentives
for signing-up and initial participation on a platform might be different than incentives
for continued (long-term) participation. Cheng and Vassileva (2006) discuss that incen-
tives are needed to get a critical mass of participants, yet argue that too many low-quality
contributions (“information overload”) can also be detrimental to the community as some
users might be more inclined to leave in such a case. Therefore, they argue for a balance
of quality and quantity for participating in a resource-sharing community, and propose an
adaptive incentive mechanism that takes into account both the user profile (such as their
reputation) as well as the current needs of the community.
Given that literature identifies several different participation incentives, it is generally
agreed that different users perceive these incentives differently. Hence, this calls for a per-
sonalization of incentives as incentive schemes which do not distinguish between different
user types or user behavior lack the capability of addressing this fact. The theory of “User
and Group (Community) Modeling” is an example how this can be addressed (Vassileva,
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2012). Furthermore, Lampe et al. (2010) apply the “Uses and Gratification” theory as well
as “Organizational Commitment” theory, and find that a “feeling of belonging” to an online
community is a major motivation factor across user types, and that users might continue
participating on the platform for reasons other than the ones they had when they initially
joined the community.
Other aspects that have been studied related to participation in online communities are
different types of recognition (for users) and their effect on participation (Chan et al., 2004),
the effects of social comparison on user contribution in online communities (Harper et al.,
2007), and the application of gamification aspects in online communities in order to further
foster participation and contribution (Deterding et al., 2011).
3.1.2. Participation Incentives in Similar Sharing Systems
Social Clouds are conceptually close to other sharing platforms, thus it is helpful to con-
sider participation incentives in these similar systems. Examples for systems where the
engineering of proper (user) incentives has been studied include file sharing P2P networks
(Golle et al., 2001; Feldman et al., 2004; Anagnostakis and Greenwald, 2004; Antoniadis,
2004; Zhang et al., 2009), Volunteer Computing (Nov et al., 2010), sharing of workflows in
social contexts (De Roure et al., 2009), and even in technical areas such as traffic regulation
in wireless access networks (Liao et al., 2002).
P2P Networks In contrast to a social scenario where there are direct or indirect relation-
ships between users, P2P systems are mostly anonymous. Certain characteristics of P2P,
such as this anonymity and the possibility of whitewashing, i.e. the creation of new identi-
ties, make appropriate incentivization techniques necessary. One of the most severe prob-
lems in P2P networks is free-riding, i.e. the consumption of resources without providing
resources in return. For example, Cuevas et al. (2010) find that only a small fraction of P2P
users create most of its content. Various approaches have been proposed in this setting,
ranging from micro-payments for contribution (Golle et al., 2001), discriminating server
selection and shared history of exchanges/behavior (Feldman et al., 2004), exchange-based
incentives through service prioritization (Anagnostakis and Greenwald, 2004), to the use
of tokens, reputation and service classes for the exchange of resources (Ranganathan et al.,
2004). Novel incentive schemes continue being published, indicating the practical impor-
tance of this research.
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Interestingly, there is evidence that intrinsic motivations are more important than extrinsic
ones which, though sometimes relevant as well, are not considered the dominant motiva-
tion (see e.g. Tedjamulia et al. (2005)). Despite this finding, many P2P incentive schemes
focus on credit- or payment based systems which can be considered extrinsic incentives.
One potential explanation for this is the fact that the P2P networks considered for these
schemes are anonymous, which makes it potentially riskier to rely on pro-social behavior
or generalized reciprocity.
Other Community-based Networks Conceptually close to the use case Social Cloud
are the previously mentioned platforms myExperiment.org and nanoHUB.org. myExper-
iment.org (De Roure et al., 2009) is an example of workflow sharing within a scientific
community. Here, a platform is provided with which researchers can share, adapt and use
scientific workflow processes and experiments, therefore enabling collaboration and the
spread of common workflows. Due to its target group, the main incentive for scientists to
join and participate in the sharing of workflows is the potential improvement of scientific
processes through the use of community-fostered workflows and experiments. Similarly,
nanoHUB.org (Klimeck et al., 2008) allows for the sharing of teaching and research materi-
als on nanotechnology and aims at fostering collaboration in this field. nanoHUB.org uses
virtual credits (“nanos”) to reward contributions such as answering questions in forums.
The amount of credit indicates the level of contribution of a user, and can also be used
to purchase several items in the platform store. Examples of non-scientific communities
are online photo-sharing communities, where different motivations such as enjoyment or
self-development are found to be important (Nov et al., 2010), and social commerce com-
munities where users are able to open virtual stores and are connected to other sellers via
a social network (Stephen and Toubia, 2010). In the latter case, monetary rewards are the
primary incentive to participate in such a community.
3.1.3. Discussion
Summarizing the related work, there are two challenges in the design of participation in-
centives that need to be addressed: 1) the existence of distinct participation stages with
potentially different incentivization requirements, and 2) the acknowledgment that not all
users react similarly to certain incentives, which has to be considered in the design and
evaluation of incentive schemes.
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Despite the described literature on similar systems, the effects of incentive schemes on so-
cial sharing systems require additional research. For the setting of a Social Cloud (or a gen-
eral social resource exchange setting), the different participation stages (such as discovery
followed by active participation) as well as the relevant incentives therein have to be iden-
tified. This is the focus of Section 3.2. In addition, to provide a more general framework
for participation stages in social sharing platforms, factors that influence the importance
of certain incentives need to be analyzed. For example, resource sharing in a professional
setting (i.e., with colleagues, companies, etc.) might emphasize monetary incentives to a
higher degree than sharing with close friends. The survey discussed in Section 3.3 aims to
address these issues. Finally, considering that user types can have different motivations to
participate, the effect of user type distributions on the effectiveness of an incentive scheme
needs to be studied as well. This is subject of the case studies in Chapter 4, which aim at
taking a first step in this direction.
3.2. Engineering Incentives for Social Clouds
Among the first steps in the design process of incentive schemes is the identification of the
different stages of participation that users have with the platform. Only with this insight,
and the incorporation of the characteristics of the participation stages, the incentive scheme
can be tailored to the specific needs of the exchange platform. This section, therefore, pro-
vides a classification of three different participation stages for Social Clouds, as well as a
discussion about factors which influence participation within these stages. This section is
an extended version of Haas et al. (2011).
3.2.1. Incentives During the Participation Lifecycle
The sustainability of resource sharing mechanisms crucially depends on having a critical
mass of active users with continued participation over time. Therefore, in the design of
a Social Cloud, providing appropriate incentives for active participation has to be among
the most important goals. In order to provide appropriate incentives, different stages of
user participation and contribution can be distinguished (Jones and Rafaeli, 1999; Iriberri
and Leroy, 2009). The different stages of a community life-cycle have different goals, e.g.,
starting with aim to get a certain number of registered users and subsequently focusing on
encouraging useful contributions. Hence, there is a changing emphasis within these stages
on which aspects successful communities and sharing platforms must focus on (Iriberri
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and Leroy, 2009). An effective incentive scheme has to address these different stages and
be adaptable for changing requirements (Vassileva, 2012).
The incentive classification scheme presented in this chapter identifies three participation
stages during which users interact with the Social Cloud in different ways. This is similar
to related classifications of user participation phases such as (Fogg and Eckles, 2007), yet
focuses more on the underlying social connections of users. Each stage can be character-
ized by unique goals and therefore has specific incentive requirements. Figure 3.1 shows
the three stages along with the challenges that have to be met. In the first stage, User
Discovery and Registration, potential users of the platform have to be discovered and the
value of participating on the platform has to be communicated to them. The next stage,
User Participation, addresses the challenge of incentivizing registered users to actually
offer resources, while at the same time discouraging free-riding behavior. The last stage,
Social Behavior in Resource Sharing, is closely intertwined with the second stage, yet fo-
cuses on social aspects. If users actively participate and provide resources, they should
have incentives to adhere to certain social behavior. For example, the platform might im-
plement agreements that specify the responsibilities of the sharing partners in the resource
exchange. A desired behavior, in this case, could be providing the resources according to
the agreement rather than defecting from the offer if a request arrives, or not to engage
in malicious behavior such as intentionally providing incorrect feedback about other users
(Petri et al., 2012).
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Figure 3.1.: Participation Stages and User Incentivization Problems
Stage 1: User Discovery and Registration
Before users can participate in a resource exchange, they have to be made aware of its
existence and be invited to join the corresponding platform. Here, several steps can be
distinguished, namely discovery, invitation, and registration of potential users.
For the discovery of users the existing relationships between members of the platform with
potential users can be utilized. Both direct discovery through manual invitations as well
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as automatic discovery, e.g. through automated advertisements or scraping of the social
networks of users, are feasible. In case of manual discovery, existing users can be incen-
tivized to find new users by, for example, bonus programs where the user gets a certain
amount of credits or other benefits for each invited user that joins the platform. Gamifi-
cation aspects can also be utilized for this task (Deterding et al., 2011), e.g., by providing
badges or trophies for successful user invitations. In case of automatic discovery, mining
of available data through the underlying social network platform can be applied to auto-
matically identify and suggest users. Similar to the process of user discovery, invitations
can then be sent either manually, or automatically. If potential users are discovered and
invited to join the platform, their decision depends on their motivation and the incentives
to join the platform. Here, too, several incentivization schemes are possible. For example,
invited users who join the platform may receive a sign-up bonus, e.g. credits, or may be
awarded priority functionality during a certain time after their subscription. The actual
form of incentivization will most likely depend on the specific application scenario.
An important issue that has to be considered is the concept of trust. For example, if the
platform (and thereby the social network) gets larger users might not be direct friends of
each other, and with such an increase in size and complexity new assumptions about trust
may be necessary. The problem of trust transitivity is particularly interesting in this case.
Some approaches simply consider the existence of trust transitivity and calculate indirect
trust relationships through multiplication of direct relationships (Golbeck, 2005). Transitiv-
ity of trust might be, however, highly user-dependent, making such a general assumption
problematic. Caton et al. (2012) discuss these and other aspects of trust, specifically in the
context of Social Clouds.
Stage 2: Encouraging Active Participation
After the discovery and subscription of new users, they have to be incentivized to actively
participate on the platform and offer resources. Only if a certain, critical mass of actively
participating users is achieved, will the platform be sustainable (Preece and Maloney-
Krichmar, 2003). A lack of participation is considered a danger for such virtual commu-
nities (Rafaeli and Ariel, 2008).
Tackling the Free-rider Issue Providing incentives for participation is closely connected
to the free-rider problem. Naturally, users may perceive the consumption of resources as
beneficial whereas the provision of one’s resources usually induces costs of some sort, e.g.
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power consumption. It is a well-known problem in online communities that users may not
have adequate incentives to actively participate, which leads to a small number of contribu-
tors and a large number of passive consumers. Whereas the contributors actively engage in
the community and make up much of the overall participation on the platform, the passive
users, sometimes referred to as “lurkers”, consume resources without providing resources
themselves (Bishop, 2007; van Dijck, 2009). Example communities where this phenomenon
can be observed are P2P networks (Adar and Huberman, 2000), open-source communities
(Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003), and the platform Wikipedia (Tapscott and Williams, 2007;
Priedhorsky et al., 2007). Hence, it is necessary to design the platform in such a way that
users profit from contributing. In the long run, this ability will be one of the make-or-break
factors of a resource sharing platform.
User Heterogeneity Another issue is the potential heterogeneity of user types with re-
spect to their motivations to participate and contribute. Previous work (see e.g. Andreoni
and Miller (2002) for user behavior in social settings) has shown that in exchange scenarios,
different user types can be distinguished which have different perceptions and motivations
to contribute. This poses a significant challenge in the design of a resource exchange plat-
form such as a Social Cloud. For the design of incentives, this has the crucial implication
that incentives have to be provided that address all or most of the potential user types of
the community. Ideally, the incentive scheme takes the different user types into account
and provides individualized incentives (Vassileva, 2012). One common form of incentive
schemes that try to address both free-riding behavior and heterogeneous user types are
schemes where users obtain participation points or rewards from contribution, and are
only allowed to participate in case they can provide enough points or a high-enough level
of previous participation (see e.g. Ranganathan et al. (2004) on P2P systems).
User participation also crucially depends on the chosen economic allocation mechanism.
Depending on the type of user and the application scenario, different market mechanisms
provide different incentives for active participation. This issue is elaborated in Section 3.2.2.
A case study how heterogeneous user types can be addressed in the design of an incentive
scheme is provided in Chapter 4.2.
Stage 3: Incentivizing Social Behavior
Even if users share and offer different types of resources, it is not guaranteed that they will
adhere to their offers and provide the resources as anticipated. Considering the social set-
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ting, social behavior in this case can be defined as the adherence to the platform rules and
agreements, as well as refraining from malicious behavior. The willingness to provide re-
sources is a necessary first step to get a reasonable amount of offers as well as heterogeneity
that increases the attractiveness of the sharing platform, yet it is not a sufficient condition
for actual resource sharing. Only if the providers actually adhere to their offers the sharing
makes sense. That is, resource providers should have the incentive to fulfill their (volun-
tary) obligations and really provide the services. This is also true for resource consumers,
as they should be incentivized not to damage other users’ resources, e.g., not store illegal
of harmful data on other users’ machines or use offered VMs to execute malicious code.
Social Service Level Agreements There are several important aspects how a desired so-
cial behavior can be induced in platforms such as Social Clouds. One option is through
the design of (resource or trading) agreements as well as their enforcement. Unlike the
design of these components in other markets for electronic resources or services where
agreements are often described by Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and enforcement is
achieved through penalties when SLAs are violated, other aspects have to be considered
in a socially-oriented scenario such as a Social Cloud. As the sharing of resources is, in its
essence, voluntary, standard SLA and penalty approaches are not suitable. This calls for
the development of a new type of SLA that considers these issues (see e.g. Michalk and
Haas (2011)). One of the premises of a Social Cloud is that real-world relationships should
be utilized in the resource sharing mechanism, yet the sharing and trading of resources
should have no negative effect on these real-world relationships. Hence, the specification
of resources to be shared through hard SLAs may not be an ideal approach as (volunteer)
consumption of resources is, in many cases, not business driven. Furthermore, enforce-
ment through monetary or other penalties can be counterproductive. For example, if a
friend fails to deliver the agreed-upon resource this is not comparable to when a company
fails to deliver business-critical services. Hence, the design of SLAs that are able to address
the mentioned specifics of sharing in social contexts is a necessary task, which however is
outside the scope of this work.
Trust and Reputation Systems Another attempt at fostering social behavior in online
(sharing) communities is the design of a trust or reputation system (see Jøsang et al. (2007)
for an overview of related models). By giving users the ability to provide feedback about
other users’ actions, the trust and reputation schemes aim to discourage malicious behavior
through indirect enforcement. In other words, even though users might not have interacted
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directly beforehand, the trust and reputation system allows them to obtain information
about each others’ previous behavior. Examples for such trust models are SocialReGreT
(Sabater and Sierra, 2002), EigenTrust (Kamvar et al., 2003), PeerTrust (Xiong and Liu, 2004),
and PowerTrust (Zhou and Hwang, 2007), all of which are focused on establishing a reliable
trust rating for (potentially anonymous) user-based networks. Another example is Petri
et al. (2012) who apply a feedback-based trust model to P2P cloud communities, a setting
very similar to a Social Cloud.
From the viewpoint of the incentive scheme, the second and third stage are closely inter-
twined. Incentive schemes usually have the goal to increase participation or encourage
certain actions in a system, thereby inherently focusing on the second stage. However, as
the incentive scheme prescribes rules in the system (such as which interactions are possible
based on the contribution score of a user), these rules might affect the behavior of users
in the third stage as they determine the potential action of a user. From a game-theoretic
viewpoint on incentive systems, besides the specification of agreement and enforcement
structures, the concept of strategically acting users has to be taken into account as well. In
this context, users are said to be acting strategically if they pursue some personal goal and
take into account the potential actions of other users while trying to achieve this goal. In
other words, users try to find the strategy that is most beneficial for themselves, potentially
irrespective of the effects of this strategy on other users or the system.
3.2.2. Factors Influencing the Participation Incentives
The importance of certain incentives throughout the user life-cycle depends on the actual
characteristic of the specific scenario. On one hand, design characteristics of the platform
affect user incentives, namely the relationship types of users given the underlying social
network, the applied market mechanism, and the specific application scenario. There are
complex dependencies between these factors, which are addressed in this section. On the
other hand, users might have personal motivation to participate in a Social Cloud indepen-
dent of its actual implementation. This issue will be considered in the next section.
Application Scenarios and Market Mechanisms As discussed in Chapter 2.1, there is a
wide range of application scenarios for SCs, which are differentiated by the specific types
of resources that are shared (e.g., storage or VMs), the use case (sharing among friends vs.
sharing for a research project), and the organizational setting of the scenario with respect
to the participating users (private users vs. sharing between companies).
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Considering these examples it is clear that the choice of proper incentives depends on the
actual application scenario, as users’ motivation might be quite different in certain do-
mains. In purely social or volunteer scenarios, currently implemented systems such as my-
Experiment (De Roure et al., 2009) suggest that intrinsic motivations, fostered by Trophy
or Reciprocation mechanisms, provide sufficient incentives to share resources. In contrast,
extrinsic motivations (e.g., credits such as nanos on nanoHUB.org) might be necessary to
incentivize strategically acting users in enterprise scenarios. A universal incentive system,
thus, is not promising, and the application scenario and its intricacies have to be taken into
account in the design of the system.
Relationship Types Besides the application scenario, other factors influence the choice of
an appropriate incentive mechanism. Although Social Clouds build upon the inherent trust
relationships between users, the level of trust depends on the type and strength of users’
relationships. Ties between users can be different based on the different social groups (fam-
ily, friends, acquaintances, etc.), or the frequency of interaction. The classification between
strong and weak ties is an example for such different strengths of relationships (Granovet-
ter, 1973).









Figure 3.2.: Example of Relationship Types and Resource Sharing Incentives
Consider, for example, the situation shown in Figure 3.2 where a user has different types
of relationships with other users of the underlying social network. Suppose that three
groups can be identified: Family and close friends, colleagues and acquaintances, and the
remaining group of other people which include people where the friendship only exists
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in digital form. The definition of such groups of friends is already available, for example
through relationship lists in Facebook or circles in Google+. As one can imagine, a user
might have different incentives to share with users in each of these groups. Intuitively,
one would rather share resources with family members than with strangers without direct
personal connections. Consider, for example, computation or storage of sensitive data. A
user most likely will trust family members or close friends to be reasonably careful with
data (given certain technical prerequisites), but this may not be the case with purely online
“friends”.
Therefore, it is useful to distinguish the incentives to share and the expected rewards with
respect to these groups. Whereas users might share altruistically with users from the first
group and do not expect direct compensation due to the high level of trust, the weak rela-
tionships in the third group might require direct rewards, such as receiving virtual credits,
for the sharing of resources between these groups. In practice, however, it is a nontrivial
task to infer the relationship type or strength of users based on interaction data within a
social network (Xiang et al., 2010). For example, close friends might not use social network
platforms to interact frequently as they have other means of communication. Hence, the
incentive design of a Social Cloud should offer the users flexibility in the choice of how
resources are exchanged and if some form of compensation is required.
Market Mechanisms Another factor that influences user incentives is the choice of mar-
ket mechanisms, which can also both depend on the application scenario and on the rela-
tionship type (and thus the level of trust) between the users. Consider, again, Figure 3.2.
Building on the previous reasoning, certain market mechanisms seem to be more appro-
priate for trading with different types of relationships. For resource sharing with users of
the first group, purely volunteer or reciprocal mechanisms may be most appropriate as the
closer relationships might infer a sense of reciprocation. In this setting a high level of trust
is present and users expect no immediate reward in return or trust other users that they will
share resources in the future. On the other hand, for exchanges with users of the second
group Trophy, Reputation or Credit mechanisms may be adequate and offer certain advan-
tages. For example, reputation can compensate the lower levels of trust between the users
by providing additional information about other users, and credit systems would allow
users to accumulate credits which they can use for resource consumption. Finally, due to
the lower trust levels between the user and members of the third group, credit-based sys-
tems or other monetary mechanisms might provide the only form of reasonable incentives
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to engage in trading (see e.g. the multitude of credit- or activity-based incentive schemes
in anonymous P2P sharing communities summarized in Section 3.1).
3.2.3. Design Implications for Social Clouds
This section points out several important aspects concerning participation incentives in
Social Clouds. First, it is necessary to obtain an understanding of the relevant motivations
of potential participants throughout the identified stages of the participation lifecycle. Only
with knowledge about different user types and their respective motivations it is possible to
design incentive schemes that consider the important, platform-specific intricacies. Second,
the relevance of certain incentives is affected by several factors such as the application
scenario or the exchange mechanism. The interplay between the different user types as well
as their interaction with the incentive scheme and the exchange mechanisms implemented
on the platform can be quite complex and hard to predict. This should be acknowledged
in the design of incentive schemes, and a design process utilizing sensitivity analyses with
respect to user type distributions can provide useful additional insights.
In order to address these aspects and challenges, the next section aims to get an under-
standing of the relevant user motivations and incentives to participate in a Social Cloud. In
addition, Section 4.2 of the next chapter shows how the simulation tool presented in the last
chapter is a complimentary methodology in the design of Social Clouds. By simulating the
introduction of an incentive scheme, the non-trivial effects of that scheme on the different
user types of the system will be studied.
3.3. Identifying Relevant User Incentives
The previous sections introduced the various incentive problems that a market designer for
a resource sharing platform needs to consider. Whereas these considerations were mainly
driven by theoretical work and empirical observations of similar systems, it is necessary to
identify the relevant incentives for users of a particular system and sharing scenario. For
this reason, a small-scale web-based survey was conducted as a first step to get a better
understanding of incentives for potential users. This survey can be seen as a pre-test of
a more in-depth study of incentives relevant for individuals or certain user groups.2 The
2Ideally, such a survey would be coupled with a prototype of the system in question, and target the users of
the prototype. As the technical SC prototype was not ready to deploy at the time of the survey, this was
unfortunately not suitable.
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focus of this section, therefore, is to describe the web survey and its results, aiming at
identifying relevant incentives for sharing platforms such as a Social Cloud.
3.3.1. Goals and Design of Web Survey
Identifying relevant incentives is necessary for all three participation stages as discussed
earlier in Section 3.2.1. The survey discussed in this section focuses on the first two stages,
as the last stage (incentives for social sharing behavior) is inherently dynamic and requires
feedback from participants that have used the system in practice. Being closely related to
research question 1.1, the goal of the survey is to answer following questions:
1. What types of resources have users shared previously, with whom did they share
them, and what are the relevant motivations for previous sharing?
2. What are relevant incentives to join a sharing platform and actively share resources?
How does this depend on the previous experience, the sharing scenario (private vs.
professional networks), the use case (sharing of storage) as well as the personality
type?
The first goal was to identify the previous experience of the survey participant with other
sharing systems. This includes questions about the resources that have been shared, the
platforms that have been used as well as the user groups the resources have been shared
with. Such information is important for a system designer as the (subsequently asked)
sharing incentives might be different for users based on their previous experience. The sec-
ond goal was for users to provide information about their perceived importance of certain
incentives, such as monetary compensation or altruism.
Together with the additional data gathered during the survey, which besides the men-
tioned previous experience also includes demographic data and a short personality test,
this allows for an exploratory analysis of the importance of relevant incentives for certain
user types. To limit the survey length, the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI, Gosling
et al. (2003)) was used instead of the longer standardized questionnaires to assess person-
ality types. Additionally, two sharing scenarios were distinguished, sharing in a private
network vs. sharing within a professional network, in order to identify potential differ-
ences based on the sharing scenario. In a private network, sharing occurs between friends,
whereas the focus of the professional network is to share between colleagues, co-workers
and classmates.
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Survey Implementation The survey was implemented in English and German using Sur-
veyMonkey3 and consisted of three main blocks. The first block considered questions about
previous sharing behavior. If the survey participant previously shared resources in similar
settings, questions about the previously used platforms, shared resources, and the motiva-
tions to share these resources are asked. Given that users, independent of their previous
sharing experience, are interested in sharing resources in similar settings, the second block
studies the motivations to participate and actively provide resources in two hypothetical
sharing scenarios. The goal of this block is to identify if there are differences in the impor-
tance of certain motivations between the scenarios, which considered sharing in a private
(friend) network compared to a professional (business) network. Finally, the last block
concluded the survey with the aforementioned personality and demographic questions.
Given that participants of the survey do not necessarily have experience with previous re-
source sharing, or are not even interested in sharing resources, the survey included two
additional questions that acted as filters in the processing logic. The first filter asked par-
ticipants if they previously have shared resources, and either directed them to the first
block of questions, or to the second filter question. This second filter asked survey partic-
ipants if they are in general interested in sharing resources. With a positive response, the
participant was directed to the second block of questions, otherwise to the demographic
questions. Appendix A shows the logical structure of the survey (Figure A.1), as well as
the survey questions.
The survey included closed questions with a given set of answers to choose from as well
as open questions. For the questions involving assessment or evaluation, a 6-point Likert-
scale was used.4
3.3.2. Evaluation
Having introduced the survey goals and logic, this section presents the results of the on-
line survey. In particular, the results considering the research questions are addressed.
3http://www.surveymonkey.com – last accessed May 2014
4There is currently no consensus if a scale with even or odd options should be preferred. On one hand,
using a scale with an even number of options cannot represent a truly neutral opinion, and by forcing
the participant to choose a non-neutral option might thereby bias the results (Schnell et al., 2011; Garland,
1991). On the other hand, having an odd number of options and using the midpoint can be used to avoid a
tendency or to get through the survey as quickly as possible, potentially without reading or thinking about
the questions. In such a case it could not represent a truthful statement and hence bias the result as well
(Weijters et al., 2010).
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Especially, the following demographic statistics show that the participants reflect the lo-
cal (student) community to a high degree. Hence, it is not a representative sample of the
population, which is why the results and potential implications of the survey have to be
interpreted carefully.
General Statistics and Demographics The survey was conducted over a period of two
months from December 2012 to February 2013. In total, 172 people participated the survey,
whereof 126 fully completed it (73.3%). Of the 126 completed responses, 5 are not consid-
ered for the evaluation due to not meeting the data validity criteria. In particular, these five
responses contained participants that could not have possibly read all answered questions
thoroughly in time (lower time limit 1 minute if all blocks were answered), checking the
same item on the Likert-scale for all answers, or being extremely contradictory in their TIPI
answers (putting themselves on the opposite extremes for the personality factors). This
leaves 121 fully completed and valid responses which are considered for the subsequent
evaluation.5
Considering language, 86.0% of the participants completed the German version of the sur-
vey, and 14.0% the English version. This indicates that the main pool of participants was
probably sourced locally. Nearly three quarters of respondents were male (73.9%), which
also indicates that mostly local people participated as this reflects the local gender distri-
bution at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. The majority of participants were in the
age groups of either 20-25 (46.2%) or 26-35 (35.3%). Students make up the majority of par-
ticipants (61.4%), followed by employees (30.3%). 8.3% either list another profession or
preferred to not answer this question. In addition, over half of the respondents have a
university degree (55.4%), and 36.2% have a high school diploma or “Abitur”.
Previous Resource Sharing Experience The first block of the survey asked participants
about their previous experience in sharing resources online. This block was answered by
119 out of the 121 participants, meaning that 98.3% of participants had such previous ex-
perience.
First, the participants were asked which online platforms they previously used to share
resources. For the given sample, the majority of participants used email, DropBox or other
(private) social networks to share resources online (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A). Other
Cloud- or P2P-based platforms are also frequently used, for example Google Drive, P2P
5Including the not considered 5 responses does not change the presented results significantly.
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Figure 3.3.: User Groups with which Resources were Previously Shared Online
platforms and own servers. Interestingly, professional networks are used much less fre-
quently than private social networks to share resources online (13% vs 74%). Besides the
platform for sharing, participants were asked which type of resources they previously
shared (Figure A.3 in Appendix A). Whereas resource types such as files, pictures, and
music are common as expected, it also shows that both lecture notes and sample solutions
are shared frequently, which can be explained by the high number of students in the given
sample. Furthermore, storage is shared by approximately 24% of the participants, which is
relevant for another question later in the survey.
Figure 3.3 shows the user groups with which the participants have shared resources online.
Sharing among direct friends, relatives, and classmates is very common, whereas fewer
participants share resources with users they only know indirectly or online. This can be
an indication that the necessary level of trust to facilitate sharing is higher for these user
groups.
Finally, the last set of questions in the first block considered the incentives that were impor-
tant for participants in their previous online resource sharing experience. The participants
were asked to rank the relevance of certain incentives, where 1 on the Likert-scale corre-
sponds to “not important” and 6 is “very important”. The results are shown as boxplots
in Figure 3.4. The data reveals that direct requests from other users, general altruism and
helpfulness, as well as the own benefit of sharing are considered the most important in-
centives by the majority of users. Social reputation and other forms of compensation are
less important for most users, and financial compensation is considered least important.
These results indicate that direct compensation is not necessarily a driver in resource shar-
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Figure 3.4.: Incentives for Previous Online Resource Sharing
ing, participants rather seem to include strategic considerations such as reciprocity in their
decision to share resources online, as shown in the high importance of “own benefit”.
Incentives for Registration and Sharing After considering the experiences of previous
online resource sharing, the second block of questions in the survey studied the impor-
tance of certain incentives in hypothetical resource sharing scenarios. This covered the first
two stages of the sharing lifecycle, namely incentives to register as well as incentives to
actively participate. Furthermore, the scenarios distinguished between sharing in private
social networks (such as Facebook) and professional social networks (primarily used for
business and professional networking, such as LinkedIn), to investigate if users have dif-
ferent incentives to participate in resource sharing based on the type of relationships they
have with other people in the network.
There are several interesting results that can be seen in Figure 3.5. Considering sharing re-
sources with other users in a private network (e.g., non-colleague friends), the relevant in-
centives for registration and active participation on the platform are quite similar, as shown
in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b. The most important incentives are requests from close friends, as
well as the own benefit from sharing (e.g., expected reciprocity). Furthermore, curiosity
and helpfulness also are important for many participants, yet less important than the pre-
viously mentioned incentives. Financial compensation is, similar to the case of previous
resource sharing in Figure 3.4, the least important incentive for most participants.
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Figure 3.5.: Survey Results for Registration and Participation Incentives in Private and Professional
Networks
The results were also compared using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test as the data was not nor-
mally distributed. The statistical evaluation showed that in private networks, monetary
compensation (p = 0.01), helpfulness (p = 0.01), as well as curiosity/fun (p = 0.05) are con-
sidered more important for the participation stage. In professional networks, a statistically
significant difference in the importance between registration and participation incentives
could not be detected.
The Difference of Private and Professional Networks Users might perceive private net-
works differently to professional networks. Hence, it is interesting to see if the relevance
of the considered incentive categories are different for users across these two types of net-
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works. The comparison of incentives in private and professional networks in Figures 3.5a
and 3.5b reveals interesting results. In both network types, the personal benefit (expected
reciprocity) is the most important incentive for both registration and active participation,
even more important than direct requests. Furthermore, curiosity and fun plays a lesser
role in case of professional networks, and financial compensation is slightly more impor-
tant in this context (which is in line with the previous arguments in Section 3.2.2).
As discussed previously, the relative ranking of the incentive categories between the net-
work types is similar, yet there also seem to be differences in the level of importance. Com-
paring the differences of participating in private networks compared to public networks,
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to compare the differences between the two types of
networks as the data was not normally distributed. For the different types of incentives to
join such a platform, the test detected significant differences in Monetary Compensation
(more relevant in professional networks, p < 0.001), Reputation (more relevant in profes-
sional networks, p < 0.001), and Curiosity/Fun (less relevant in professional networks,
p < 0.001). Considering the incentives to actively provide resources in private versus pro-
fessional networks, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test found significant differences in Direct
Request (less relevant in professional networks, p = 0.001), Monetary Compensation (more
relevant in professional networks, p = 0.012), Reputation (more relevant in professional
networks, p < 0.001), Curiosity/Fun (less relevant in professional networks, p < 0.001),
and Helpfulness (less relevant in professional networks, p = 0.029).
As the sample size is rather small, these results are merely a tendency, yet confirm some of
the expectations and reveal several interesting facts. The results show that in general, ones
own expected benefit as well as direct requests are the most important incentives for both
private and professional resource sharing networks. However, there seem to be subtle
differences originating from the different context of sharing, where sharing with friends
tends to place a higher emphasis on curiosity and helpfulness, and sharing with colleagues
leads to a slightly higher emphasis on monetary compensation.
Sharing of Storage Space The last set of questions in the second block considered a sce-
nario in which storage space is shared between users, allowing other users to store data on
the participant’s machines. The questions were framed in a way that indicated that such
storage would be completely safe for the storage providers due to security and encrypting
techniques. As storage sharing is a relevant use case and already implemented on cer-
tain platforms, the aim of this question set was to identify the necessary user groups and
relationship types for which participants might be willing to share storage resources.
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Considering the user groups that participants are willing to share storage with, the results
show that besides a small minority that either is not willing to share storage at all or willing
to share with everybody, most participants would be willing to share with family, relatives
and close friends (see Figure A.4 in Appendix A). About 30% are also willing to share
with classmates and colleagues, yet only a small subset of participants would be willing to
share storage with friends of their friends. This also indicates that most participants require
a certain level of trust towards the other user in order to allow sharing of storage space. In
particular, assumptions about trust transitivity have to be handled carefully as the results
for friend-of-friend relationships indicate that the perceived level of trust considerably de-
creases for indirect connections. This is confirmed in Figure A.5, which indicates that users
specifically require close relationships for sharing of electronic storage space.
The Influence of Personality Type on Sharing Incentives After the previously discussed
questions about incentives for online resource sharing, the survey closed with some short
demographic questions as well as the TIPI. The aim of including the TIPI questions was
to potentially identify if certain incentives are more relevant for certain personality traits.
Figure 3.6 presents an overview of the participants’ personality profiles based on the ten














Figure 3.6.: Survey Results for Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)
As the sample size is rather small, and the TIPI cannot provide as thorough a personality
trait classification as the longer Big Five Inventory can (John et al., 1991), the results of the
correlation analysis have to be interpreted with care. Table 3.1 compares the mean and
standard deviation of the answers to two other data sets, the original TIPI data set (Gosling
et al., 2003) as well as a German adaption of the TIPI questionnaire (TIPI-G, Muck et al.
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Table 3.1.: Comparison of Survey TIPI Scores with original TIPI scores (Gosling et al., 2003) and
TIPI-G (Muck et al., 2007)
Data Sample
Size
Extrav. Agreeabl. Consc. Emotional
Stab.
Openness
Survey 121 4.30 (1.38) 4.72 (1.05) 5.23 (1.16) 5.01 (1.14) 5.17 (1.03)
TIPI 1126 4.56 (1.48) 5.26 (1.12) 5.47 (1.13) 4.85 (1.45) 5.43 (1.06)
TIPI-G 175 4.87 (1.21) 5.20 (0.95) 5.85 (0.93) 5.10 (1.20) 5.49 (0.97)
(2007)). Although there are small differences, overall the values are similar to the other
data sets. Unfortunately, even if there are tendencies in the data, the sample size is also too
small to conclusively identify significant correlations between personality traits and the
importance of certain incentives except for some cases.
Despite these issues, there are some results that are noteworthy to discuss. First of all,
there is an expected significant positive correlation between ’Extraversion’ and ’Openness’.
Further positive correlations are between ’Extraversion’ and ’Conscientiousness’ as well as
’Emotional Stability’, and between ’Conscientiousness’ and ’Emotional Stability’ (see e.g.
Tables A.1 and A.2).
Considering TIPI and relevant previous sharing incentives, there is a significant positive
correlation between ’Conscientiousness’ and direct requests as well as general helpfulness
(see Tables A.1 and A.2). For sharing in private networks, both in case of registration and
participation incentives ’Extraversion’ is significantly positively correlated with monetary
compensation, reputation, own benefit and curiosity/fun, yet only in the participation sce-
nario there is a significant correlation between ’Extraversion’ and requests of close friends.
Additionally, ’Agreeableness’ is positively correlated with helpfulness (see Table A.3). In
professional networks, also both for registration and participation incentives, ’Extraver-
sion’ is significantly positively correlated with requests from friends, own benefit, curios-
ity/fun, and reputation. Furthermore, in these cases ’Openness’ is also significantly pos-
itively correlated with curiosity/fun and helpfulness, indicating that these incentives are
more relevant for people considering themselves more open (see Table A.4).
In summary, these results provide a good basis for further investigation of relevant in-
centives, especially targeted at more specific scenarios. The insights gained by this short
survey are helpful in getting an overview of participants’ attitudes towards sharing, their
potential willingness to share with indirectly connected network users, and different rela-
tive importance of incentives based on the type of relationships between the users.
76 Incentives in Social Clouds
3.3.3. Discussion
The survey results shed light on the relevance of certain incentives for sharing in a So-
cial Cloud. In particular, for the registration and participation on such a platform, non-
monetary incentives (such as helpfulness, curiosity, fun, and reputation) have a higher
relevance than monetary compensation, which is similar to findings from literature. Con-
sidering relationship types, the sharing of resources with close friends is more prevalent
than the sharing with acquaintances or indirect friends.
Table 3.2.: Relevance of Incentives for Private and Professional Networks, Mean and Standard De-
viation
Incentive Private Professional Stat. Difference(p=0.05)
Registration
Request Close Friends 4.69 (1.26) 4.45 (1.27)
Monetary Compensation 2.34 (1.39) 2.88 (1.64) X
Reputation 2.66 (1.40) 3.35 (1.55) X
Curiosity/Fun 4.13 (1.28) 3.43 (1.44) X
Helpfulness 3.99 (1.25) 3.98 (1.29)
Own Benefit 4.76 (1.15) 4.81 (1.24)
Participation
Request Close Friends 4.85 (1.24) 4.50 (1.29) X
Monetary Compensation 2.67 (1.61) 3.04 (1.73) X
Reputation 2.83 (1.49) 3.31 (1.52) X
Curiosity/Fun 3.92 (1.37) 3.46 (1.46) X
Helpfulness 4.31 (1.06) 4.07 (1.20) X
Own Benefit 4.74 (1.17) 4.70 (1.25)
The results also show differences in the relative importance of certain incentives with re-
spect to the sharing scenario. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the difference in said
relevance. Monetary compensation overall is of lesser relevance than other incentives, yet
more important in professional settings. In contrast, curiosity/fun is of higher importance
in private settings.
The identified relevant incentives also have to be considered in the design of a Social Cloud.
For example, the relevance of direct requests implies that corresponding interaction capa-
bilities between users should facilitate such direct requests. Considering resource sharing
in social contexts, the findings show that the specific sharing scenario has to be taken into
account for the incentivization of users. In particular, the importance of non-monetary in-
centives emphasizes the necessity to implement allocation mechanisms that are not based
on monetary transactions or compensations.
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3.4. Summary
This chapter identified and discussed the explicit need to address user participation incen-
tives in Social Clouds. Its aim was to address research question 1.1. Section 3.2 proposed
a model in which three participation stages are distinguished, namely User Discovery and
Registration, User Participation, and Social Behavior in Resource Sharing. Additionally,
factors that influence the importance of incentives, such as the application scenario, rela-
tionship types and the applied market mechanisms, were identified. An online survey was
conducted to identify potential differences in the importance of incentives within differ-
ent stages, and its results discussed in Section 3.3. The results show that non-monetary
incentives such as altruism, fun, or expected reciprocity are more important then monetary
compensation, which is in line with the Social Cloud assumptions. Regarding factors that
influence the importance of incentives, the results indicate that for the given scenario and
participation pool, the setting of the network (private vs. professional) influences the im-
portance of certain incentives such as monetary compensation. Furthermore, users prefer
to share resources along stronger relationship types, i.e., favor sharing with friends over
sharing with colleagues or friends of friends. In contrast, for the given scenario the im-
portance of the considered incentives was similar in both the registration and participation
stage.
As discussed before, the identification of user participation stages as well as the relevant
incentives in these stages are a necessary first step in the design of an incentive scheme.
As a next step, this knowledge can then be applied in the design of an incentive scheme
tailored to the given scenario. Before adapting and implementing the incentive scheme on
the platform itself, a simulation-based approach can be leveraged to study the sensitivity
of said scheme on changes in the system, e.g., a change in user type distributions. There-
fore, the next chapter presents two case studies that show how incentive and contribution
schemes can be evaluated with respect to different user characteristics.

Chapter 4.
Designing Incentive Schemes and
Co-operative Infrastructures
“It is well known in the public goods literature that in the absence of outside incentives the
individually rational allocation of resources in such an environment will, in general, be less than
the socially optimal outcome.”
(Krishnan et al., 2006)
THE identification of participation stages and the relevant incentives therein is thenecessary first step in the development of an incentive scheme tailored to the specific
needs of a Social Cloud. Based on these insights, incentive schemes can be developed that
incorporate the findings. In practice, the impact of such incentive schemes needs to be
studied to assure that the goals of the incentive scheme are met and that the incentives are
set correctly.
As mentioned before, there are several ways how incentive schemes can be designed and
evaluated, such as implementing the proposed incentive scheme and test it through a pro-
totype system with a test user group, or deriving predictions based on analytical models.
Complementary to these approaches, a simulation-based study can be particularly helpful
when evaluating through a prototype is not possible or feasible, e.g., in the early devel-
opment stages of a system or when changes to the system are expensive and the effects
need to be predicted beforehand. An example for such an application is the prediction of
the effects of changing user groups and user behavior, and their impact on the efficiency
of the incentive scheme. Simulation-based approaches have been advocated before for use
in the design process of incentive systems in online communities, see e.g. Mao et al. (2007)
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and Ren and Kraut (2011). Hence, such a simulation-based approach in the engineering of
incentive schemes is the focus of this chapter.
This chapter illustrates how incentive schemes can be designed and studied using a
simulation-based approach by presenting two case studies. Specifically, this chapter aims
to answer research questions 1.2 and 1.3. Section 4.1 describes the user model that is used in
both case studies. In Section 4.2, the first case study develops an incentive scheme with the
aim to encourage resource contribution from users. During the case study, the (dynamic)
effects of the incentive scheme on the overall system, as well as on different user types,
are evaluated. The second case study, which is presented in Section 4.3, models a platform
for which the necessary resources are co-operatively provided by the platform users them-
selves. Specifically, it aims to study the suitability of different contribution schemes (i.e.,
how users contribute to the co-operative infrastructure) for the considered platform. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the case studies.
4.1. User Model
Users in the case studies are described by several characteristics, which include:
• Resources: Users have a resource endowment, which can be of several resource types.
They can offer parts of their resources and may request resources from other users.
The resources are generally described by amount and type.
• Objective: The goal of the users, in general, is assumed to be the maximization of
their utility function. In this case, the objective is generally to maximize the (positive)
difference of benefits (e.g., through consumption of resources) and costs (e.g., for
offering resources).
• Availability: As users are probably not available all the time, their availability can
be described by respective distributions. For example, Javadi et al. (2011) identify
several user groups for the Volunteer Computing project SETI@home with distinctive
distributions for availability and unavailability intervals.
For ease of reference, Table 4.1 provides an overview of the parameters that are used in the
case studies.
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Table 4.1.: Model Parameters
Parameter Description
β Convexity parameter
λ Degree of altruism
p Relative price of providing or sharing resources
ωi,r Resource endowment of user i and resource type r
r Resource type
ρi,r Percentage of resources of type r that user i shares
si,t Contribution score of user i at time t
σi,r Percentage of resources of type r that user i reserves for own purposes
σi,min Minimum amount of resources that user i reserves for own resources
Πi,o Amount of resources that user i reserves for own purposes
Πi,s Amount of resources that user i shares
τi,r Utility parameter from consuming resources from other users
Resources In the case study model, each user i has an endowment of (computing) re-
sources ωi,r available, where r ∈ R indicates the resource type. They can use them either
for (self-) consumption or provision them to other users or the infrastructure. The percent-
age of resource type r that the user consumes or reserves for their own purposes is denoted
by σi,r (this includes not using the resources at all, i.e., idle resources). Similarly, δi,r is the
percentage of resource type r that user i shares with other users (or the infrastructure in the
second case study).
The cost for resource provisioning is indirectly determined through the parameter p: the
higher p, the higher the relative cost of providing resources compared to consuming them
or leaving them idle. As users only have a limited amount of resources available, for each
user i the following endowment constraint has to be fulfilled:
σi,r + pρi,r = 1 (4.1)
This indirect approach of modeling costs was chosen for following reasons: first, model-
ing an explicit cost function requires assumptions about its components and their relation.
For example, although there are studies that model energy costs for computer systems,
their exact form (especially for different resource types) is hard to determine (see e.g. El-
nozahy et al. (2003)). In addition, the detailed measuring of energy consumption and costs
requires additional equipment such as smart meters, which might not be available to all
users. Second, one might question if explicit cost considerations have a major influence on
the decisions of users in social contexts. While this might be true for anonymous systems
such as P2P, it is not clear if users explicitly take into account the costs for supporting a
resource request of a (potentially indirect) friend.
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Objective Using the standard economic approach, users are assumed to optimize a cer-
tain utility function. In contrast to classic economic theory, however, the utility function
is not modeled as being purely dependent on the consumption and costs of resources. As
the concept of social or other-regarding preferences and a multitude of studies have shown,
for their decision making users might take other users’ behavior and consumption into ac-
count (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (2000); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Andreoni and Miller
(2002); Falk and Fischbacher (2006); Fehr and Schmidt (2006)). Hence, the case studies
model a user’s decision through a utility function that incorporates these aspects.
Specifically, the user model makes use of utility functions studied by Andreoni and Miller
(2002). They provide general utility functions that can explain findings from economic ex-
periments in which a significant amount of subjects exhibit altruistic behavior, which is
in contrast to the traditional economic principle of self-interest and rational utility maxi-
mization.1 More specifically, altruistic behavior in this case means that a user “is willing to
sacrifice own resources in order to improve the well being of others” (Fehr and Schmidt,
2006, p.620). This is the case when users provide resources for others or the platform in-
frastructure, as they incur costs (not being able to use the resources themselves) but their
contribution increases the performance of the system. Andreoni and Miller (2002) show
that through correct parametrization of the following utility function (Equation 4.2), altru-
ism can be included in economic decision making. Their approach is used for two reasons:
1) the given setting closely resembles a public goods game where users incur costs for pro-
viding resources to the public (other users or the co-operative infrastructure), and in this
case self-interest and altruism are often used as the most relevant parameters that charac-
terize the behavior of users (see e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher (2003)). 2) Their utility function
is able to capture various forms of utility functions, from classic substitutive and Leontief2









1Based on certain assumptions, it is common in economics to describe the preferences that users have with
respect to an outcome (such as resource allocation) with a utility function that implements these preferences
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002). Andreoni and Miller (2002) also showed that this utility function is able to
explain empirical data of several laboratory games which are conceptually very similar to the considered
scenario, specifically that a user’s actions affect the utility of other users.
2In a Leontief utility function, the utility depends on the minimum value of the given components:
U(x1, x2) = min{x1, x2}. See e.g. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 49).
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Here, Πi,s denotes the self-consumption of resources of user i, and Πi,o denotes the pro-
visioning of resources. As mentioned before, σi,r is the percentage of resource type r that
the user reserves for own purposes, and ρi,r the percentage of resource type r that they
share with other users. β is a parameter that defines the convexity of the preferences, and
λ defines the degree of altruism.
Besides consuming their own resources and giving their resources to other users, users gain
a certain utility from successfully served resource requests, denoted by τi,r. For simplicity,
this is assumed to be linear in the percentage which is served by other users, with limits
[0,1]. In other words, the more of their resource requests are fulfilled by other users, the
higher the respective utility. τi,r is included in the utility function as shown in Equation
(4.2) because, in some sense, the utility from consuming other resources can be considered
similar to consuming one’s own resources. Furthermore, note that τi,r does not directly
depend on (and hence cannot be directly influenced by) the decisions of user i, as it depends
on the number of resources that the other users provide.
Furthermore, each user belongs to a certain utility type as identified by Andreoni and
Miller (2002). The different types and the parameters of the utility function are summa-
rized in Table 4.2. Besides three types with different values for β and λ (types 4-6), types
1-3 describe special shapes of the utility function. Type 1 models selfish users who only re-
ceive utility from resource consumption, having no inherent incentive to provide resources.
Type 2 models a classic Leontief utility function, and type 3 models the case when self-
consumption and provisioning are perfect substitutes.
Table 4.2.: List of Potential Utility Function Types based on Andreoni and Miller (2002)
Type Function Size λ β Description
1 Ui = ∑λ Πi,s,λ 0.227 - - Selfish




0.142 - - Leontief
3 Ui = ∑λ Πi,s,λ + Πi,o,λ 0.062 - - Perfect Substitutes
4 see equation (4.2) 0.245 0.319 0.621 Weak Selfish
5 see equation (4.2) 0.162 0.529 -0.350 Weak Leontief
6 see equation (4.2) 0.162 0.736 0.669 Weak Perfect Substitute
Using the individual contribution to the system as the altruistic parameter is not the only
possible way of modeling “social” behavior; alternatives can be studied as well. For exam-
ple, instead of individual contributions, the average utility of other users could be used.
Other possibilities are to use the average contribution and/or consumption amount in the
84 Designing Incentive Schemes and Co-operative Infrastructures
system, or the average amount of successfully satisfied requests.3 While undoubtedly in-
teresting, these aspects are left for future case studies.
Based on their utility function, each user will choose their individual optimal values for ρi,r
and σi,r depending on their level of altruism and the convexity of their preferences. Note,
however, that a user might wish to reserve a minimum level of their endowment, σi,min,
for other usage (such as private use or sharing with friends). In the model, this would be
equivalent to reserving a certain percentage of ωi, and only have (1− σi,min)ωi potentially
available for usage. As this is equivalent to an adjustment of user i’s available resource en-
dowment, in order to avoid making the model unnecessarily complex this aspect is omitted
in the remaining model.
4.2. Case Study: Designing Incentive Schemes
Having identified the participation stages of users as well as relevant incentives for re-
source sharing in Chapter 3, the next step is the application of this knowledge in the design
of an incentive scheme for Social Clouds. To achieve this, the findings have to be trans-
formed into a suitable incentive scheme, which is the focus of this case study. It investi-
gates the effects of an incentive scheme on the considered sharing platform and its users to
encourage the contribution of resources to fulfill on-demand computing requests of users.
The case study is an example how a simulation-based approach as described in Section 2.2
can be used in combination with the previously gained insights in the design and engi-
neering of an incentive scheme. The section is an extended version of Haas et al. (2012). It
starts with an outline of the scenario in Section 4.2.1, and describes the simulation model
in Section 4.2.2. The case study is evaluated in Section 4.2.3 and the findings discussed in
Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1. Scenario
The case study builds on the work of John et al. (2011), and Thaufeeg et al. (2011) who an-
alyzed how the Social Cloud concept can be used to augment traditional Volunteer Com-
puting by leveraging social networks to encourage participation. It builds upon the ba-
sic premises of volunteer computing that users contribute to “worthy” projects, retaining
3Consider the following simple example to explain why such an approach can make sense: a user contributes
a data set to a community or colleague and consequently a new discovery is made which benefits that user
or the community as a whole. In that case, the benefits for the other users might influence the individual
contribution of resources.
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the argument that if user communities leveraged their social relationships as sources of
resources, their accessible compute power would exceed that of existing volunteer com-
puting projects (John et al., 2011).4
In the given scenario, a user can request certain technical entities/resources that are
needed, e.g. for a specific scientific project. Examples could be a BOINC-like project (An-
derson, 2004) that mainly requires computing cycles as resources, or more complex projects
that require more than one resource type, e.g. databases, memory, and so on. An exchange
of virtual machines as presented in Chapter 6 is also possible. The request of the user is
then advertised to other users in their Social Cloud. These users decide whether or not to
supply the required resources. In general, the more links to other members a user has in the
system, the higher the potential supply of resources and thus the likelier it is that a request
can be entirely fulfilled. The main objective of this case study is to evaluate the effects of a
trading constraint (TC) on the system, specifically the effects on different user types.
4.2.2. Modeling an Incentive Scheme
User Behavior
The user model builds on the utility function presented in Section 4.1. Without loss of
generality, Πi,s and Πi,o can be general functions that describe how a user’s utility depends
on the consumption and provisioning of resources. This case study, for simplicity, only
considers Equation (4.2) with Πi,s (σi,r,τi,r) = σi,r + τi,r and Πi,o (ρi,r) = ρi,r, i.e., the users’
utility is linearly dependent on the consumption and provisioning percentage, respectively.
Note that the components σi,r, ρi,r and τi,r are normalized to the range [0,1]. This is done
to make different resource types comparable in the utility function, assuming an equal
importance of resource types for the users.5
The optimal level of resource consumption and (through the endowment constraint) also
for provisioning can be calculated through the derivative. Depending on the relative price
for resource provisioning, users select a certain percentage of their resources that they con-
tribute to other users. Assuming that the utility function can be segmented into a sum of
4This is based upon the number of users in Facebook (1.19 billion monthly active users in 11.2013, see
http://tinyurl.com/fb-size), that an average user havs 190 friends see http://tinyurl.com/
fb-anatomy (last accessed May 2014), and the assumption that sharing also occurs between friends of
friends.
5The model can be augmented to capture user-specific preferences for different resource types, which is, for
ease of understanding, omitted in this case study.
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functions (one for each resource type), and the types are independent of each other, the

















∀r ∈ R (4.3)
Note that the maximization is only meaningful for either σi,r or ρi,r, as one determines the
other, and τi,r only depends on the amount of resources that other users provide and cannot
be directly influenced by user i.6
While the percentage of provided resources as in Equation (4.3) might be individually op-
timal when utility maximization is considered to be the goal of the users, one might ask if
there are other, system-centric goals that are more in line with the philosophy of the system.
One such example could be the percentage of resource requests that can be fulfilled.
Incentive Scheme
While a utility function only models the willingness to contribute, given assumptions or
data on the distribution of user types and the respective parameters, a sharing platform
without additional rules might not induce the proper incentives for each user group to
participate in resource sharing. Hence, an additional trading constraint is introduced as a
type of incentive scheme in order to limit the effects of free-riding and incentivize users to
increase their resource contributions.
The trading constraint is similar to the incentive scheme described by Ranganathan et al.
(2004) and other contribution-based schemes. The main idea of the incentive scheme is that
each user receives a contribution score based on its contribution to the Social Cloud, and
each user can only trade with other users that have a lesser or equal contribution score. In
other words, if si(t) is the score of user i at time t, a trade can only occur with users j for
which sj(t) ≤ si(t). Increasing one’s score allows the user to select from a broader base of
other users to satisfy resource requests, which affects the probability that resource requests
are fulfilled (and thus has an influence on the utility).
6Note further that for utility type 5, restricting the range to [0,1] would yield a theoretical optimum of σ = 1,
due to asymptotic conditions. However, as this is unrealistic, 1 is excluded from the optimization, in which
case equation 4.3 applies again.
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Ranganathan et al. (2004) argue that this is an effective incentive scheme in P2P networks,
leaving free riders with little options but to increase their participation if they want to
continue using the network. However, they did not study the effect of the incentive scheme
on the system itself, e.g., considering performance metrics such as number of different files
(resources) shared in the system. Different user types, which might be adversely affected
by the constraint, were also not considered.
For the evaluation this case study looks at two system performance measures:
1. The average utility of users
2. The number of satisfied requests
Intuitively, one might suspect that introducing a trading constraint reduces both average
utility (due to the utility of free riders being lowered) and successful allocations (as the
supply for a request is shortened for users with lower contribution scores). However, as
users gain utility also from successful requests in the system, increasing their contribution
could increase the number of successful allocations (more supply), and thus in turn increase
their utility again. This case study evaluates which of these effects prevail.
Contribution Score The contribution score consists of two weighted components as
given in Equation (4.4).7 As a baseline, κ1 = κ2 = 0.5, is used, i.e., an equal weighting






The first component, squantity,i, is calculated based on the quantity of resources that a user
provides, giving an incentive to provide more resources to increase the contribution score.
While this is, for itself, not necessarily beneficial for the system, as a user can provide huge
amounts of resources that are not needed by other users at all, quality and relevance of
resources can also be included. The quantity score of a resource is determined through
Equation (4.5). Over a certain time period (Tc), the maximum contribution of all users is
determined, and the contribution of every user is normalized by that maximum such that
7More components can be easily integrated. Examples are quality, relevance to the system, and diversity of
resources.
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The second component of the contribution score, sscarcity,i, is the scarcity of a resource, which
is determined through Equation (4.6) as the relative amount of requests vs. offers. The
higher the ratio, the scarcer a resource is, and providing scarcer resources yields higher







The relative scarcity of a resource can be determined by Equation (4.7), where ri,r are the





An s-shaped scarcity function is used to normalize the scarcity value to the interval [0,1].
Equation (4.8) defines this function, where κT is a threshold value that can be set to specify
the amount from which a resource is considered is scarce. This approach allows for mod-
eling flexibility by allowing to set different thresholds for different types of resources.
ψr =






· ηr − π2κT (κT + 2)) +
1
2 for 1≤ ηr ≤ κT
1 for ηr > κT
(4.8)
Trust-based Allocation Matching
Given the resource requests from other users, the selection process of a user has to be mod-
eled. In this case, trust-based resource allocation is used. Each user has a certain (resource-
specific) trust value with every other user, which depends on previous experiences between
the users (granted and fulfilled resource requests leading to higher trust).
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Initially, in a real-world Social Cloud users can categorize their friends with respect to
trust values. In the simulation, the initial assignment of trust values is based on the net-
work structure. Directly connected users are randomly assigned to trust scores according
to ϑ ∈ [0.5,1.0]. For not directly connected users the initial assignment is based on trust
transitivity. As argued by Golbeck (2005), trust is to some degree transitive, meaning that
the direct trust scores on the path of an indirect relationship can be used as a proxy for in-
direct trust. However, the exact degree of transitivity is not clear, and the survey results in
Section 3.3 indicate that trust to a friend-of-friend is considerably lower than trust for users
with a direct social connection. For this reason, and as repeated multiplication for indirect
relationships of a higher degree quickly decreases the corresponding trust value, the case
study assumes that trust is transitive for friend-of-friend relationships, and that the initial
trust value for connections involving more than one friend in between the users is set to
zero.
The trust score dynamically changes based on the rating that each user gets from other
users for the provisioning of resources or services. Similar to the trust-based recommenda-
tion system described in (Walter et al., 2008), users are able to provide feedback about the
quality of resource provision, where χr,j,i(t) denotes the feedback of user j about user i for
resource type r.
The update of trust values is done through following formula:
ϑi,j,r(t + 1) =
wt · ϑi,j,r(t) + (1− wt) · χr,j,i(t) for χr,j,i(t) ≥ 0.5(1− wt) · ϑi,j,r(t) + wt · χr,j,i(t) for χr,j,i(t) < 0.5 (4.9)
In this formula, wt is the weighting factor that determines the smoothness of the moving
average, i.e., how fast new information (positive or negative feedback) χr,j,i(t) ∈ [0,1] is
taken into account (where user j rates user i). For values wt ∈ [0.5,1], this update scheme
propagates negative effects fast and positive effects slow, which is representative for the
property of trust (Walter et al., 2008), and is also aligned with trust aspects in Social Clouds
(Caton et al., 2012). In the simulation, wt = 0.75 is used as baseline value for this reason.
To study the sensitivity of the system with respect to this update rule, an alternative trust
update scenario (ATU) with wt = 0.25 is studied as well, in which case positive feedback
effects are incorporated fast whereas negative effects slowly.
For every resource r, the potential matches are shown to user i in a list sorted according
to the trust values. The probability of selecting one of the requests of the list is simulated
through the Click through rates of Google (Hearne, 2006), as a proxy for real choice behav-
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ior. In other words, this probability function assigns a higher probability for matches on
top of the list, as these are chosen more likely than lower-ranked matches. Additionally,
users are modeled to have a certain minimum trust threshold for sharing, ϑmin, that indi-
cates the minimum trust score that has to exist between users. In the simulation, ϑmin = 0.3
is chosen to reflect that even in case of transitive trust, users might not be willing to share
with users they do not know (e.g. friends of friends) or have low trust ratings.8
4.2.3. Evaluation of Dynamic Effects
The evaluation of the incentive scheme consists of two parts. First, the effect of the partici-
pation constraints on certain performance indicators of the Social Cloud is studied. In ad-
dition, the dependency of underlying user type distributions on the results is investigated.
Hence, the evaluation aims at addressing following questions considering the usefulness
of a trading constraint for the resource exchange platform:
• Effects of trading constraint: What is the effect of introducing the trading constraint
on the average users’ utility? How does the trading constraint change the number of
successfully shared resources?
• Consequence for different user types: To what degree are different user types af-
fected by the trading constraint?
Simulation Specifics
For the case study, a social network with small-world properties is used as network topol-
ogy (using a connection rewiring probability of 40%, see Watts and Strogatz (1998)). To
study the effect of network size, networks of 20, 50, 100, 200 and 500 users are compared.
Depending on the size, each user has a direct connection to roughly one quarter of the
other users, which also reflects certain small-world network properties.9 As a baseline,
κ1 = κ2 = 0.5 is used in the simulation. For the trust calculation, the average feedback given
by users is χr,j,i(t) = 0.7 with a standard deviation of 0.3 to account for changing quality
in the requests. The scenario considered 3 resource types, a maximum resource amount of
10, as well as a scarcity value of κT = 5. All users are initialized with the same contribution
score, which changes over time according to the individual contributions of the users.
8Due to the other assumptions and the relatively low level, the simulation results do not seem to be sensitive
towards the chosen value.
9For example, in a network with 500 users, each user is directly connected to 100 other users.
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In all scenarios, 10 repetitions of the setting were made to minimize the potential effects of
initialization and random number effects. Results were averaged over the 10 repetitions.
Each scenario was implemented as a discrete event simulation with 1000 simulation peri-
ods. In each period, the users decided on the amount of resources they offer (based on the
utility function in Section 4.2.2), and the matching is performed. In order to avoid the start-
up problem and potentially skewed results due to initialization effects (Law, 2007, 508ff.),
only the last 900 periods are used for the evaluation.
Effects of the Trading Constraint on the System
While the introduction of a trading constraint as shown in the Section 4.2.2 was proven
to increase participation and reduce free-riding in P2P systems (see Ranganathan et al.
(2004)), its usefulness in social collaborative scenarios is not clear. Therefore, the effects of
the trading constraint on the system are studied first. This is followed by a more detailed

























Figure 4.1.: Average User Utility
Figure 4.1 shows the average utility per user for different network sizes for the baseline
trust update as well as the alternative scenario where negative feedback propagates slowly
(ATU). Two effects can be observed. First, the average utility increases with the network
size. This is intuitive, as a larger network (and more connections to other users) provides
each user with more possibilities to share resources. That is, the larger a network and the
more connections a user has, the higher the likelihood of an accepted request. Second, the
average utility per user is lower in the scenario with the active trading constraint. This
could also be expected, as the trading constraint yields lower contribution scores for free-
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riders, thus indirectly lowering their utility. As the trading constraint limits the number
of users each user can share resources with10, less requests are accepted, which lowers the
utility of users. Additionally, both effects are not sensitive to the trust update mechanism,
i.e., whether negative effects are propagated slowly in the trust score or not. This can be
seen by the qualitatively similar average user utilities for the two different trust update
mechanisms in Figure 4.1. This is an indication that the qualitative effects are related to
other factors such as the user types and their behavior, rather than the trust calculation.
Looking at additional simulation results also yields interesting observations. Figure 4.2a
shows the effect of the trading constraint on the probability that a resource requests is
successfully granted (i.e., matched with a suitable offer). Clearly, due to similar reasons as
for the decrease in average utility, the percentage of granted resource requests is decreased
if the trading constraint is introduced. As users, on average, have a smaller set of other
users they can potentially share resources with, the probability that a request is successfully
matched is decreased, on average.
Considering the trust update, Figure 4.2a shows that especially smaller networks are af-
fected by the trust update mechanism. If negative feedback affects the trust score to a
high degree, it is likelier that users affected by this fall below the necessary trust thresh-
old needed for a successful transaction. This leads to the lower percentage of successful





















































(b) Ratio Matches per Offer
Figure 4.2.: Average Offers and Matches per Offer
Furthermore, while the simulation results reveal that the average amount of offers per user
does not significantly change with the network size, the ratio of successful matches per
offer significantly increases with the network size (see Figure 4.2b). This can be explained
by the fact that the more connections each user has, the higher the potential number of
10I.e., the subset of users each user can share with is strictly included in the set of users in the setting without
the trading constraint.
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other users that could be interested in a specific offer. Again, due to the contribution score
which reduces the potential set of sharing users, the scenario with the active trading con-
straint yields a lower match per offer ratio. Similarly, the scenario with fast negative trust
propagation yields lower ratios as well.
Effect of Trading Constraint on User Types
The previous results are expected, due to the design of the trading constraint. However,
it is at first not clear how different user types are affected by the trading constraint. The
contribution score aims to provide incentives to share resources, as selfish users with a low
contribution score will not be able to request resources from users with a higher contribu-
tion score. To study the second question stated at the beginning of this case study, the ratio
of utility per user in the active trading constraint scenario is compared with the baseline
scenario without trading constraint. Figure 4.3 shows the baseline trust update scenario,














































Figure 4.3.: Relative Change in User Utility through the Trading Constraint
First, as observed earlier, the average utility of some user types increases with the network
size, due to the larger pool of potential resource sharing partners. Second, the trading
constraint discriminates users of different utility types. Having a closer look, it can be seen
that user types 1 (selfish) and 4 (weak selfish) are particularly vulnerable to the trading
constraint, and their utility even decreases with the network size. Indeed, these two user
11The alternative trust update scenario yields very similar results and is therefore omitted.
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types represent selfish users who are only interested in their own resource consumption.
Due to the contribution score, their set of potential sharing partners is reduced, which
leads to less granted requests in the scenario with active trading constraint. Hence, the
simulation confirms that selfish users (free-riders) are punished by the incentive scheme.
In contrast to the selfish users, other utility types perform better, especially with increas-
ing network sizes. The utility of user types 3 (perfect substitutes), 5 (weak Leontief) and 6
(weak perfect substitutes, see Table 4.2) is close to the utility in the scenario without trading
constraint, especially with increasing network sizes. This confirms that non-selfish users
have less negative effects due to the contribution score. In particular, user type 5 performs
as well as in the baseline scenario for larger network sizes, which means they are not af-
fected at all by the trading constraint. In addition, the utility of user type 2 (Leontief) is not
affected by the trading constraint.12
Effect of User Type Distribution
The previous results are based on the distribution of utility types as given in (Andreoni
and Miller, 2002). As this is a rather specific assumption which potentially influences the
results considerably, this section studies two different types of utility distributions in order
to compare the validity of the previous findings. The first user type distribution considers
a larger percentage of social user types, which is modeled as 70% of type 6 and only 30%
selfish users of type 1. The second distribution considers the opposite, 70% selfish users
(type 1) and only 30% of more social users (type 6), based on empirical findings that many
online and P2P networks exhibit a large number of non-contributing users (e.g., Adar and
Huberman (2000)).
Table 4.3.: Incentive scheme with different user type distributions. Numbers in brackets are average
utilities without and with active trading constraint.













20 1.38 0.87 (1.15,1.00) 0.87 (1.36,1.18) 0.65 0.92 (1.09,1.00) 0.92 (1.28,1.18)
50 1.39 0.80 (1.25,1.00) 0.94 (1.46,1.37) 0.73 0.86 (1.16,1.00) 0.93 (1.36,1.26)
100 1.42 0.77 (1.29,1.00) 0.96 (1.51,1.44) 0.66 0.84 (1.19,1.00) 1.01 (1.40,1.42)
200 1.40 0.76 (1.31,1.00) 0.97 (1.53,1.48) 0.59 0.82 (1.21,1.00) 1.04 (1.42,1.47)
500 1.46 0.75 (1.33,1.00) 0.98 (1.55,1.52) 0.65 0.82 (1.22,1.00) 1.06 (1.43,1.52)
12This specific result, however, should not be overemphasized, as this is a very specific utility function and
in this simple scenario, users only apply a simple optimization function which ultimately determines their
utility (in fact, the minimum in the Leontief utility function is responsible for the unchanged utility).
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Table 4.3 shows the relative utilities of the user types as well as the average number of offers
per user for the two scenarios. The more social scenario with the larger number of sharing
users yields almost twice the average number of offered resources per user, and also a
higher average utility than the baseline scenario. In addition, the relative decrease in utility
for selfish users is higher in the social scenario and lower in the free-rider scenario. This is
due to the higher utility for selfish users in the social scenario without trading constraint,
as they are able to benefit from the higher number of offered resources by altruistic users
and thus have a higher utility in that case. Once the trading constraint is active, though, the
average utilities of both types are same for both scenarios (based on the fact that in neither
scenario their resource requests are fulfilled).
For the type 6 users, an additional interesting effect can be observed. In the free-riding sce-
nario, the relative utility is sometimes even higher with the trading constraint than with-
out, whereas for the social scenario the relative utility is smaller with the trading constraint.
This can be explained by the observation that in the free-riding scenario without trading
constraints, users of type 6 have to compete with selfish users, hence potentially lowering
their chance of getting a resource request granted. With the trading constraint and with a
higher number of users in the system, they only have to compete with other users of the
same type, thus increasing their chances to receive resources.
Overall, the results for the different user type distributions show that, in general, the effect
of the trading constraint is qualitatively the same (punishing free-riders). In certain scenar-
ios it can even be beneficial for more altruistic users to introduce the trading constraint.
4.2.4. Summary
Summarizing the findings, the incentive scheme with the trading constraint discriminates
between different user types. While selfish types are punished by the constraint and their
utility is significantly lowered, non-selfish users often perform almost as well as, and some-
times even better, as the baseline scenario. Hence, this simple case study outlines the use-
fulness of using simulation as tool in the design process for Social Clouds. It both confirms
the expected behavior of the incentive scheme, and at the same time discovers interesting
relationships concerning different user type distributions.
The case study can be augmented by a more detailed analysis to determine the sensitivity
of the results on the simulation assumptions. Further sensitivity analyses include the effect
of different network structures (random, small-world, etc.), additional parameters in the
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contribution score (e.g., quality of the provided resources), and different values for a trust
threshold, below which resources are not granted to a requesting user.
4.3. Case Study: Co-operative Infrastructures
Computational social resource sharing platforms such as Social Clouds aim at facilitating
the exchange of resources among users by providing means to register as a user, advertise
or request resources, user lookup queries, communication utilities, allocation algorithms,
and so on. All these tasks require infrastructure resources to store and use data, and the
platform owner/provider has to decide how to acquire these infrastructure resources. Two
of the most common means are to either invest in dedicated computational infrastructure
resources on which the platform runs, or to use third-party Cloud resources to host the
platform. Both approaches incur costs for the infrastructure and its maintenance.
Yet, a currently underrepresented approach to provide infrastructure resources to host a
platform is to make use of the computational resources available to the platform users in
a co-operative resource provisioning model. Especially when users are willing to share
and exchange computational resources between other users, they might be willing to share
a certain part of these resources with the platform itself. Such platforms already exist,
for example cloud storage solutions that use storage space provided by users, which can
increase their allowed space by contributing to the platform.13
Such an approach is perfectly suitable for Social Clouds. As the platform requires coor-
dination mechanisms to facilitate their basic functionality (user management, resource al-
location, etc.), an underlying computational infrastructure must be provided. Supporting
a distributed computing platform requires an initial investment, advertising, or the intro-
duction of fees. In a social context, this might be undesirable or counterproductive. For
example, Shampanier et al. (2007) showed that users will not even pay negligible fees when
free alternatives are available.
Following this reasoning, the second case study proposes a novel co-operative infrastruc-
ture on which socially oriented exchange platforms, such as a Social Cloud and poten-
tially even social network platforms, can be supported, without incurring the overhead
or costs of provisioning dedicated infrastructure resources. Instead of using dedicated,
out-sourced, or third-party infrastructure, the platform is hosted upon the computational
resources it manages.
13See http://www.symform.com – last accessed May 2014
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Such a co-operative scenario is particularly fitting for social and volunteer computing, as
users are providers as well as beneficiaries of the platform. In this setting, resources are
defined as the computational capabilities needed by the collaborative platform to function,
which in the simplest case includes: computational power and storage. This can also be
extended to services like (distributed) databases and P2P overlay networks. Although as-
pects like reliability, redundancy, and technical instrumentation are important, these are
not focus of this section. Instead, this section focuses on the economic methods to address
system availability, redundancy, and scalability.
The section is an extended version of Haas et al. (2013) and is structured as follows. Section
4.3.1 defines the notion of co-operative infrastructures and gives an overview on related
work and similar concepts. Section 4.3.2 introduces and describes the economic model
behind co-operative infrastructures, and Section 4.3.3 evaluates the economic model with
respect to certain performance metrics. Section 4.3.4 concludes with a summary and out-
look on model extensions.
4.3.1. Definition of Co-operative Infrastructures and Related Work
Before the case study can consider the effects of contribution schemes for co-operative in-
frastructures, a general definition of this concept is needed to provide a basis for the sub-
sequent model. The unifying characteristic of practically all types of co-operative organi-
zations, such as credit unions, grocery shops, or infrastructures, is the fact that it is owned
by a group of people. Depending on the type of co-operative, not only the ownership but
also the management of the organization is shared by its users. These characteristics are
the basis of the following definition of co-operatively provided infrastructures:
Definition 5 (Co-operative Infrastructure ). A co-operative infrastructure is a scalable comput-
ing platform where all (computational) resources constituting the platform’s infrastructure, as well
as those made available over the platform, are owned and/or managed by its users.
Co-operatives can provide specific advantages over other methods, especially over third
party solutions. For example, it is difficult to quantify the platform’s required quality of
service. Consequently, commercial entities may be incentivized to act opportunistically,
i.e., maximize profit, which might not be in the users’ best interest (Spear, 2000). There-
fore, trust in the platform is critical, and inherent in the concept of collaboration and co-
ownership in a co-operative.
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User View on Co-operative Infrastructures
From the viewpoint of a user within a Social Cloud which utilizes co-operative infrastruc-
tures, the decision to share resources involves two levels as shown in Figure 4.4. Given
that the user has resources available for sharing or exchange, they can either share them di-
rectly with other users, or contribute the resources to the co-operative infrastructure. These
decisions are naturally intertwined, as making the resources available to either the infras-
tructure or to other users implies that the resources are not available for other purposes
anymore. In other words, the contribution of a user to the sharing platform depends on the
contribution to the co-op infrastructure, and vice versa.









Figure 4.4.: Levels of Sharing for Platforms with Co-operative Infrastructures
An important implication of this viewpoint is that models for sharing resources within
the resource exchange environment should incorporate the possibility to provide resource
to the infrastructure, thus blocking these resources from sharing with other users. How-
ever, this is not an easy task for several reasons. On one hand, the decision of users to
either use their available resources for sharing with other users or for the infrastructure
might be highly dynamic, and might depend on factors such as current requests of certain
friends or the overall contribution to the co-op platform. On the other hand, the individual
motivations to contribute to the infrastructure might be different compared to sharing the
resources with friends (e.g., reciprocity considerations), and depend on the respective in-
centive scheme. Hence, an integrated model is likely to be too complex for the given case
and the two levels are considered independently. Yet, the independent models can include
parameters that approximate the contribution to the other level. For example, in the co-op
model presented in this chapter, the parameter σi represents the percentage of resources
blocked for other uses, such as own consumption or sharing with other users.
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Related Work
Co-operative (co-op) business models are prevalent in a range of domains including gro-
cery stores, credit/banking unions, health care and even housing. The core premise of a co-
op model is distributing ownership, management and profit-sharing across its members.
Depending on the scenario, co-ops can be formed between different groups of individuals
and for many different reasons. Consumers, employees, producers, and residents are all
motivated in different scenarios to form a co-op business. From an economic point of view,
Porter and Scully (1987) investigate the formation of co-ops by comparing their efficiency
to other organization forms. They compared different efficiency metrics (price, scale and
managerial efficiency) and found that non-cooperative firms tend to be more efficient than
co-ops. These metrics are, however, not applicable in this scenario as they are price-based,
which implies that other metrics are needed in case of non-monetary Social Clouds.
In computer science, a co-op metacomputer was first introduced by Cime and Marzullo
(1999). In this system, contribution is voluntary but intended to be mutually beneficial for
users. More recently, in Grid and Cloud computing, federations have been created that
span multiple institutions allowing resources to be shared amongst members of a virtual
organization (VO). In these domains, novel co-op approaches to resource management and
task allocation such as the Community Scheduler Framework (CSF) (Xiaohui et al., 2006)
and the DRIVE metascheduler (Chard and Bubendorfer, 2008) have been proposed. Both
CSF and DRIVE utilize community contributed resources for core metascheduling tasks
such as resource allocation. Considering the feasibility of that approach, Xu and Yung
(2010) showed that secure and privacy preserving auction protocols can be used in a co-
operative metascheduling architecture to conduct trustworthy resource allocations on po-
tentially untrusted resources. Unlike the Social Cloud model, these metaschedulers are
designed to support job submission on a large scale, comparably static, Grid environment
where providers have huge resource pools and can provide explicit availability guaran-
tees.
The concept of a co-op is implicit in the definition of a Social Cloud, as members benefit
directly from resource sharing with one another. A Social Cloud differs from many other
resource sharing architectures as it leverages the relationships defined in a social network.
However, Social Clouds and therefore the co-op infrastructure are not free from risk, as
relationships can change over time. The implications for security in dynamic Social Cloud
environments have been investigated by Xu and Yung (2010). Socially based systems are
also becoming increasingly common in both academic and commercial applications. For
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example, social networking principles are commonly employed for coordinating ad hoc
research communities such as the previously mentioned myExperiment.org (Roure et al.,
2009), nanoHUB.org (Klimeck et al., 2008), and GlobusOnline14 (Foster, 2011). Commercial
applications such as FriendStore15 (Tran et al., 2008) offer distributed file storage provided
by a user’s friends. Diaspora16 is a first step towards creating a Facebook-like social net-
work platform relying on content resources (e.g., images) provided by its members (rather
than dedicated resources). The model proposed in this case study builds upon this idea, by
also capturing the computational resources needed to run the system, providing a platform
free of dedicated centralized servers.
The concept of co-operative infrastructures is conceptually similar to several other sharing
scenarios. For example, in public goods scenarios users contribute parts of their resources
to a public good which is accessible to other users (e.g., paying taxes where the projects
funded by tax money can be subsumed as public goods). Another example is the sharing
of knowledge in related communities. In both cases, the contribution of each user affects
the other users as they are able to consume the public good. As mentioned in Section
3.2, the “Tragedy of the Commons” problem can be observed in many related systems,
which states that in public goods scenarios a single user’s incentives to contribute might
be inversely affected by the contributions of other users. Hence, this issue also has to be
addressed in a co-operative setting. In the following case study, this is done through certain
contribution schemes by which the users contribute to the infrastructure.
Whereas this case study focuses on the economic model of contribution schemes, similar
systems have been studied from a conceptual and technical perspective. Babaoglu et al.
(2012) consider the creation of P2P Infrastructure Clouds in which the (potentially unreli-
able) cloud resources are provided by the participants of the cloud. Their prototype imple-
mentation focuses on aspects such as self-organization and robustness to failures. In an-
other model, Khan et al. (2013) study infrastructure clouds based on community networks.
Their evaluation focuses on technical aspects such as response time and its dependency
on the heterogeneity of provided resources. Both approaches, however, focus on technical
issues and do not consider resource contribution schemes.
14https://www.globus.org/ – last accessed May 2014
15http://friendstore.news.cs.nyu.edu/ – last accessed May 2014
16https://joindiaspora.com/ – last accessed May 2014
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4.3.2. Economic Model
Previous literature on co-operative models focuses either on the organizational level (Porter
and Scully, 1987; Spear, 2000), or the individual member level (Sexton, 1986). As no exist-
ing organizational data is available for this study, the approach of Sexton (1986) is applied
which looks at individuals incentives to participate in the co-op.17 To do this, the follow-
ing aspects need to be specified: 1) the users and their characteristics (e.g., endowment,
utility function, etc.) (Sexton, 1986); 2) the resource requirements of the distributed system
(Cime and Marzullo, 1999), in this case the Social Cloud platform; and 3) the contribution
schemes through which users are encouraged to join the co-op and provide resources (Sex-
ton, 1986). Each of these aspects are elaborated on in the following subsections to create a
co-op model that is adequate for the considered scenario. As discussed, only computational
infrastructure resources are considered in the co-op model, not software requirements such
as databases.
User Model
The basic user model was presented in Section 4.1. In particular, the six different utility
functions as given in Table 4.2 are used to model six different types of users. For this case
study, the availability of users is additionally considered. Users are modeled as having
a rate of availability αi, in which their resources are available to the Social Cloud. This
aspect constitutes the notion of quality of (a contributed) service (QoS), as availability is a
standard QoS measure.
As Social Cloud implementations are still in their prototype phase, no traces of user behav-
ior within the context of a Social Cloud exist. Consequently, the performance of a Social
Cloud cannot be analyzed based upon production user data. However, to develop a co-
op model it is assumed that user behavior within a Social Cloud is similar to behavior
patterns in Volunteer Computing, as both rely on ad-hoc user communities donating spare
computing capacity. Therefore, to model users the SETI@home (Anderson, 2004) host avail-
ability traces for the years 2007-09 is selected, which contain information for over 220,000
hosts.18 These traces have been the subject of many analytical studies (e.g., Anderson and
17It should be noted that this is only one possible approach. The fact that economic actions are influenced by
the social relations of a user has long been recognized (see e.g. Granovetter (1985)). Yet, it can be argued
that these approaches (taking social embeddedness into account) are especially helpful when applied to
(economic) network analysis based on observed data. However, as the actions of individual users are
simulated without existing data, the model relies on specific behaviors instrumented through theoretically
grounded and context fitting utility functions.
18Available: http://fta.inria.fr – last accessed May 2014
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Fedak (2006); Javadi et al. (2009, 2011)), motivating their selection, as they provide a solid
foundation to base a Social Cloud context upon. Statistical analysis of the data in (Javadi
et al., 2011) reveals that 21% of the monitored hosts exhibit statistical independence in their
availability. The authors also provide probability distributions for these hosts as well as for
several clusters that can be distinguished within these 21% of hosts. These clusters are used
to define different user types in the co-op model. Based on these results, Javadi et al. (2011)
deduced a distribution of the length of availability intervals, which is used to simulate the
availability of users. Table 4.4 summarizes the statistics of the six clusters, providing their
relative size, average availability and the distribution functions of the interval lengths.19
Table 4.4.: List of User Cluster based on Javadi et al. (2011)
Cluster Relative Size Avg. Availability Avail. Interval Dist. Unavail. Interval Dist.
1 0.042 83.9% Gamma(0.289,311.711) Hyper-Exponential
2 0.108 82.2% Gamma(0.340,152.216) Hyper-Exponential
3 0.658 26.0% Weibull(0.431,1.682) Hyper-Exponential
4 0.004 91.7% Gamma(0.347,371.622) Hyper-Exponential
5 0.094 72.3% Gamma(0.342,89.223) Hyper-Exponential
6 0.094 56.7% Gamma(0.357,43.652) Hyper-Exponential
While the user types in Table 4.2 are found in experimental games, one might ask if this
is a realistic setting for the case of co-operative infrastructures. Hence, this setting is also
compared with another user type distribution which considers sharing in P2P networks.
The basis for this distribution is obtained from Adar and Huberman (2000), who present
a study on free-riding in Gnutella, a then-popular P2P platform, and shows that in this
platform approximately 70% of the users do not share at all. Therefore, another scenario is
introduced which captures this user type distribution in which 70% of users have a selfish
utility function of type 1, and the remaining 30% share to some degree (according to utility
function type 6). The second scenario is used to study the effects of different user type
contributions on the applicability of the considered contribution schemes.
Modeling System Requirements
Determining the feasibility of users providing the computational infrastructure of a plat-
form requires knowledge of the platform’s resource requirements (i.e., the resources re-
quired to guarantee the functionality of the platform). In general, system requirements
R (n) can be modeled as R (n) = l1 f (n) + l2 where l1 f (n) specifies the increase in resources
19The specifics of the unavailability interval distributions can be found in Javadi et al. (2011).
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based on the number of users (n) and l2 is the minimum amount of infrastructure re-
sources needed for the platform. This is a reasonable base model as the computational
requirements for necessary platform tasks generally increases with the number of users
(and transactions), while some base functionality must also be provided at all times (e.g.,
database services).
A realistic model of required resources is essential for the co-op model and the evaluation
results. Hence, the system requirements function is modeled based on certain assumptions
as well as empirical observations from the Social Cloud prototype presented and evaluated
in Chard et al. (2010). They studied several aspects of the deployed prototype, such as
resource (CPU, memory) usage, on which the requirements function is based. In abstract
terms, the system requirements are calculated for one time period. In this time period,
each of the n users participates in y transactions which are typical for the platform. For
example, this could be the computation of an auction or preference-based allocation for a
particular resource. The reverse second-price-sealed-bid auction as implemented in Chard
et al. (2010) is considered as a proxy for the transaction. This mechanism is known to be
resource-demanding and has high resource requirements, thus representing the necessary
computational power needed to host a Social Cloud and ensure its functionality.
Every transaction requires a certain amount of resources for execution. From Chard et al.
(2010) it can be empirically derived that an average computer (represented as the average
resource amount, ω̄) requires f (n) = ω̄
3√n2
γ resources for one transaction.
20 As it is unre-
alistic that all transactions in one time period have to run simultaneously, the parameter δ
denotes the percentage of transactions that require resources at the same time. If ωmin de-
notes the minimum number of resources that have to be provided regardless of supporting
basic functionality, then the system requirements function (SR1) can be expressed as:






Equation (4.10) assumes that all users participate in every transaction. If for example, only
half of the users, on average, participate in transactions then the system requirements func-
tion (SR2) will be:






20The exact function was found using curve fitting in Matlab, which yields γ = 933 and a goodness of fit of
0.97. Note that Chard et al. (2010) provides values for up to 50 users, but the findings strongly suggest that
the general trend of the curve can be extrapolated for more users.
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Contribution Schemes
Considering the social context of the Social Cloud paradigm, it can be argued that the
goal of such a system should be to provide sufficient resources to run the platform, but
at the same time not burden users with too much effort or high costs. If ri is the resource
contribution of user i to the co-op infrastructure, the following optimization problem has









ri = ρi ∗ωi ∀i ∈ 1, ...,n
σi + pρi = 1 ∀i ∈ 1, ...,n
σi,ρi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ 1, ...,n (4.12)
In order to acquire the required infrastructure resources by the co-op’s members, the fol-
lowing contribution schemes are considered:
• Enforced fixed contribution (EFC): Users are required to provide a certain quantity
of resources to the infrastructure as a membership requirement.
• Voluntary fixed contribution (VFC): Users choose to contribute a predefined per-
centage of their own resources.
• Voluntary variable contribution (VVC): Users may freely choose what percentage of
their endowment they are willing to contribute, i.e., no minimum is prescribed.
Enforced Fixed Contribution For fixed contribution schemes, two alternatives are possi-
ble: either the contribution can be fixed independent of the user’s resource endowment,
or the contribution can be proportional to the user’s endowment. The first alternative is
used by some popular file sharing systems, where a minimum amount of resource shar-
ing is required. However, such a scheme might exclude users from the system which do
not have the required resources available, or would force some users to allocate most of
their resources for the infrastructure. Hence, the latter case is used to calculate the fixed
percentages, because it is more considerate of users with low resource endowments.
In the proportional contribution scenario, let ρ∗i denote the percentage of user i’s resource
endowment that needs to be allocated to the co-op infrastructure. The minimum necessary
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min ∗ (1− σi) (4.13)
ρ∗min =
R (n)
∑i (1− σi) ∗ωi ∗ αi
(4.14)
The calculation of the expected contributed resources depends on the assumptions about
the users, specifically σi and ωi. Without information about user types an assumption has
to be made, otherwise the expected or observed user type distributions can be used to
estimate σi and ωi. Clearly, if the estimate of user types does not reflect the true distribution,
it will affect the overall amount of resources that are contributed, and thus impact the
availability of the system.
This calculation represents a static view of the system, as only average availabilities are
taken into account. Dynamic effects such as the distribution of availability and unavail-
ability intervals might affect the overall performance of the system, however, especially
if these intervals are correlated between users (e.g., availability patterns during the week
compared to during the weekend). Hence, the feasibility of such a contribution scheme has
to be studied via simulations to capture the dynamic properties.
Voluntary Fixed Contribution In this scenario, the percentage ρ is prescribed by the system
according to some criteria, and users voluntarily contribute if ρ is smaller than their indi-
vidual optimum ρ∗, otherwise they choose to not contribute resources. This differentiates
this scheme from EFC, as in the latter case a certain contribution is mandatory.
Hence, the contribution of user i can be described as follows:
ρi =
ρ if ρ∗ ≥ ρ0 else (4.15)
Although this scheme does not enforce contribution of users, it also significantly depends
on the choice of ρ. If it is set too low, more people will contribute, yet the overall amount
of contributed resources might not be high enough. On the other hand, setting ρ too high
potentially leads to less contributing users.
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Voluntary Variable Contribution In this contribution scheme, users choose their level of
contribution based on their individual preferences for resource usage, considering for ex-
ample altruistic motivation. This scheme addresses the key motivation of a Social Cloud,
that is, users voluntarily choose to provide resources to the platform.
Using the utility function described earlier (Eq. 4.2) and the resource constraint (Eq. 4.1),
the optimization problem can be solved for user i. With the basic assumption that Ui ≥ 0,




























Hence, the relative contribution to the infrastructure depends on several factors: 1) the
importance of donating resources to the infrastructure (λ, the level of altruism), 2) the con-
vexity of the utility function (β), and 3) the relative price p for giving resources to the
infrastructure. In particular, the more expensive it is to allocate resources to the infrastruc-
ture, compared to consuming them (i.e., p > 1), the lower the users’ contribution to the
infrastructure.
4.3.3. Evaluation of Contribution Schemes
Having developed a comprehensive economic co-op model, the focus of this evaluation
is to investigate the following aspects of a co-op infrastructure for a Social Cloud: 1) the
average utility of users between the contribution schemes, and 2) the effects of specific pa-
rameters, especially the relative price p to provide resources, in the proposed contribution
schemes. Additionally, two QoS factors of the platform are studied: system availability (as
the percentage of time periods in which the resource requirements are met) and the ratio
of provided to required resources (as a measure of redundancy). To study the effects of the
number of users on the results and the scalability of each approach, Social Clouds of differ-
ent sizes (10 to 400 users) are considered. Note that these numbers are much smaller than
the hundreds of millions of users that are registered on Facebook, however individual So-
cial Clouds represent individual social network islands, and not the entire social graph.
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Simulation Specifics
The general simulation framework is implemented as follows. In total 100 simulation runs
per scenario are performed and the results averaged, in order to account for possible simu-
lation bias with respect to the initialization of users. At the beginning of a simulation run,
users are created according to the clusters in Table 4.4. Users might have different resource
endowments available, hence their respective resource endowments are drawn uniformly
from the interval [5,15], and the average resource endowment is given by ω̄ = 10. As a
baseline, the minimum amount of resources required to host the Social Cloud is assumed
to be half of an average user’s resource endowment (i.e., 50% computation power of an
average computer). For the enforced fixed contribution scenario, ρ∗i is calculated according
to the equations in Section 4.3.2, and σi is calculated based on the type of user i.
All scenarios include 10,000 simulated time periods. In the first period, it is determined
whether users are initially available (or not) based on the average availability of the cluster,
and the length of the first (un)availability interval is drawn according to the respective
distribution. In every following time period, the amount of resources provided for the
infrastructure is calculated, and if an (un)availability interval ends, the availability of a
user is switched and the next interval is determined. Considering the startup problem
(Law, 2007), the simulation requires approximately 50-500 time periods to reach a steady
state, so only the results of the time periods 500-10,000 are considered for the evaluation.
Two different system resource requirements functions, SR, are considered for each con-
tribution scheme in order to study the robustness of the findings. First, the worst case
requirements SR1 where R (n) is set according to Equation (4.10) with δ = 1, y = 1, ω̄ = 10
and ωmin = 5. In this case, every user participates in every transaction and all transactions
have to be computed simultaneously, which reflects a peak scenario with very high system
load. The values for ω̄ and ωmin are determined because users’ endowments are drawn
from [5,15]. Second, the second system requirements function SR2 represents an off-peak
scenario with lower requirements, and is determined by Equation (4.11). For SR2, only half
of the users participate in each transaction, and δ is set to 0.5. This is still a high average
load, yet acknowledges that the co-op infrastructure might be set up to capture average
requirements instead of peak loads.
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Enforced Fixed Contribution
In this contribution scheme, each user has to provide a certain percentage of their endow-
ment to the system. For the evaluation, the actual resource contributions are simulated
when users provide exactly the minimum percentage (as calculated in Equation 4.14), and
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(f) Provided vs. Required Resources, SR2
Figure 4.5.: Simulation Results for Enforced Fixed Contribution
Figure 4.5 shows that the results of this contribution scheme depend on several factors:
first, the minimum contribution percentage initially decreases with the number of users,
but if the system size surpasses 50 users ρ∗min begins to increase again (Figures 4.5c and
4.5d). Second, the number of provided resources is higher than the amount of required
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resources (i.e., there is some level of redundancy, see Figures 4.5e and 4.5f). Third, the
average availability of the system ranges from 80% to 100%, for the optimal contribution
ρ∗min (Figures 4.5a and 4.5b). This is mainly due to the fact that the calculation of ρ
∗
min only
considers average values of user availability, which does not account for the dynamics of
the system (such as multiple users being unavailable simultaneously). Furthermore, for
worst case resource requirements it begins to slightly decrease for larger systems. For aver-
age resource requirements, the availability is slightly better for larger systems and remains
constantly at 100%.
Two issues can be observed with this contribution scheme. On one hand, if the minimum
contribution percentage is increased to account for dynamic (un)availability, the average
availability of the system increases, reaching values very close or equal to 1 (Figures 4.5a
and 4.5b). On the other hand, the system is also scalable as the average system availability
increases with the number of users. This can be explained by the fact that the more users
contribute, the larger the pooling effects of (un)available users, which leads to a “smooth-
ing” of provided resources and a higher probability that the system resource requirements
are met at any point in time. Furthermore, the percentage of time periods where the system
resource requirements are actually met does not seem to depend on the specific resource
function as a comparison of Figures 4.5a and 4.5b shows. This is mainly due to the fact that
the (un)availability interval distributions determine the number of contributing users, and
the requirements function mainly affects ρ∗min.
Overall, the results show that if an enforced fixed contribution scheme is used, it is better to
set the required ρ higher than the minimum ρ∗min. This leads to higher system availability
even for small increases of ρ because the larger individual user contributions alleviate the
unavailability of other users.
Voluntary Fixed Contribution
In this scenario certain users contribute a fixed percentage of resources if this percentage is
lower or equal to their optimal percentage. The decision criterion can be found in Equation
4.15 in Section 4.3.2. This scheme does not force users to contribute resources, as EFC does,
yet the usability depends on the choice of the fixed contribution percentage ρ as well as the
user type distribution.
Figure 4.6 displays the simulation results where not all users have to contribute to the
co-op infrastructure. Several interesting findings can be observed. First, as expected the
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(f) Provided vs. Required Resources, SR2
Figure 4.6.: Simulation Results for Voluntary Fixed Contribution
percentage of users who contribute to the infrastructure decreases as the required contri-
bution amount increases (Figures 4.6c and 4.6d). Second, especially for high resource re-
quirements the provided resources are lower than the required amount, therefore leading
to a lower system availability as in EFC (Figures 4.6a, 4.6e as well as 4.6b and 4.6d). This
indicates that the worst-case system requirements (SR1) increase disproportionally to the
contributed resources for larger system sizes (in this case, more then 50 users). For average
resource requirements (SR2), system availability is better and even can reach 100%, and the
scalability behavior improves as well.
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In particular, the results also show that the system performance crucially depends on the
required contribution that is selected. Contribution levels between ρ = 0.2 and ρ = 0.3 seem
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(f) Provided vs. Required Resources, SR2
Figure 4.7.: Simulation Results for Voluntary Variable Contribution
The variable voluntary scheme in Section 4.3.2 allows each user to calculate their optimal
individual contribution for infrastructure resources, based on individual preferences, ac-
cording to Equation (4.19). In the following simulations the relative price of resource con-
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tribution p was also varied between 1.0 and 3.0 to capture that providing resources might
be comparably more expensive than using them or leaving them idle.21 In order to study
system behavior in a more realistic setting, each user is assigned to a certain availability
cluster and is given a particular type of utility function, according to Table 4.2. The type of
utility function also determines the optimal contribution level, given the optimal condition
based on the resource endowment constraint.
Using the user type distribution from Andreoni and Miller (2002), the results shown in
Figure 4.7 are obtained. The simulation shows several interesting results. On one hand, the
intuition that higher relative contribution prices leads to fewer contributions is confirmed
in Figures 4.7c and 4.7d. The average contribution decreases with increasing relative prices
for provisioning, a result which is independent of the system resource requirements. On
the other hand, system availability as well as the average amount of contributed resources
strongly depend on the relative prices that users bear for providing resources. If relative
prices are too high users choose to provide only a small number of resources, which leads
to the decrease in system availability as shown in Figures 4.7a and 4.7b. This also affects
the scalability of the system; if prices for contribution are roughly similar to prices for self-
consumption, the contribution scheme is scalable with the number of users.
Furthermore, on average, significantly more resources are provided than required, leading
to higher redundancy levels (Figures 4.7e and 4.7f). Along with the previous finding this
indicates that the incentive-based scenario would be especially vulnerable when only a few
users contribute to the system. Although individually they might contribute a significant
amount of resources, the system is more dependent on these few contributors. In case of
their unavailability the resource requirements might not be met.
To study the dependency of the simulation results on the underlying distributions of user
types (and hence, utility functions), the previous results are now compared with a more
conservative distribution, as shown in Figure 4.8. As stated in Section 4.3.2, this distribu-
tion is obtained from observed P2P systems, where 70% of users are purely selfish free-
riders, and only 30% are willing to give resources to the infrastructure (types 1 and 6 in
Table 4.2, respectively).
In this scenario, based on the high number of free-riders, the general level of system avail-
ability is much worse than in the previous case (Figures 4.8a and 4.8b). This is especially
21Prices p < 1 would mean resource provisioning is less expensive then leaving them idle, which can be, e.g.,
achieved through subsidization. Although this might be an option to encourage contribution to the co-op,
it has to be determined where such subsidies would come from. This is not the focus of this case study,
hence the case p < 1 will not be considered in this evaluation.
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(f) Provided vs. Required Resources, SR2
Figure 4.8.: Simulation Results for Voluntary Variable Contribution, mostly Selfish User Types
evident at peak times where resource requirements are high, as the high number of selfish
users leads to a significant decrease in resource contribution. In the case of moderate re-
source requirements, the system performs well when contribution is not expensive (p≈ 1)
and for larger numbers of users. Moreover, both the proportion of provided to required
resources (Figures 4.8e and 4.8f), and the average contribution per user (Figures 4.8c and
4.8d), are lower compared to the results in Figure 4.7, which explains the reduced system
availability. It is noteworthy that despite the conservative distribution of user types, the
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system performs surprisingly well for moderate resource requirements and lower relative
prices.
4.3.4. Discussion
Figure 4.9 shows a comparison between the average utility per user in the enforced fixed,
voluntary fixed and voluntary variable schemes and for both resource functions. As pre-
dicted, the average utility is higher when users are allowed to choose their individual op-
timal level of contribution (rather than being forced into potentially suboptimal levels of
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Figure 4.9.: Utility per User for Different Scenarios
Based on the previous evaluation results, there are some further observations through
which the feasibility and scalability of a co-op infrastructure can be evaluated. First, if a
fixed contribution is enforced by the system, the (un)availability characteristics of the users
have to be taken into account when the necessary contribution percentage is calculated.
In this case there is an inherent trade-off between increasing the individual contribution
ρ∗i and making the entire system perform better or more reliably. That is, the QoS factor
availability is directly dependent on the chosen level of parameter ρ∗i . For example, an
increase in ρ∗i significantly increases the system availability, but in this case individual con-
tributions can be very high for large system sizes (up to 47% of the endowment). Second,
the results from the voluntary variable contribution scheme indicate that even under worst
case requirements, allowing users to select their contribution level the system resource re-
quirements are met in many time periods when relative contribution prices are low (cor-
responding to high availability, as well as a rather high redundancy factor as shown in
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Figures 4.7e and 4.7f). Furthermore, the average individual utility is higher than in the
fixed scheme. However, based on the underlying distributions of user types, the system
performance is much more dependent on the voluntary contribution of single users.
Hence, the system designer has to address the following trade-off: either force users to
give a certain, fixed percentage of their endowment to the co-op infrastructure, e.g. as a
condition for participation, or let users freely choose their contribution. In the latter case,
the average utility of users as well as system availability/redundancy tends to be higher,
but one must carefully study the user type distribution to ensure that there are enough
users willing to contribute. For practical settings, it might be beneficial to monitor the
resource contributions and/or determine the distribution of user types, and adjust the used
contribution scheme if the system availability level falls below a certain threshold.
There are several potential extensions of the co-operative infrastructure model that can
be pursued. First, the model can be augmented to account for additional resource types.
Instead of only considering one resource type, real co-operative systems require several
different types of resources to run, e.g., computational power to calculate transactions,
bandwidth to accommodate large file transfers, and storage to save databases and other in-
formation. In this case, the co-op infrastructure requires a certain amount of each resource
type to be successfully deployed, and over-provisioning of one resource cannot compen-
sate underprovisioning of another resource, leading to a combinatorial problem.
Another extension of the presented model is to analyze how specific incentives (e.g., rep-
utation mechanisms, compensation for resource provisioning, etc.) alter the willingness
of users to contribute. This is particularly interesting when combined with an integrated
model that considers both sharing resources with other users and contributing to the co-op
infrastructure. Such a unified model would allow the design of tailored incentive schemes
that take both aspects of contribution into account.
Furthermore, as a co-op infrastructure induces both positive and negative exter-
nal/network effects with a growing number of (contributing) users, another question is
if there is an optimal size of a co-op infrastructure depending on the interplay of negative
and positive effects. While this has been studied in context of P2P music sharing networks
(Asvanund et al., 2004), the adaption to co-op infrastructures remains an open issue. For
example, the previous results show that for EFC, the system availability level increases with
a higher number of users which indicates that the co-op is more robust for larger number
of users, whereas for VVC the results depend on the relative price of resource provisioning.
Finally, the ultimate goal of a co-op model is to provide a sustainable infrastructure for its
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users. To guarantee sustainability, concepts such as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) can
be investigated and applied to the co-op model. Through the management of these KPIs,
the administrators of the co-op infrastructure could monitor, analyze, and steer the system
to ensure that the minimum service quality levels are fulfilled.
4.4. Summary
This chapter presented two case studies how a simulation-based approach can be lever-
aged in the design of incentive schemes for exchange and sharing platforms such as Social
Clouds. The focus of the first case study (Section 4.2) was the introduction of an incen-
tive scheme in resource sharing networks, and its effects on user participation and utilities.
The evaluation showed interesting dependencies between the effects of the scheme, the
user type, and the user type distribution. The second case study (Section 4.3) introduced
the concept of co-operative infrastructures. It studied several contribution schemes for the
provision of infrastructure resources needed to run the platform by the users themselves.
Considering research question 1.2, these exemplary case studies show that the use of a
simulation-based approach to evaluate certain aspects of a sharing system, such as an in-
centive scheme, can provide useful additional information about potential effects on the
system. The first case study exemplified that dynamic effects can be identified through the
simulation tool, e.g., the effects of introducing an additional trading constraint on different
user types. With such an approach, potential changes to a Social Cloud can be evaluated
before their implementation, and can yield useful information about the predicted conse-
quences. Additionally, the second case study showed that entirely new scenarios can also
be studied through the simulation tool. For example, if a co-operative infrastructure should
be introduced for a Social Cloud, the simulation approach can help to determine the most
effective contribution scheme to ensure a certain level of system availability.
Addressing research question 1.3, the second case study showed that the decision for a
certain contribution scheme depends on the user type distribution of the respective Social
Cloud. If resource provisioning to the Social Cloud does not incur considerable additional
costs and the Social Cloud does not mainly consist of selfish users unwilling to participate
in the co-op, a voluntary contribution scheme is feasible. In contrast, if users are less will-
ing to provide resources on their own, an enforced contribution scheme can be necessary
to ensure the applicability of a co-op approach to host the platform infrastructure. Hence,
in practical scenarios, the identification of user type distributions is important to select the
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appropriate contribution scheme. In addition, the importance of non-monetary incentives
for participation in a Social Cloud (in particular general helpfulness and reciprocity as-
pects, see Section 3.3) indicates the general feasibility of such a co-operative infrastructure
approach.
It is important to emphasize that such an approach is complimentary to other methodolo-
gies such as prototyping or live experiments. Ideally, these methodologies complement
each other and yield valuable insights which together lead to a more holistic design pro-
cess. To augment the case studies shown in this chapter, two prototypical implementa-
tions, a Social Storage Cloud (Chard et al., 2012) as well as a Social Compute Cloud for
sharing virtualized resources (Caton et al., 2014), have already been implemented. These
prototypes are particularly helpful in observing actual user acceptance, behavior and feed-
back with respect to the general idea, system usability as well as specific implementation
details. For example, user interaction can be observed and analyzed with respect to demo-
graphics and other user characteristics. Complementary to the simulation and prototype
approaches, lab experiments can capture user behavior in certain market scenarios and
determine the motivation of potential users to contribute and share resources in different
application scenarios. This can be accompanied by surveys and questionnaires which are
specifically suited to study the motivation of users, their incentives as well as determine
the reason of their observed behavior.
Overall, Chapters 3 and 4 showed the relevance of non-monetary incentives for Social
Cloud settings, and how the identified relevant incentives can be implemented in incentive
and contribution schemes that encourage user participation. A web-based survey showed
that non-monetary motivations and incentives such as helpfulness and reciprocity con-
siderations are more important for users than monetary compensation. Additionally, the
survey revealed that the setting of a Social Cloud (e.g., sharing in a private compared to a
professional setting) influences the relative importance of certain incentives.
The findings are also relevant for the design of allocation mechanisms. Once users of a
sharing platform offer resources while others request these resources, the question arises
how an allocation can be derived in this setting. Due to the low relevance of monetary
incentives, the use of non-monetary allocation mechanisms is a promising approach to
retain the benefits of a centralized market allocation while focusing on preferences rather
than (monetary) valuations for resources. This is the focus of the next part of the thesis.
Chapters 5 and 6, thus, take a market view of the system and consider resource sharing
where users have preferences with whom they want to share. Specifically, several allocation
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mechanisms, their relative performance, as well as strategic implications will be the focus
of these chapters.
Part III.
Two-Sided Matching in Social Clouds

Chapter 5.
Resource Allocation in Social Clouds
“Two properties of key importance for market design are stability, which encourages groups to
voluntarily participate in the market, and incentive compatibility, which discourages strategic
manipulation of the market.”
(Nobel Prize Committee, 2012)
IN social settings, the exchange of resources is often driven by non-monetary factors.This can be observed empirically by considering the various platforms which use non-
monetary incentives and mechanisms (such as trophies or reciprocity, see Section 3.1). The
results of Chapter 3 also indicated that these types of incentives are considered most im-
portant for users participating in a Social Cloud. As identified in Section 2.3.2, two-sided
matching provides the means to allocate resources with a market-based approach that al-
lows for the optimization of desirable criteria, such as fairness of welfare of an allocation,
while at the same time does not involve monetary transactions. Instead of (monetary) valu-
ations for resources, participating users specify a preference ranking that reflects their will-
ingness to share and exchange resources with other users. This chapter, therefore, considers
the application of preference-based matching algorithms in the context of Social Clouds.
To introduce the relevant concepts, Section 5.1 provides the definitions and notation needed
to study preference-based resource allocation. In particular, different types of preference
structures and performance metrics as well as their impact on problem complexity are dis-
cussed. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the two-sided matching literature and dis-
cusses several aspects that are commonly studied in preference-based matching.
Using this terminology, Section 5.3 describes existing algorithms for preference-based
matching. Most of these algorithms are specialized for specific scenarios, i.e., focus on a cer-
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tain combination of preference structures. While there are efficient (approximation) algo-
rithms for certain scenarios, there are cases for which no approximation algorithm exists.1
Additionally, only certain standard combinations of optimization metrics are considered in
the literature. However, there are cases in which the flexible combination of optimization
metrics might be useful. For example, in a Social Cloud the desired goals of an allocation
might change over time. In the beginning, the platform might focus on the benefits for the
individuals to provide incentives for participation, whereas in later stages aspects such as
fairness with respect to different users might be of higher importance. Existing algorithms
are not able to provide such a flexibility and can only focus on a small combination of met-
rics. Heuristic algorithms, on the other hand, allow for a flexible optimization of metrics
and are suitable for different preference structures. Therefore, the focus of this part of the
thesis is the development and evaluation of heuristics for two-sided matching. In particu-
lar, Genetic Algorithms (GA) (Goldberg, 1989) and Threshold Accepting Algorithms (TA)
(Dueck and Scheuer, 1990) are considered for this case.
The sole existence of heuristics does not guarantee their usefulness, especially considering
the quality of allocations calculated by the heuristics. Therefore, it is necessary to com-
pare the performance of these heuristics with existing algorithms, which is the goal of this
chapter. Thus, the performance of the currently best-known algorithms is compared to the
heuristics in Section 5.4, which considers several scenarios with different types of prefer-
ences. With the corresponding evaluation, research question 2.1 can be addressed:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.2 ≺PERFORMANCE OF HEURISTICS What is the performance of
heuristics for preference-based matching compared to existing matching mechanisms?
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, GA and TA heuristics are
defined for general two-sided matching scenarios and different optimization goals. On
the other hand, the chapter provides a performance comparison of these flexible heuristics
compared to existing algorithms as well as the study of these algorithms in various settings.
For example, the performance of the algorithms in the case of correlated preferences is a
relevant problem that has not been examined extensively before.
1In fact, for some scenarios non-trivial approximation guarantees cannot exist (Manlove et al., 2002; Halldórs-
son et al., 2003), which means that no algorithm can guarantee to always find better than worst-case lower
bounds on approximation.
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5.1. Preference-based Resource Matching
This section formalizes two-sided matching problems. Section 5.1.1 starts by introducing
notation, definitions, and fundamental theorems on preference-based matching, follow-
ing standard literature. Building on this, Section 5.1.2 presents the commonly considered
performance metrics used to determine the quality of a solution. Finally, Section 5.1.3 cat-
egorizes different problem types according to the structure of the preference rankings, and
discusses the computational complexity of these problem types.
5.1.1. Definitions and Relevant Theorems
A two-sided matching model considers scenarios where users i are participants in a market
and want to share and exchange resources. It is assumed that a user i cannot concurrently
supply and demand the same resource type r. Therefore, it is possible to split the users
into the set of nX requesting users, Xr, and nY providing users, Yr. Note that in this model
matching is considered only within the same resource type, i.e., the index r is omitted from
all subsequent formulas. In total, there are nX + nY users participating in the market. For
easier notation, requesters will denote users of side X and providers of side Y. Without loss
of generality, the index j will denote users of the opposite side.
Each user i has a preference profile Pi =
(
Pi,j1 , . . . , Pi,jn
)
over users j of the other market
side with whom they want to share resources, where Pi,j denotes the (ordinal) preference
rank that user i has towards user j. The preference towards ∅ indicates the preference for
being unmatched. Preference profiles are transitive and can be asymmetric. The preference
profiles represent transitive priority structures %= (%i) where each user of the opposite
side is ranked according to its priority. The asymmetric part i indicates a strict priority,
whereas the symmetric part indicates an indifference. All users j with j i ∅ are said to be
acceptable for user i (and vice versa). A common representation of preferences is through
ranked order lists. For example, if user i has preferences j2  j1 ∼ j3  j4, the most preferred
alternative is j2, which is preferred to both j1 and j3, which are in turn preferred to j4.
The corresponding preference ranks in this case would be Pi,j1 = 2, Pi,j2 = 1, Pi,j3 = 2, and
Pi,j4 = 4.
2
A preference profile of user i is said to be complete if j ∅ for all users j. If ∅ j for some
users j, the preference profile is said to be incomplete. This indicates that user i prefers to
remain unmatched rather than be matched to user j. A preference profile is strict if for all
2An alternative ranking would be Pi,j4 = 3, in case only strict priorities increase the ranking.
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users j,k of the opposite side j %i k is asymmetric. If j ∼ k for some users j and k, then the
preference profile is said to have indifferences, or ties.
Given the representation of users’ preferences and the supply and demand in the market,
the goal of two-sided matching is to find a match µ = 〈X,Y〉 that defines which users are
matched. 〈X,Y〉 consists of pairs 〈x,y〉 with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. In this work, only one-to-one
matches are considered, i.e., one requesting user is matched to one providing user, and vice
versa.3
A matching is a function µ : X → {Y ∪∅} that allocates one requesting user from X (or
∅) to one providing user from Y (or ∅) and fulfills the constraints ∀i ∈ X : µ(i) ∈ {Y ∪∅},
∀i ∈Y : µ−1(i) ∈ {X ∪∅}, and ∀i, j 6= ∅ with µ(i) = j : ¬∃k such that µ(k) = j or µ−1(k) = i.
In other words, each user is either matched to another user or remains unmatched, and
users can only be part of one matching (i.e., no user can be matched to more than one other
user). A mechanism implements µ for the given preference profiles.
The quality of a match µ is characterized by certain criteria. Fundamental to the theory of
two-sided matching is the question of whether users have the incentive to deviate from a
given match. If no two users have the bilateral incentive to deviate, a match is called stable.
For the definition of stability, the definition of blocking pairs is necessary:
Definition 6 (Blocking Pair ). A blocking pair is defined as a pair 〈x,y〉, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, such
that
1. µ(x) = ∅ or y x µ(x), AND
2. µ−1(y) = ∅ is single or x y µ−1(y), AND
3. x and y are mutually acceptable.
Blocking pairs are essential in characterizing the notion of stability in two-sided matching.
Throughout the chapter, following definition for stability will be used:
Definition 7 (Stability ). A match is said to be stable if it contains no blocking pairs.
Stability infers that no user can find another user of the opposite side who prefers it to its
current partner, and both mutually benefit from the change of matched partners. This is an
3A discussion of many-to-one and many-to-many markets is provided in Section 5.2.
5.1. PREFERENCE-BASED RESOURCE MATCHING 125
important concept for theoretical and empirical reasons, and the implications are discussed
in the next section.
It is important to note that in case of preference profiles with indifferences, there are other
concepts of stability that can be used. Irving (1994) introduced the concepts of strong sta-
bility and super stability. Both build on a slightly adjusted notion of a blocking pair. In
the case of weak stability (as used in this thesis), both partners in the blocking pair have
to strictly prefer each other to their current partner. For strong stability, only one of the
users has to strictly prefer the other user while the second user can be indifferent between
the options. In case of super stability, both can be indifferent between their current match
and the potential new match. It was shown that while there always exists a weakly stable
solution, this need not be the case for strongly or super stable solutions (Irving, 1994). As
weak stability is the most often used in the literature, and strongly stable and super stable
solutions do not always exist (see Irving (1994)), this chapter will concentrate on this notion
of stability.
Considering the existence of solutions to the two-sided matching problem, the following
result provides an optimistic outlook:
Theorem 1 (Gale and Shapley, 1962, and Irving, 1994 ). For each two-sided matching prob-
lem, potentially with incomplete preference lists and/or indifferences, there exists at least one stable
solution.
As mentioned before, stability is usually considered to be the most important characteristic
of a match. Therefore, the existence of at least one stable solution to the matching problem
as shown in Theorem 1 is a very important and helpful result. On the other hand, the next
definition shows that the number of different stable solutions can be very large:
Theorem 2 ( Irving and Leather, 1986; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Knuth, 1997 ). Depending
on the preference profiles, the number of different stable matches can be exponential.
Theorem 2 is an important result as it implies two aspects: 1) the number of different stable
solutions can be very large, and an enumeration of these solutions might not be feasible; 2)
different stable solutions can be further evaluated considering other performance criteria
as well. Therefore, the next section introduces the commonly considered criteria which are
used alongside stability to measure the quality of a solution.
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5.1.2. Performance Metrics for Two-Sided Matching
In standard two-sided matching scenarios, stability is often seen as the most important
property. Yet, as seen in the last section the number of stable solutions for a given set of
preference profiles can be large, sometimes even exponential in the number of users. For
this reason, several other criteria are commonly used in conjunction with stability. For the
matching problems considered in this chapter, the following economic performance criteria
are considered:4
Stability Stability is measured by the number of blocking pairs in a solution (see Defini-
tion 6).
Welfare As a measure of the total “satisfaction” of users with respect to their preferences,
welfare is defined as the average rank of the matched partner for each user.5 In formal
terms:
Welfare =
∑i,j∈〈X,Y〉 Pi,j + Pj,i
nX + nY
(5.1)
Note that lower numbers indicate better solutions, as the most preferred alternative has
rank 1.
Fairness Considering the welfare distribution of the two sides, fairness is measured as the
difference of the average ranks of the matched partner. A higher fairness score reflects that
users of one side are, on average, matched to partners with a better rank than users of the
other side, whereas scores around 0 reflect a more equal welfare distribution. Formally:
Fairness =
∣∣∣∣∑i,j∈〈X,Y〉 Pi,jnX − ∑i,j∈〈X,Y〉 Pj,inY
∣∣∣∣ (5.2)
Number of Matched Pairs For problems with complete preferences, the algorithms con-
sidered in this thesis always yield the maximum number of matched pairs. In contrast,
4The definitions of welfare and fairness scores are adapted from Gusfield (1987) and Iwama et al. (2010).
In addition to the presented metrics, regret is sometimes considered as well. It is defined as the lowest
preference rank that any user is matched with, and is a measure for how good a solution is for the user
with the lowest-ranked matched partner.
5Welfare is also sometimes referred to as the most “egalitarian” solution.
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this property is lost by introducing incomplete preferences. In such cases, the number of
matched pairs is used as a quality metric for the matches:
NumPairs = ∑
〈X,Y〉
{〈x,y〉 |x 6= ∅ ∧ y 6= ∅} (5.3)
In case of incomplete preferences, finding the stable match with the highest number of
matched pairs is the most commonly considered combination of metrics. Even though
finding the welfare- and fairness-best stable solution can also be goals in this case, the
application of the welfare and fairness metrics to the incomplete preferences case requires
the specification how unmatched users are handled for the calculation of metrics. There is
no standard in the literature how this case is handled, and most approximation algorithms
focus on the mentioned combination of stability and matched pairs. In the subsequent
evaluation, the welfare and fairness metrics will consider the matched users only.
For the given definitions, ranks are equally weighted, i.e., weights for different preference
rankings are not considered. This follows standard literature on two-sided matching, yet
cannot capture the fact that preference rank differences might not be equidistant in real
settings. For example, a user might consider the difference between the first and second
rank differently than between the tenth and eleventh. Although the subsequently described
heuristics are easily adapted to a weighted preference setting, the unweighted setting is
evaluated as algorithms for the weighted settings do not exist for each relevant scenario.
5.1.3. Preference Structures and Computational Complexity
The goal of two-sided matching is to find an allocation that optimizes a certain combi-
nation of the aforementioned performance criteria. The complexity of finding an optimal
solutions depends on two input parameters: 1) the type of user preference profiles, and 2)
the combination of metrics that are used in the optimization.
To classify the preference types considered in a given problem, the case of complete and
strict preferences is abbreviated as SM (stable matching), complete preferences with indif-
ferences as SMT (stable matching with ties), and incomplete preferences with indifferences
as SMTI (stable matching with ties and incompleteness).
Theorem 3 ( Iwama et al. (1999); Manlove et al. (2002); Halldórsson et al. (2003) ). If pref-
erences are complete and include indifferences, finding a welfare-optimal or fairness-optimal stable
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match is NP-hard, and also hard to approximate. If preferences are incomplete and include indiffer-
ences, finding a maximum size stable match is NP-hard, and finding a welfare-optimal maximum
size stable match is NP-hard and hard to approximate.
There are two noteworthy implications when preference structures with indifferences
(SMT) or incompleteness (SMTI) are considered. First, Theorem 3 shows that finding an
approximation algorithm for the welfare- of fairness-optimal stable solution is a hard prob-
lem itself, meaning that for these problems there is no approximation algorithm that is able
to guarantee a non-trivial solution quality. This result exemplifies the importance of study-
ing heuristics for finding solutions in these cases. Second, if only indifferences are allowed
in preference structures, yet the preferences themselves are complete, then the adapted al-
gorithms as well as the heuristics guarantee that the maximum number of matched pairs is
found. This simply follows the fact that in case of completeness, every user of the other side
is acceptable, leading to a matching with maximum size (which is the size of the smaller
market side). As soon as incompleteness is introduced, the algorithms are not able to guar-
antee a maximum size matching anymore. In this case, finding the maximum size stable
matching is usually considered the most relevant objective, and finding the welfare- or
fairness-optimal stable matching out of the maximum size matching is considered a subor-
dinate goal which further increases problem complexity.
Table 5.1.: Computational Complexity of Two-Sided Matching Problems. SM indicates complete
and strict preferences, SMT complete with indifferences, and SMTI incomplete with indifferences.
Objectives are Stability (S), Welfare (W), Fairness (F), Number of Matched Pairs (NM), or Multiple
Objectives (MO).
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S & NM NP-hard Király (2011) Approx Király
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Table 5.1 provides an overview of the computational complexity of the matching problems
relevant for this work. For the baseline case of complete and strict preferences (SM), it is
possible to find a stable match, as well as the stable match with the best welfare, in polyno-
mial time. Yet even with these rather strict assumptions about preference types, finding the
stable match with the best fairness score is NP-hard. Once either the completeness or the
strictness assumption is relaxed, the complexity of finding stable solutions that optimize
an additional performance criterion increases. In case of complete preferences with indif-
ferences (SMT), finding the welfare-optimal solution becomes NP-hard. The algorithm of
Irving et al. (1987) can still be used to calculate a solution, yet as the solution quality de-
pends on the way that the indifferences are broken, it cannot guarantee an optimal solution
anymore.6 Computing the fairness-optimal solution remains NP-hard. In the general case
of incomplete preferences with indifferences (SMTI), the standard goal is to find a stable
solution of maximum size. This problem is also NP-hard, and several approximation algo-
rithms have been developed for this case.
Considering preference structures, besides the classification into SM, SMT and SMTI, pref-
erences can be categorized according to their correlation, i.e., the degree to which the pref-
erences of multiple users are correlated. On the one hand, preferences are uncorrelated
if each user’s preferences are independent of other users’ preferences, e.g., if preferences
are created randomly. On the other hand, Celik and Knoblauch (2007) propose a method
to create correlated preferences. Given a certain threshold percentage x, the first x pref-
erences are common among all participants of a side, and the last n − x preferences are
common as well (the actual order can be different, of course). This introduces a correlation
in the set of preferences which can have an effect on the algorithm performance.7 In the
subsequent evaluation, uncorrelated preferences will be used as a baseline, and preference
correlation according to the mentioned method will be applied as well to study its effects
on the matching outcome.
5.2. Related Work
The literature on two-sided matching, beginning with the seminal paper of Gale and Shap-
ley (1962), has emphasized stability as the design objective for two-sided matching. Un-
der the assumptions that preference rankings are strict and independent (of preferences of
6To guarantee optimality, the algorithm would have to be applied to all possible ways to break the indiffer-
ences. In the general case, this number can be exponential in the lengths of ties and number of users.
7Another possibility is to study intercorrelated preferences (see Boudreau and Knoblauch (2010)), however
this is left for future work.
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other individuals),8 Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced two of the standard problems in
two-sided matching, the College Admissions problem and the Marriage Market. They also
provided the first description of the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithm, which under the
mentioned assumptions is able to find at least one and at most two stable matches rapidly
(in polynomial time).9
The literature on two-sided matching has grown considerably since Gale and Shapley
(1962), as have the applications of two-sided matching. Roth (2008) and Abdulkadiroglu
and Sönmez (2010) provide extensive overviews on the field of two-sided matching and
related concepts such as one-sided matching. Broadly speaking, there have been several
main areas of research:
1. Types of Matching Problems
2. Preference Structures
3. Alternative Design Objectives
4. Computational Complexity.
Types of Matching Problems As mentioned earlier, the focus of this work is 1 : 1 resource
allocation, i.e., one user of side X is matched to one user of side Y, and vice versa. This
model, often termed a “Marriage Market”, was first defined by Gale and Shapley (1962)
and has received considerable attention. There are, however, other types of models that
are noteworthy to discuss. For example, if providing users of side Y have the capacity to
serve (or to be matched with) several users of side X, the problem becomes a 1 : n matching.
The standard model in this case is the College Admission Model (see e.g. Gale and Shapley
(1962); Roth (1985); Balinski and Sönmez (1999)), where users of side X request one unit
of a resource (e.g., a college space), and users of side Y have a certain capacity, cy ≥ 1, of
resources they can provide. It is noteworthy that some of the algorithms used for 1 : 1
matching problems can be used for 1 : n problems through certain adjustments as well, and
that several of the important theorems and implications presented in the previous chapters
also hold in this case. For the more general model of m : n matching, Roth and Sotomayor
(1992) provide a good overview of algorithms that can be used in this case.
8In particular, no “two-body problems” in which two or more individuals preferentially interact, such as in
spouses preferring to locate near each other, were permitted.
9As Roth (2008) notes, certain labor markets had been managed successfully since the 1950’s using a version
of DA, but Gale and Shapley were unaware of this at the time.
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Preference Structures Regarding preferences, the DA and much of the subsequent liter-
ature focuses on problems with strict preference orderings. If ties (indifferences) are intro-
duced into the problem, certain characteristics of the algorithms can no longer be guaran-
teed. For example, in order to use the standard algorithms such as DA, the ties have to be
broken first as the DA only allows strict preferences as input. Erdil and Ergin (2006, 2008)
introduced an algorithm that can cope with ties in preferences. Their algorithm tries to find
potential Pareto-improvement cycles in a given solution which might improve the overall
quality of the solution. As Gusfield and Irving (1989, p.219) note, however, many of the
strong results for DA and related algorithms depend upon strict preference orderings, and
characterizing stable matches under partial ordering remains a largely open problem. Scott
(2005) considers several variants of the standard, symmetric matching problem, specifically
concentrating on different concepts of stability. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) study the effect
of tie-breaking on the efficiency of the DA mechanism, and also consider the stability-cost
of finding an efficient matching which does not have to be stable. They show that in some
cases the welfare of participants of one side can be improved, which leads to the introduc-
tion of a potentially large number of blocking pairs.
Considering the type of preferences, the previously introduced definitions follow standard
literature and specify a qualitative preference ranking, i.e., for every two alternatives the
ranking determines whether the first alternative is better, worse, or equal to the second
alternative. They do not, however, allow for a quantitative comparison of how much bet-
ter or worse an alternative is. For example, from the ranking a1 > a2 > a3 it cannot be
inferred how much better a1 is compared to a3. The concept of weighted preferences extends
the previous qualitative definitions and assigns a weight (or score) to each preference rank.
Such a weighting of preferences has been proposed by Irving et al. (1987). They present
adapted algorithms for certain matching problems, using the standard performance met-
rics. However, Pini et al. (2011b) argue that the performance metrics themselves have to
be adapted to capture preference weights. Overall, as algorithms for weighted preferences
have only been developed for certain preference structures and a quantitative weighting of
preferences might not always be necessary, this work focuses on the standard definition of
qualitative preferences in two-sided matching.
Objective Functions Regarding design objectives for matching, other than stability, it
was shown early on that DA is heavily biased as it finds the optimal stable match for one
side, and the pessimal stable match for the other side (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992). This
raises the question of finding stable matches (or matches with only a few unstable pairs of
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pairs) for the sake of other criteria, such as fairness and social welfare. For strict and com-
plete preferences, Irving et al. (1987) efficiently compute the welfare-optimal stable match.
Axtell and Kimbrough (2008) discuss trade-offs between stability and welfare, and Klaus
and Klijn (2006b) study (procedural) fairness and stability. Iwama et al. (2010) propose an
algorithm that approximately yields the fairness-optimal stable matching. Using heuristics
such as Genetic Algorithms, Kimbrough and Kuo (2010) show that they can yield supe-
rior solutions for welfare and fairness if a certain instability is allowed. Other approaches
that look at different or multiple objectives for certain matching problems include Vien and
Chung (2006), Klaus and Klijn (2006a), Pais (2008), Pini et al. (2011a), and Boudreau (2011)
which also consider economic criteria such as welfare. From the perspective of what met-
rics are most relevant in practice, Echenique and Yariv (2011) study one-to-one matching in
experimental settings where participants have full information about the preferences. They
find that, among other things, stable matches are the most prevalent outcome, and that the
cardinal representation of the ordinal preferences impacts which of the different matches is
selected.
Computational Complexity The issue of computational complexity arises once prefer-
ences with incompleteness or indifferences are considered. On one hand, the number of
stable matches can be large, sometimes exponential in the size of the problem (Gusfield
and Irving, 1989; Knuth, 1997), and it has been shown that the two-sided matching problem
in general is #P-complete (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, p.157). Furthermore, for the consid-
ered SMT and SMTI preference structures, the respective optimization problem is NP-hard
(Halldórsson et al., 2007), and for certain scenarios such as finding the maximum number of
matched users Integer Program formulations exist (Iwama et al., 2010). As discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1.3, for strict and complete preferences there are polynomial-time algorithms to com-
pute the welfare-optimal (Irving et al., 1987) and approximately fairness-optimal solutions
(Iwama et al., 2010). However, by introducing indifferences and/or incompleteness, the
problem of finding the welfare-optimal, minimum-regret or fairness-optimal stable match
becomes NP-hard, and sometimes even hard to approximate (Halldórsson et al., 2007).
Due to this complexity, heuristics have been studied to obtain solutions to the matching
problem, the GA being a prominent example. For example, Nakamura et al. (1995) study
whether a GA can yield stable matches with higher fairness than the DA solutions, yet do
not consider indifferences or other objectives. Aldershof and Carducci (1999) describe a
GA to compute stable solutions from random initial assignments, with stability as the sole
objective. Furthermore, both Kimbrough and Kuo (2010) and Vien and Chung (2006) com-
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pare a GA with multiple objectives to the standard algorithms, yet neither of them consider
indifferences in preferences.
Summary
The literature review shows that while two-sided matching is a well-studied problem in
the literature, there are still some aspects that need further investigation. Table 5.2 pro-
vides an overview of the most relevant related work for 1 : 1 resource alloaction. Especially
considering the flexibility towards optimizing different or changing objectives, existing al-
gorithms mostly focus on a given set of optimization goals, and for certain combinations of
goals no efficient optimization or approximation algorithms exist. As the calculation of the
optimal solution is, in general, NP-hard, heuristics are particularly well suited for scenarios
with multiple or flexible objective functions and different preference settings as they can be
adapted to cover the respective scenario. Previously developed heuristics, however, have
either focused on the setting of strict preferences or a certain combination of optimization
goals. Hence, the heuristics developed in this thesis bridge this research gap by providing
the flexibility to cover different preference structures.
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Goal
5.3. Algorithms for Preference-based Matching
Most algorithms found in the literature concentrate on finding stable matches under cer-
tain conditions. Depending on the quality guarantees that an algorithm offers, they can
be distinguished into exact, approximate and heuristic algorithms. Exact algorithms yield
the optimal solution for a given scenario, and approximate algorithms guarantee that the
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solution quality is within a certain bound of the optimal solution. Heuristic algorithms, in
general, do not provide such a quality bound, yet have other advantages such as the flexi-
bility to consider multiple simultaneous objectives. This section introduces the algorithms
considered for this chapter. Section 5.3.1 starts with the description of exact algorithms
and the scenarios they can be applied in, and Section 5.3.2 continues with an overview of
state-of-the-art approximation algorithms. Finally, Section 5.3.3 introduces and describes
the heuristic algorithms that are focus of this chapter.
5.3.1. Exact Algorithms
As seen in Section 5.1.3, for certain preference structures the calculation of the optimal so-
lution is possible in polynomial time. For strict preferences the Deferred Acceptance (DA)
algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962) can be used which always yields a stable outcome.
Additionally, in this case the welfare-optimal (WO) algorithm by Irving et al. (1987) yields
the welfare-optimal (or most egalitarian) stable solution in polynomial time. In the case of
indifferences, a tie-breaking rule has to be applied first in order to apply these algorithms.
The tie-breaking rule greatly affects the quality of the resulting matching and, in general,
applying the algorithms after tie-breaking does not guarantee a good solution. This section
describes the respective algorithms. In addition, the matching problem is formulated as a
Linear Program for the SM case and as Integer Program for the SMTI case.
Formulation as Optimization Model The two-sided matching problem can be formu-
lated as an optimization problem. For the standard model of strict preferences, Vande Vate
(1989), Rothblum (1992), and Roth et al. (1993) introduced a linear programming (LP) for-






zi,y ≤ 1 ∀y ∈ Y (5.5)
∑
j∈Y





zi,y + zx,y ≥ 1 ∀〈x,y〉 ∈ A (5.7)
zx,y ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X,y ∈ Y (5.8)
zx,y = 0 ∀ (x,y) ∈ (X×Y)\A (5.9)
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In their model, the decision variable zi,j determines whether users i and j are matched
(zi,j = 1) or not (zi,j = 0), and A defines the set of acceptable matched pairs. The optimiza-
tion function (5.4) maximizes the number of matched pairs. Equations (5.5) and (5.6) ensure
that each user is only allocated once. Equation (5.9) prohibits matched pairs which are not
mutually acceptable, and Equation (5.7) guarantees that the solution is stable. Although
Equation (5.8) is formulated as a linear constraint, the properties of the optimization prob-
lem ensure that a solution that satisfies constraints (5.5) - (5.9) is in fact an integer solution
of the given optimization problem (Rothblum, 1992; Roth et al., 1993).
For the case of indifferences in preferences, the previous formulation has to be adapted. In
particular, applying the formulation to a problem with indifferences might not yield valid
integer solutions anymore, which makes an adaptation of constraint (5.8) necessary. This
also implies that the corresponding optimization problem is an Integer Program (IP), which
are, in general, NP-hard to solve.10 Using a formulation similar to Iwama et al. (2014)11, the






zi,y ≤ 1 ∀y ∈ Y (5.11)
∑
j∈Y





zi,y + zx,y ≥ 1 ∀〈x,y〉 ∈ A (5.13)
zx,y ∈ {0,1} ∀x ∈ X,y ∈ Y (5.14)
zx,y = 0 ∀ (x,y) ∈ (X×Y)\A (5.15)
As before, the optimization goal is to maximize the number of matched pairs (Equation
5.10). Other optimization functions can be used as well, provided they are linear. For ex-
ample, for complete preferences with indifferences the welfare-optimal solution can be ob-




zi,j. Constraints (5.11), (5.12),
and (5.15) are unchanged, and constraint (5.13) ensures a (weakly) stable solution.
10This is in accordance with the previous theoretical findings in Table 5.1.
11The difference in this formulation is in Equation (5.13), which stems from a slightly different definition of
the % relation. Conceptually, however, the two formulations are equivalent.
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Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Being introduced in the seminal article by Gale and Shapley (1962), the Deferred Accep-
tance (DA) algorithm has been widely used and adapted for applications in research and
practice. It was first introduced for the simple Marriage Market (symmetric matching in-
stances with nX = nY), and subsequently adapted for other matching problems such as
College Admission problems. The strengths of the DA are its fast runtime, applicability for
different preference structures, and simplicity.
Considering complexity, the DA runs in O(n2) where n is the size of a (symmetric) market
side, which makes it the fastest deterministic algorithm among the described algorithms to
solve the matching problem. It can be easily adapted to cope with incomplete preferences,
and indifferences are usually handled by breaking the ties first before applying the DA in
its standard formulation. The pseudocode of the DA is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962)
Data: Preference Profiles
Result: Stable match µ
1 begin
2 If some preference profiles are not strict, break the ties to get a strict ranking;
3 while Unmatched users of side 1 who have not proposed to all acceptable users in their preference
list do
4 select a user of side 1 that is unmatched and has acceptable partners to which they
didn’t propose yet;
5 user proposed to partner that is highest on their list;
6 if partner is unmatched and finds user acceptable then
7 partner temporarily accepts proposal;
8 else if partner is matched and prefers user to current match then
9 partner temporarily accepts proposal;
10 formerly matched user becomes unmatched and removes partner from
preference list;
11 else
12 user removes partner from preference list;
13 end
14 end
15 All users are matched to their current partner
16 end
Despite these advantages, the DA has several limitations as well. Firstly, although it al-
ways yields a stable solution, for a given set of strict preferences it can only find at most
two different stable solutions by switching the side that starts the algorithm. As there are
up to exponentially many stable solutions (Knuth, 1997), the solution quality of the DA
with respect to other performance metrics such as welfare is not immediately clear. Sec-
ondly, the DA yields particularly unfair solutions in the sense that it calculates the best
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stable solution for the starting side and the pessimal stable solution for the second side.
This has to be considered especially when fairness aspects between the two market sides
are of importance. Lastly, in case of incomplete preferences the DA does not guarantee
a matching of maximum size. Albeit an undoubtedly useful algorithm, for these reasons
other algorithms have been developed over time to address these issues.
Welfare-Optimal Algorithm
For the problem of finding a welfare-optimal stable solution in case of strict and complete
preferences, Irving et al. (1987) present an algorithm that yields a solution in polynomial
time (henceforth called Welfare-Optimal algorithm, WO). If n is the size of one side in
a symmetric setting, the runtime of their algorithm is O(n4). The pseudocode of WO is
shown in Algorithm 2. The algorithm uses the concept of rotations, which were studied in
the context of a symmetric 1:1 market by Irving and Leather (1986). They showed that all
stable solutions of a given matching problem can be identified by the use of these rotations.
Essentially, the algorithm by Irving et al. (1987) uses this rotation concept in combination
with graph-theoretic algorithms in order to find the sequence of rotations that yield the
welfare-optimal stable solution. Similar to the DA, WO can be used in case of strict pref-
erences with or without indifferences by breaking the ties before the start of the algorithm.
However, in case of indifferences WO only guarantees the welfare-optimal stable solution
for a given tie breaking; the global welfare-optimal matching cannot be guaranteed.
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode of Welfare-Optimal Algorithm (Irving et al., 1987)
Data: Preference Profiles
Result: Welfare-optimal stable match µ
1 begin
2 Calculate shortlists for each user;
3 Calculate all rotations given the shortlists;
4 Create graph from weighted rotation poset P;
5 Compute maximum-weight closed subset;
6 Eliminate all rotations in maximum-weight closed subset;
7 end
The O(n4) algorithm by Irving and Leather (1986) was later improved to a O(n2.5log n)
algorithm by Feder (1992). As the focus of the subsequent evaluation is the solution quality
rather than the runtime (the quality is the same as both are optimal algorithms), only WO
is considered in the evaluation.
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5.3.2. Approximation Algorithms
As it is not possible to calculate optimal solutions through polynomial-time algorithms for
all matching problems, in certain cases approximation algorithms can be used to calculate
a solution with a specified quality bound. Examples of the problem types where an ex-
act solution cannot be computed in polynomial-time is finding the fairness-optimal stable
solution (even for strict and complete preferences), and finding the maximum size stable
matching in case of incomplete preferences (see the overview in Table 5.1). For these prob-
lems, approximation algorithms have been developed.
Fairness Approximation
Finding the fairness-optimal stable solution is NP-hard even for strict and complete prefer-
ences. Hence, Iwama et al. (2010) propose an approximation algorithm (henceforth called
Fairness-Equal, FE) that yields stable solutions with a certain quality bound on the fairness
score. The FE algorithm works with a parameter ε that specifies the fairness bounds within
which the near-optimal fair solution is intended to be found. Without loss of generality, the
implementation of FE used for the evaluation assumes ε = 0.1. Clearly, the specification of
this bound involves a certain trade-off. On one hand, if the bound is too tight, it is possible
that no solutions will be found within the bound. On the other hand, if the bound is too
large, the solution quality with respect to the fairness score might be worse, as solutions
are accepted which might be further away from a perfectly fair solution.
MaxPairs Approximation
As described earlier, in case of incomplete preferences it is NP-hard to find the stable match
of maximum size. Several approximation algorithms have been suggested for this case. As
the trivial approximation ratio in this case is 2, i.e., the worst case size of a solution is half
the size of the optimal solution, any approximation ratio smaller than 2 is desirable.
• Shift: Halldórsson et al. (2007) describe an approximation algorithm for this case, in
the following abbreviated as Shift. For certain preference structures, this algorithm
provides non-trivial quality bounds for finding the stable match of maximum size.
Shift operates through breaking indifferences in a systematic manner and applying
the DA on the resulting set of strict preferences. In particular, if indifferences occur
on both sides of the market, Shift guarantees non-trivial quality bounds if the length
of indifferences is at most 2.
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• McDermid: McDermid (2009) presents an algorithm with a 3/2 approximation ratio,
which is the best known approximation ratio for the general case without restrictions
on tie lengths.
• Király: Similarly, Király (2011) presents an algorithm with a 5/3 approximation ratio,
which has a slightly better runtime than that of McDermid (2009).
• GSModified: Paluch (2012) presents another algorithm with the same runtime and
approximation ratio as the algorithm by Király (2011).
These algorithms are used in the subsequent comparison. If ties are only one-sided, (Iwama
et al., 2014) provide an algorithm that guarantees an approximation ratio of 25/17. Irv-
ing and Manlove (2008) present algorithms to approximate stable marriage and hospi-
tal/residents problems. As the former puts a considerable restriction on the preferences,
and the latter has a worse approximation ratio than McDermid, Király and GSModified,
they are not considered in the evaluation.
5.3.3. Heuristics
In addition to the mentioned algorithms, the use of heuristics to find solutions to the match-
ing problem is investigated. In this chapter, besides improvement cycles as suggested in
the literature (Erdil and Ergin, 2008), two different heuristics are used: a Genetic Algorithm
(GA) (Goldberg, 1989) as an example of a evolutionary (meta)heuristic, and a Threshold
Accepting algorithm as an example of a local search heuristic. In general, heuristics can
be used to find (stable) solutions from random initial assignments (see Aldershof and Car-
ducci (1999); Kimbrough and Kuo (2010)), or to improve an initial stable matching by trying
to retain stability and increasing other performance criteria (see Haas et al. (2013)).
Improvement Cycles
In the case of (potentially incomplete) preferences with indifferences, Erdil and Ergin (2008)
suggest an algorithm that computes improvement cycles for a given stable solution. This al-
gorithm, called Requester-Optimal-Stable-Matching (RSMA) throughout the chapter, looks
for ordered sequences of matched pairs, such that each requester (weakly) prefers to be
matched to the provider of the next pair. If such a sequence of matched pairs exists, switch-
ing each requester to the next provider on the respective sequence element yields another
stable match that is Pareto-superior for the requesting users (though not necessarily for the
providers). In case the sequence of pairs contains a pair with an unmatched requester and a
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pair with an unmatched provider, the sequence is called an improvement cycle, otherwise
an improvement chain. It is easy to see that an improvement cycle increases the number
of matched users, whereas an improvement chain yields a match with the same number of
matched users.
While RSMA guarantees that users of one side are not worse of from the improvement,
this is not necessarily true for users of the second side. For such cases, Erdil and Er-
gin (2006) suggest an alternative algorithm, the Efficient-and-Stable-Matching-Algorithm
(ESMA), which focuses on improvements in which both sides are (weakly) better off. As
this restricts the potential chains and cycles that can be found, the subsequent evaluation
only considers RSMA, as initial results have shown that applying ESMA does not signifi-
cantly improve the solution in but a small number of cases.
MaxPairs Heuristic
Gelain et al. (2013) present local search heuristics to solve the generalized stable match-
ing. They start with solving the relaxed version of the problem (assuming complete prefer-
ences), thereby potentially introducing instability, and then deleting unstable pairs through
an iterative process until stable solutions are found. Initial tests showed that its perfor-
mance with respect to solution quality is worse than the heuristics proposed in this chapter,
which is why it has not been considered for further evaluation.
Genetic Algorithms
Starting with the groundbreaking works of Goldberg (1989) and Holland (1992), Genetic
Algorithms (GA) have been widely used for and successfully applied to many optimization
problems. Specifically, they have been found to perform well in case of large search spaces
(Duffy, 2006; Kimbrough and Kuo, 2010; Haas et al., 2013).
GAs start with a (usually randomly created) initial set of potential solutions (the popula-
tion) and evolve this solution set by applying certain mathematical operations on them.
The quality of a potential solution is determined by its fitness, i.e., how well it performs
with respect to the given objective function. The aim of this type of evolutionary algorithm
is to create new solutions which are better than the initial population. Each potential so-
lution, a chromosome, consists of several genes, where each gene represents the value of an
attribute of the solution. Traditionally, chromosomes and genes are encoded as bit-strings,
although integer- or real-valued genes are also commonly used in practice. In order to find
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solutions with high fitness values, the GA evolves the population by applying the men-
tioned operations, yielding a new population of potential solutions.12 Usually, there are
three main genetic operators used to obtain the new population, which are specified as
follows (see Goldberg (1989)):
Selection Through the selection operator, a certain number of chromosomes of the old
population are selected into an intermediate population, and the subsequent operations
are performed only on this intermediate population. Intuitively, this means that only a cer-
tain number of solutions are allowed to reproduce, and usually only the fittest solutions are
selected in this step. The selection itself can be implemented in various ways. In practice,
many GA implementations use either a tournament or a roulette-selector. A tournament
selector of size k randomly selects k solutions out of the population and selects the fittest
of these k solutions. In contrast, a roulette-selector assigns probabilities to individual solu-
tions, where the probability of being selected is proportional to the solution’s fitness.
Crossover The crossover operator was developed as an analogy to biological reproduc-
tion. Usually, crossover is only applied to a certain percentage of solutions of the interme-
diate population. The crossover itself is performed in two steps. First, two solutions of the
intermediate population are selected. Second, certain parts of the two selected solutions
are swapped. There are several commonly used crossover operators that determine which
parts of the chromosomes are swapped. As some crossover operators might create invalid
solutions depending on the specific encoding of the chromosomes, the right crossover oper-
ator has to be chosen for the given problem. The newly created solutions, called offspring,
then usually replace the parent solutions.
Mutation After crossover, the mutation operator randomly changes the values of some
genes according to a specified mutation probability. The rate of mutation is essential for
the performance of the genetic algorithm. If the mutation rate is too low, the chance of
getting stuck in local optima increases. In contrast, setting the mutation rate too high does
12An important theoretical result on the efficiency of a GA is the schema-theorem, also referred to as the build-
ing block hypothesis. The theorem states that schemas, defined as a subset of genes which are inherent to fit
chromosomes and that are found across several chromosomes, are exponentially more often propagated in
successive generations (Goldberg, 1989). In other words, inherent characteristics of successful solutions are
exponentially more often found in next generations of the population. This is important for the matching
problem, as it states that successful matched pairs are propagated to the new solutions.
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not allow the algorithm to settle and converge to a solution due to the continuous adjust-
ments through mutations. Hence, care must be taken in selecting a mutation rate, as this
fundamentally affects the outcome of the genetic algorithm.
For the matching problem, each chromosome represents a solution 〈X,Y〉. A chromosome
consists of several genes, where each gene encodes a provider-requester match 〈x,y〉 of the
solution. In other words, when a solution has m matches, the chromosome has m genes,
and each gene consists of two identifiers, one for the provider, one for the requester.13 As
fitness functions for two-sided matching, the maximization of stability, welfare, fairness,
number of pairs, or a combination thereof are used. As each chromosome only encodes a
set of matched pairs, the preferences of the users are needed to evaluate its fitness.
In order to improve the fitness of the solutions, the two described genetic operators are
applied after the fitness evaluation in order to derive new, potentially better-performing
solutions. For crossover, the cycle crossover operator (Goldberg, 1989) creates new potential
solutions by combining two parent solutions. This type of crossover operator ensures valid
solutions for the given encoding by exchanging the same set of IDs for the two chromo-
somes.14 The mutation operator, given a certain mutation probability, depends on the type
of preferences and optimization objective. In case of complete preferences with indiffer-
ences, it randomly selects two genes (matched pairs) of a given chromosome and exchanges
either the requester or provider identifiers to create a new chromosome. In case of incom-
plete preferences, it randomly selects a gene with an unmatched requester, a randomly cho-
sen amount of genes representing matched pairs, and a gene with an unmatched provider.
This is done for a similar reason as the RSMA algorithm by Erdil and Ergin (2008): to po-
tentially find an improvement cycle that, when each requester is matched to the provider
of the next pair in the cycle, increases the number of matched pairs. This specification of
crossover and mutation operators ensure valid solutions which are not necessarily stable.
As the subsequent evaluation focuses on stable matching algorithms, blocking pairs are
discounted in the objective function of the GA, which ensures that newly created, unstable
solutions are not likely to be propagated through the evolution rounds. The population is
evolved using these operators over a given number of rounds. For the selection of solutions
that form the new population in the next evolution round, a tournament selector of size 2
13Note that the maximum number of genes is nX + nY , which represents the case that each user is unmatched.
14The use of standard crossover operations might yield solutions where users are matched multiple times.
Hence, only the class of crossover operations that are applicable for enumeration settings are of interest.
5.3. ALGORITHMS FOR PREFERENCE-BASED MATCHING 143
is used. Additionally, through an elitist selection the 5 best solutions are guaranteed to be
transferred to the next population. Algorithm 3 shows the pseudocode for the GA.15
Algorithm 3: Pseudocode of Genetic Algorithm based on (Goldberg, 1989; Holland,
1992)
Data: Preference Profiles
Data: Crossover and mutation probabilities
Data: Number of evolution rounds and size of population
Data: Number of best solutions retained: nbest
Data: Optional: Starting Solutions
Result: Match µ
1 begin
2 Create initial population: solution set← initial population;
3 for i← 1to number evolution rounds do
4 temporary solution set← perform crossover operation;
5 for solution ∈ temporary solution set do
6 mutate solution according to mutation probability;
7 end
8 solution set← ∅;
9 solution set← nbest solutions;
10 while size of solution set < size of population do
11 run tournament selection and include winner in solution set;
12 end
13 end
14 µ← best solution of population;
15 end
To show the actual encoding and how the genetic operators work, an example for the en-
coding, the cycle crossover, and the mutation operator are provided in Appendix C.
Threshold Accepting Algorithms
The second class of heuristics studied in this thesis are Threshold Accepting (TA) algo-
rithms (Dueck and Scheuer, 1990). TAs are an example of local search heuristics, where a
given starting solution is improved by sequentially adjusting the solution and accepting
adjustments within a certain threshold. TAs are conceptually similar to Simulated Anneal-
ing approaches and have been successfully applied in many optimization problems. De-
pending on the definition of the solution adjustment per step, TAs try to improve a given
solution and hence are suitable for finding (especially local) improvements. Compared to
GAs which work on a population of different solutions in the solution space, the perfor-
mance of a TA depends on the quality of the starting solution. However, it is more flexible
15The number of evolution rounds can be dynamically adjusted if the available computation time is limited,
e.g., in settings where a solution has to be calculated in short time. If the calculation of a solution is not
time-critical, the solution quality can be potentially increased by evolving the population over more rounds.
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on incrementally improving this solution than the GA which has to rely on mutations to
find improvements once it settled on a local or global optimum. The subsequent evaluation
studies its applicability in the case of two-sided matching.
The general procedure is shown in Algorithm 4. Given a starting solution, a set of thresh-
olds is defined. For each of these thresholds, a certain number of adjustments are sequen-
tially performed on the solution. For the matching problem, the adjustment is similar to the
mutation operator of the GA. For complete preferences, it selects two matched pairs and
switches either the requesting or providing users. For incomplete preferences, it selects an
unmatched user of side X, a randomly drawn number of matched pairs, and an unmatched
user of side Y (thus forming a cycle of matched pairs), and replaces the users of side X with
the respective user of the previous matched pair in the cycle. An adjustment is accepted
as new (temporary) solution if it does not decrease the solution quality by more than the
threshold (compared to the current solution). Thresholds are reduced over time such that
convergence to a (local) optimum becomes more likely, whereas the initial thresholds are
set to avoid being stuck in a local optimum too soon.
Algorithm 4: Pseudocode of Threshold Accepting Algorithm based on (Dueck and
Scheuer, 1990)
Data: Preference Profiles
Data: Number of thresholds
Data: Number of repetitions per thresholds
Data: Optional: Starting Solution µstart
Result: Match µ
1 begin
2 if µstart = ∅ then
3 µcurrent← create starting solution;
4 else
5 µcurrent = µstart;
6 end
7 for i← 1to number of thresholds do
8 for j← 1 to number of repetitions per threshold do
9 µadj← apply adjustment to µcurrent;
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Genetic Algorithm with Subsequent Threshold Accepting
GAs tend to sample (especially large) search spaces better than local search heuristics as
they start with a potentially diverse set of solutions. However, as mentioned before the
incremental improvement of a given solution depends on mutations. This might not be
as efficient as using local search heuristics that aim at improving a given solution. Hence,
the combination of the two approaches is also studied, where the GA is used to find a
good starting solution for the TA, which then tries to further improve this solution. For the
purpose of evaluation, this combination of heuristics, which represents a memetic algorithm,
is abbreviated as GATA.
5.4. Performance of Matching Algorithms
Algorithms such as GA and TA have an inherent flexibility to be adjustable to many dif-
ferent optimization functions and combinations of metrics that need to be optimized. This
stands in contrast to specialized algorithms, such as the approximation algorithms for cal-
culating the solution with the maximum number of matched pairs, which focus on one
specific scenario or set of goals. The aim of this section, therefore, is to provide a compari-
son of the performance of the different algorithms in specific settings.
For the evaluation, a simulation-based approach is used. This provides the flexibility to
test the performance of the algorithms in various different settings and perform sensitivity
analyses. Section 5.4.1 presents the specifications of the simulations, including the scenar-
ios, the varied input parameters, and the process to create preference profiles. Afterwards,
Section 5.4.2 shows the runtimes of the studied algorithms in different settings. Consid-
ering algorithm performance, for the case of SMT instances, i.e. preference profiles which
are complete and have indifferences, Section 5.4.3 compares the solution quality of the rel-
evant algorithms and evaluates how sensitive the results are with respect to certain input
parameters. Section 5.4.4 considers the same issues for SMTI instances, i.e., if preferences
are both incomplete and have indifferences.
5.4.1. Simulation Specifics
To obtain robust results and study their dependency on certain input parameters, a sys-
tematic simulation plan is used which specifies the simulation scenarios with the respec-
tive input parameter settings. Table 5.3 shows an overview of the most important input
parameters and the ranges of values that are used.
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Table 5.3.: Simulation Input Parameters
Parameter Range Description
nX {10,20,50,100,200,500} Number of requesting users
nY {10,20,50,100,200,500} Number of providing users
l {0.5,0.3,0.1,0.05} Relative length of preference lists
ψ {2,5,10} Maximum length of ties
ξ {25,100} Percentage of users j that are correlated in the preferences
of users i
The numbers of users per side, nX and nY, determine the size of the problem instance.
Usually, symmetric problems with nX = nY are considered in the literature. The evaluation,
however, also considers unequally sized problem instances. The remaining parameters are
concerned with the structure of the preferences. l determines the average expected number
of ranked users in the preference lists and is used during preference creation (see parameter
pD in Algorithm 5). ψ specifies the maximum length of the ties in the preference lists.
Furthermore, ξ defines if and to what degree the preferences are correlated. For a given
value of ξ, the users of the respective other side are split into two groups, and ξ determines
what percentage of users are in the first group. This grouping of users is the same for all
users of the side, yet the subsequent randomization leads to randomized rankings within
the two groups.
For the creation of preferences, an approach similar to (Gent and Prosser, 2002; Gelain
et al., 2013) is used. The general procedure is shown in Algorithm 5. The probability of
deletion, pD, is varied between 0.5 and 0.95 to account for a decrease in ranked users (this
corresponds to the input values for parameter l). Together with the 3 different values for
the maximum length of ties, this parametrization represents a full factorial 3x4 design for
the variables tie-length and probability of deletion, and allows for a study of the respec-
tive effects on the matching outcome. For all considered scenarios, 100 randomly created
independent repetitions are made.
In case of complete preferences with indifferences (Section 5.4.3), the algorithms DA, WO,
FE, GA, TA, and GATA are considered. Finding a stable solution is trivial by using DA,
hence the goal is to find a stable solution with good welfare or fairness scores. For GA,
TA, and GATA, several different objective functions are compared. In case of welfare op-
timization, the main objective was to decrease the previously introduced welfare metric.
Additionally, the objective function adds a penalty for each blocking pair, thereby discour-
aging unstable solutions. Similarly, for fairness optimization the fairness metric is the main
objective, and the penalty on blocking pairs is used as well. To show a multiple objective
function, the suffix ′′ − EW ′′ indicates an objective function that puts equal weight on the
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Algorithm 5: Pseudocode of Preference Generation
Data: Deletion Probability pD = (1− l)
Data: Max Length of Ties ψ
Data: Size of X and Y
Data: Correlation Parameter ξ
Result: Preference Profiles
1 begin
2 for user in set of requester or provider do
3 if ξ!=100 then
4 split users of other side into two groups of relative size ξ and 1− ξ;
5 end
6 create random preference list;
7 end
8 for preference list of users i ∈ X do
9 iterate over the users in the preference list;
10 for user j ∈ Y do
11 delete j from i’s list with probability pD;
12 if j is deleted, also delete i from j’s list;
13 end
14 end
15 for preference list do
16 for user in preference list do
17 randomly determine size of next tie length ∈ {1, ...,ψ};




welfare and fairness score, while also having a penalty on blocking pairs. Furthermore, as
the performance of DA, WO and FE depends on the way that ties are broken, these algo-
rithms are run 50 times per preference setting to study the variability in solution quality
with respect to tie breaking. For evaluation purposes, the average, best, and worst per-
formance of these 50 repetitions is presented to show the variability of results due to the
tie-breaking.
For incomplete preferences with indifferences (Section 5.4.4), the considered algorithms are
DA, RSMA, Király, Shift, McDermid and GSModified, as well as GA, TA and GATA.
For the parametrization of the GA, several different parameter combination for mutation
rate, crossover rate, crossover type and population size were compared. Similar to sugges-
tions in the literature (see De Jong and Spears (1991)), and due to the best performance of
this combination during initial pre-tests, a population size of 50 was chosen, along with a
mutation rate of 0.2, and a crossover probability of 0.6 using a cycle crossover operator. Ad-
ditionally, the best 5 solutions of a given population were always guaranteed to be ported
into the next generation. The GA was evolved for 100 evolution rounds. This is a smaller
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value than usually found in the literature, yet with the trade-off between computation time
and solution quality, initial experiments had shown that this is a suitable value. As men-
tioned before, increasing the number of evolution rounds, if the expected runtime permits,
can help to further improve the quality of GA and GATA. In other words, the presented
results can be considered a conservative view on GA and GATA performance. For the TA,
the threshold values of {0.04 ∗min{nX,nY} ,0.02 ∗min{nX,nY} ,0.01 ∗min{nX,nY} ,0} are
used with 10,000 repetitions per threshold.
5.4.2. Algorithm Runtime
Table 5.1 showed that introducing indifferences or incompleteness yields NP-hard opti-
mization problems. The computation of an optimal solution for these problems cannot
be expected in polynomial time, which is the reason why approximation and heuristic al-
gorithms are necessary. This section gives an overview of the runtimes of the considered
algorithms in different scenarios.
Finding Optimal Solutions The integer program as shown in Section 5.3.1 solves the
matching problem (with indifferences) optimally for certain cases, for example finding a
welfare-best or a maximum-size stable match. However, the calculation of the solution
to the integer program might not always be feasible in reasonable time. In order to test
the feasibility of calculating the optimal solution, the integer program was implemented
for the welfare-optimal (for the SMT case) as well as maximum-size stable match (for the
SMTI case) using ILOG CPLEX 12.116 and the corresponding Java integration to make it
callable from within the simulation tool. The solution was calculated for various problem
instances, using up to 16 parallel threads on 2 Quad-Core Xeon processor with 2.53 GHz
and 24-48 GB main memory.
The runtime experiments yield the following interesting results. First, for random uncorre-
lated preferences the solver is able to calculate an optimal solution for the given problems
up to problem sizes of 200x200 users in a matter of minutes. For larger problem instances
the solver usually runs out of memory. Second, correlated preferences significantly increase
the runtime of the solver. For example, for ξ = 25 the runtime of the solver increases to
minutes and hours even for problem instances of 50x50. For bigger problem instances, the
solver either runs out of memory again or does not yield a solution within several hours.
16http://www-01.ibm.com/software/commerce/optimization/cplex-optimizer/ – last ac-
cessed May 2014
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In real Social Cloud scenarios, the preference profiles can be quite diverse and include
incompleteness and indifferences. Hence, the computation of an optimal solution through
integer program solvers is not feasible for larger problem instances.
Calculating Approximate or Heuristic Solutions From a computational complexity per-
spective, the DA is the fastest algorithm with O(n2). Most of the approximation algorithms
for the case of incomplete preferences are similarly fast, having runtimes of O(mn2), where
m is an algorithm-specific factor.17 The WO algorithm, provided that indifferences are bro-
ken first, has a runtime of O(n4).18 Considering the studied heuristic algorithms, the TA
also has a runtime of O(mn2). In this case, m is the number of changes to the solutions
(number of thresholds multiplied with the repetitions per threshold). Similarly, the GA is
O(mpn2), where m is the number of evolution rounds and p the size of the population. For
both heuristics, the factor n2 stems from calculating the stability of the current solution,
for which no algorithm is known to have worst case time complexity better than O(n2).
Overall, the actual runtime then seems to depend on the algorithm-specific factor m.
Table 5.4.: Comparison of Algorithm Runtime
Algorithm Users10x10 20x20 50x50 100x100 200x200 500x500
Complete Preferences
DA <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec
WO <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 1 sec 34 sec
FE <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 1 sec 35 sec
GA <1 sec 2 sec 7 sec 18 sec 58 sec 8 min
TA <1 sec 2 sec 9 sec 25 sec 2 min 15 min
GATA 2 sec 4 sec 15 sec 43 sec 3 min 23 min
Incomplete Preferences
RSMA <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 5 sec
Király <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 1 sec
McDermid <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 2 sec
GSModified <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 3 sec
Shift <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec <1 sec 1 min
GA <1 sec 1 sec 3 sec 6 sec 12 sec 1 min
TA <1 sec 1 sec 5 sec 8 sec 15 sec 2 min
GATA 1 sec 3 sec 8 sec 15 sec 31 sec 5 min
Table 5.4 shows the average runtimes of the previously introduced approximation and
heuristic algorithms for different (uncorrelated) preferences.19 The table shows that for
17Shift is the only considered approximation algorithm with a different runtime. Given that the maximum
length of ties is ψ, its runtime is O(ψ2n2).
18As mentioned before, this can be improved to an O(n2.5log n) bound by Feder (1992).
19In general, runtimes for correlated preferences seem to be slightly higher than for uncorrelated preferences.
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problem sizes up to 500 users on each side, the DA, WO, and approximation algorithms
take less than or several seconds. GA, TA and GATA take longer, on average several sec-
onds to compute. This is due to the large number of evolution steps which are an essential
part of the heuristics. However, even for large problem sets finding a solution only takes a
few seconds to a few minutes.
Overall, it can be seen that for most problem instances, runtimes of all the studied algo-
rithms are in the range of seconds to minutes, which (especially for larger problem sizes) is
more than acceptable considering the NP-hard optimization problem.
5.4.3. Complete Preferences With Indifferences
If the preference profiles of users are complete yet contain indifferences, the same algo-
rithms as in case of strict preferences can be applied by breaking the ties first. However, as
shown in Table 5.1 applying the algorithms that are optimal in the case of strict preferences
does not guarantee solution optimality anymore, and finding a welfare- or fairness-optimal
stable solution is NP-hard. This scenario is the focus of this section, which is an extended
version of (Haas et al., 2013). As the considered algorithms always yield a stable solution
of maximum size in this case, it concentrates on finding a stable solution with good welfare
or fairness characteristics.
Considering GA and GATA heuristics, the subscript “−DA” indicates that they are initial-
ized only with DA solutions, whereas “−MIXED” means that a randomly created mixture
of DA, WO and FE solutions are used. Note that both WO and FE were developed for sym-
metric problem sizes, and some of their routines in calculating the solution do not easily
extend to non-symmetric settings. Hence, this case is not considered in this evaluation. At
the same time, this shows the advantage of having flexible heuristics to calculate matching
solutions: They can easily be applied to non-symmetric settings as well.
Unless stated otherwise, the statistical tests refer to non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests with Bonferoni p-value adjustment in order to account for multiple comparisons. The
test is used due to the simulation design (algorithms have the same preference lists as
input, leading to a paired design), as well as non-normally distributed data. The following
figures refer to the average values over the 100 independent repetitions. As DA, WO and
FE were run 50 times per repetition, additional bars indicate the average, best, and worst
solution out of these 50 repetitions to study the dependency of algorithm performance on
tie breaking.
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Optimizing Stability and Welfare
The combination of stability and welfare maximization aims to find a stable solution with
good welfare properties, i.e., where the average rank of the matched users is as close to the
respective most preferred option as possible. As mentioned before, for SMT instances this
is an NP-hard problem (and even hard to approximate), which means that finding a good
solution is far from trivial. Hence, heuristics such as GA and TA might be able to yield
better results than applying the algorithms developed for SM instances. The section only
presents the most important results, detailed results and additional scenarios can be found
in Tables C.1 and C.3 in Appendix C. For GA, TA, and GATA, the objective of welfare max-
imization with penalty on blocking pairs is used, which yields completely stable solutions






























Figure 5.1.: Comparison of Welfare Performance for Complete Preferences
Uncorrelated Preferences Figure 5.1 shows the results for the different algorithms for
problem sizes between 10x10 and 200x200 users, averaged over different tie-lengths. The
results show that the average welfare becomes worse with an increasing number of par-
ticipating users (indicated by an increasing score). This is not surprising, as an increase in
users also increases the list of potential competitors for high-ranked users on the preference
lists, thereby lowering the chance of being matched to a high ranked user.
Considering the performance of the algorithms, GA and GATA with mixed initial solutions
perform best. Both are able to significantly increase the DA and average WO solutions,
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and the solutions are slightly better than the best WO solutions (at the level p < 0.001).
This indicates that both GA and GATA are able to improve upon WO solutions and yield a
superior solution quality. Additionally, the fairness scores of the GA and GATA solutions
are on average slightly better than the WO (average and best) solutions.
Considering the GA performance with different initial solutions, the results show that the
GA with only DA solutions is able to significantly improve upon the DA solutions, and also
yields better solutions than WO for problem sizes up to 50x50. For larger number of users,
the WO might yield better solutions, yet the increase in solution quality compared to the
initial solutions is still significant (p < 0.001). If GA and GATA use mixed initial solutions,
the heuristics are able to improve upon them as well. This shows two issues: First, the GA
effectively improves the given starting solutions, showing its usefulness. Second, the qual-
ity of the starting solutions determine the quality of the heuristic solutions, which means
that feeding the heuristics with promising initial solutions increases their performance.
Interestingly, the TA does not perform as well. In the given setting, the TA starts with a
DA solution and then tries to find a better solution as specified in Section 5.3.3. Figure
5.1 shows that only for small problem instances the TA is able to significantly improve the
solution quality of the starting DA solution. For larger problem instances, TA performs
considerably worse compared to WO and GA. This indicates that starting with DA solu-
tions is not promising for TAs, which might get stuck in local optima. In contrast, the GA
with its ability to sample large search spaces is an adequate heuristic for SMT instances.
Due to this, the performance of GA and GATA are basically the same as TA is not able to
significantly improve the given solution.
Effect of Preference Correlation In this scenario, preferences are correlated with the fac-
tor ξ = 25, meaning that the set of user IDs is split into two sets of relative size 25% and
75%, and the 25% highest ranked users in all the preference profiles (of each side) are drawn
from the same set.
Considering finding a welfare-optimal stable solution, Figure 5.2 compares the perfor-
mance of DA, WO, GA, TA, and GATA. The results are qualitatively very similar to the case
of uncorrelated preferences. In general, the results show that the average welfare decreases
compared to the uncorrelated case, which is not surprising as the correlation means that
some users are more likely to be matched with lower-ranking users as there is an increased
competition for higher-ranked users. The relative ranking of the algorithm performance is
practically the same. GA and GATA perform significantly better than the other algorithms






























Figure 5.2.: Comparison of Welfare Performance for Complete and Correlated Preferences
on average (p < 0.001), and only the best WO solution yields comparable results (for all
considered scenarios, the signed-rank test reveals a statistical difference between the best
WO solution and GA (GATA), although the absolute difference is negligible). Another in-
teresting finding is that the spread in solution quality is smaller for correlated preferences,
i.e., is less dependent on the way that ties are broken. This is indicated by the smaller range
of best and worst solutions averaged over the 100 repetitions.
Sensitivity analyses were also performed on varying values for maximum tie lengths. The
results indicate that the relative performance of GA and GATA is better than WO particu-
larly for small tie lengths. However, the qualitative results are similar.
Optimizing Stability and Fairness
Besides welfare optimization, finding a stable and particularly fair solution is another com-
mon goal in two-sided matching. However, even for strict preferences this is an NP-hard
problem, and the approximation algorithm FE can be applied in SM and SMT instances by
appropriately breaking ties. This part of the evaluation aims to study the performance of
the DA, FE, GA, TA, and GATA algorithms for finding stable and fair solutions. As before,
it concentrates on the most important findings, and the detailed results can be found in
Tables C.2 and C.4 in Appendix C. For GA, TA, and GATA, the objective of fairness maxi-
mization with penalty on blocking pairs is used, which yields completely stable solutions
for the given scenarios.
































Figure 5.3.: Comparison of Fairness Performance for Complete Preferences
Uncorrelated Preferences Figure 5.3 presents the fairness performance of the considered
algorithms. As expected from theory, the DA has the worst performance of the considered
algorithms. Furthermore, as before TA finds improvements (in this case: fair solutions)
only for small problem instances. For larger instances the TA performance considerably
decreases. The figure also shows that the range of best and worst solutions can be consid-
erably high, which indicates that especially for DA tie-breaking greatly affects the solution
quality.
Comparing the performance of DA, FE and GA the results indicate that the GA and GATA
yield significantly better results with respect to fairness if it is initialized with mixed so-
lutions, and also outperforms the average FE solution. This is confirmed by Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests at the level p < 0.001. Over all considered scenarios, the signed-rank test
indicates a significant difference between the best FE solution and the GA solution with
mixed initial solutions, although the practical effect size can be considered negligible. The
performance of GATA-DA, initialized only with DA solutions, is significantly better than
DA solutions (p < 0.001), yet, for all but very small problem sizes up to 20x20 users, it
is worse than the average FE solution. Considering sensitivity with respect to input pa-
rameters, TA performs considerably better for larger tie lengths (see Tables C.2 and C.4 in
Appendix C).
Another interesting result is the performance of the GA with equal weight on welfare and
fairness. Tables C.1 - C.4 show that with this objective function, the fairness of the solutions
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can be substantially increased while resulting only in a small decrease in welfare perfor-
mance. This points out one of the main advantages of using heuristics to solve two-sided


































Figure 5.4.: Comparison of Fairness Performance for Complete and Correlated Preferences
Effect of Preference Correlation The results for correlated preferences are similar. Figure
5.4 shows that GA and GATA with fairness optimization and penalty for unstable pairs is
able to yield almost perfectly fair solutions for the studied scenarios. The performance of
GA and GATA with mixed initial solutions are significantly better with respect to fairness,
as a Wilcoxon signed-rank test at the level p = 0.01 reveals. Furthermore, the TA performs
slightly better for correlated preferences, and is able to provide comparably good results
for problem sizes up to 50x50 users.
5.4.4. Incomplete Preferences With Indifferences
In the most general case, preference profiles can be both incomplete and contain indiffer-
ences, in which case the common goal of matching algorithms is to find a stable solution
of maximum size. As shown in Table 5.1, there are several approximation algorithms and
heuristics specifically developed for this case. The focus of this section is to study how GA,
TA, and GATA heuristics perform against these specialized algorithms in different scenar-
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ios. For statistical evaluation, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used for the same reasons as
in the previous section.
Comparing Solution Quality
To compare the overall efficiency of the algorithms, this section studies the ability of the
mechanisms to compute a stable allocation of maximum size. The following figures rep-
resent the average values based on the 12*100 independent repetitions for each scenario,
a more detailed analysis of the effects of preference structures on the results is presented
subsequently. Similar to the previous section, for GATA the suffix ′′ −MIXED′′ indicates
that initial solutions are based on DA solutions plus an additional solution from applying
Király, McDermid, and GSModified, respectively.20 If no suffix is provided, GA and GATA
are initialized only with DA solutions. Considering the optimization function, GA, TA,
and GATA use a weighted function that emphasizes the number of matched pairs as main
goal, and also tries to optimize welfare as secondary goal. More specifically, the goal is to
minimize an objective function of the form (Max (nX,nY))
2 ∗ (Min (nX,nY)− NumPairs)+
Wel f are. This ensures that the number of matched pairs is the dominant objective, yet still
allows for the simultaneous optimization of welfare. For the evaluation and comparison
with the approximation algorithm, such an optimization function represents a pessimistic
comparison as the welfare scores tend to increase with a larger number of matched pairs,
indicating that welfare and matched pairs are conflicting optimization goals.
Performance in this case can be measured in two ways. On one hand, the percentage of
matched users can be considered as a proxy for algorithm performance. Depending on the
preferences, however, it cannot be guaranteed that there is a stable solution where all users
are matched. This suggests measuring the performance relative to the optimal solution as
an indicator how close the algorithms are to the optimal outcome.
Figure 5.5 displays the results for the first performance measure, the percentage of matched
users. Averaged over the different parameter values for tie length and length of preference
lists, the results show that with an increasing number of users, the percentage of matched
users in the solutions increases as well. Especially for large problem sizes, the majority
of users are matched (the next section shows that this seems to depend on the lengths of
the preference lists). There are apparently considerable differences in the performance of
20As seen in Section 5.4.2, the runtime for the approximation algorithms is comparably short, hence using
them in addition to the DA to get initial solutions does not increase the relative runtime of GA or GATA.






































Figure 5.5.: Algorithm Performance in Number of Matched Pairs, Uncorrelated Preferences
the algorithms. DA performs worst, which is not surprising as it was not specifically de-
veloped for this scenario. Applying the RSMA improvement cycle on the DA solution is
able to significantly increase the number of matched pairs. Considering the approximation
algorithms described in Section 5.3.2, the Király algorithm performs best, while GSModi-
fied, McDermid and Shift are slightly worse. Considering the Shift algorithm, the extended
results in Table C.5 in Appendix C show that it yields its best performance in case the max-
imum length of ties is 2, which is the core scenario for which it was developed. However,
the Király algorithm usually provides better solutions, and for larger tie lengths the perfor-
mance of Shift decreases considerably.
Both the GA and TA perform very well, being slightly outperformed only by Király. This
indicates that in contrast to the previous scenario with complete preferences, TA is a use-
ful heuristic in SMTI scenarios. Additionally, the results for GATA and GATA-MIXED
show that instantiating the GATA with solutions from approximation algorithms can sig-
nificantly increase the solution quality of GATA. In particular, GATA-MIXED on average
outperforms even the best approximation algorithm, Király, in the considered scenarios.
The statistical analysis with a Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals that there is no signifi-
cant difference between GA, GATA and Király, and that GA, GATA and Király are better
than TA, Shift, McDermid, GSModified as well as RSMA (p < 0.001). Furthermore, GATA-
MIXED yields better solutions than GA, GATA, and Király (p < 0.001).
Next, Figure 5.6 shows the relative performance of the considered algorithms with respect
to the optimum solution calculated with the Integer Program formulation as shown in Sec-
































Figure 5.6.: Algorithm Performance Relative to Optimum, Uncorrelated Preferences, 10x10 to
100x100 users
tion 5.3.1. Due to runtime and memory considerations, only the problem sizes with 10 to
100 users on each side are considered here. The graph shows that for all considered scenar-
ios the algorithms are within 95% of the optimum solution, i.e., are able to find relatively
large matches which are close to the optimal solution.






RSMA Shift TA GATA GA Király GATA-
MIXED
Mean 0.952 0.980 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.989 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.995
Median 0.965 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
S.D. 0.051 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.014
Min 0.500 0.778 0.667 0.667 0.750 0.750 0.667 0.750 0.857 0.857
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Opt. calc. (%) 0.228 0.619 0.660 0.669 0.684 0.731 0.763 0.759 0.754 0.813
Table 5.5 presents several statistics for the relative performance of the algorithms compared
to the optimal solution. Interestingly, the heuristics not only perform well on average, they
also calculate the optimal solution in more cases than the approximation algorithms. Fur-
thermore, the standard deviation is lower as well. As approximation algorithms provide a
guaranteed quality bound, i.e., worst case performance, Table 5.5 shows that the worst-case
performance is best for Király and GATA-MIXED.21
Overall, similar to the previous findings about the percentage of matched users, the con-
sideration of average and worst-case performance relative to the optimal solution shows
that GATA-MIXED not only yields the best solutions, but also the solutions with the best
21The worst-case performance of 0.66 for McDermid is exactly the guaranteed 3/2 approximation factor of the
considered approximation algorithm.
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worst-case performance. This is particularly interesting as it indicates that for the consid-
ered scenarios, the practical quality bounds of GA, GATA, and especially GATA-MIXED are
comparable (or even better) to the quality bounds of the approximation algorithms. How-
ever, as heuristics are not able to provide definite quality bounds, there might be scenar-
ios where the worst-case performance is lower than that of the approximation algorithms.
Nevertheless, the performance of the studied heuristics is more than promising.
Table 5.6.: Algorithm Performance for Welfare and Fairness Relative to GATA-MIXED, Incomplete
Preferences. Percentages indicate to what degree the GATA-MIXED solution improves upon the
respective algorithm.




Shift Király TA GA GATA
Welfare Score Increase relative to GATA-MIXED
10x10 10.2% 5.4% 5.7% 6.3% 1.1% 3.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.4%
20x20 13.9% 13.6% 11.3% 14.5% 2.5% 7.1% 0.5% 1.1% 0.8%
50x50 13.7% 31.1% 14.9% 26.6% 3.4% 8.7% 4.9% 1.1% 0.8%
100x100 12.2% 52.1% 16.7% 38.5% 3.0% 8.7% 7.6% 1.0% 0.9%
200x200 13.4% 79.9% 20.0% 50.0% 12.5% 11.6% 11.8% 1.0% 1.1%
500x500 18.5% 125.2% 26.2% 60.9% 18.5% 18.3% 17.9% 1.2% 1.3%
Fairness Score Increase relative to GATA-MIXED
10x10 2.3% 4.7% 3.1% 5.1% 0.4% 2.5% -0.2% 0.3% 0.1%
20x20 3.8% 21.4% 9.3% 19.8% 0.2% 4.7% -0.7% 0.0% 0.0%
50x50 14.1% 89.5% 30.3% 68.8% 2.1% 14.8% 7.3% 0.7% 0.8%
100x100 35.5% 196.9% 63.6% 145.2% 4.7% 36.3% 30.5% 0.7% 1.8%
200x200 72.9% 338.0% 108.3% 224.7% 70.6% 72.4% 69.9% 4.5% 5.1%
500x500 75.5% 378.2% 102.6% 203.4% 75.9% 76.6% 73.3% 4.9% 5.0%
Besides the superior performance in the number of matched pairs, it is also interesting to
consider the performance of the algorithms with respect to welfare and fairness charac-
teristics, even though the approximation algorithms are not specifically developed for this
combination of metrics. Table 5.6 presents the average welfare and fairness performance
relative to GATA-MIXED. For example, a value of 50% indicates that the welfare score of
an algorithm was 50% higher (i.e., worse) than the welfare of the GATA-MIXED solution.
The results show that not only does GATA-MIXED yield better solutions with respect to the
number of matched pairs, the solution quality with respect to welfare and fairness is con-
siderably better than the approximation algorithms.22 The relative improvements in wel-
fare and fairness are particularly high for larger problem instances, which indicates that
the respective solution quality can be considerably increased by the use of the proposed
heuristics. For example, compared to the best approximation algorithm Király, welfare im-
provements of up to 18% and fairness improvements of up to 76% can be achieved, which
22Interestingly, TA seems to find slightly better solutions for small problem instances. The relative improve-
ment, however, is small, and taking into account the solution quality for larger problem instances, GATA-
MIXED provides the overall best solution quality.
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means that users are on average matched to higher ranked partners, and that the solution
treats both sides more equally. Table 5.6 also shows that RSMA, which focuses on finding
improvements for users of one market side, yields comparably unfair solutions, and po-
tential fairness and welfare improvements by using the heuristics can be substantial. These
results show that the heuristics not only provide good solutions for the standard combina-
tions of goals, but also for multiple objectives such as finding a maximum size stable match
with good welfare or fairness properties. This can be especially important in social settings
where such welfare and fairness aspects are of importance, making the proposed heuristics
particularly beneficial in these settings.
Effect of Preference Structures and User Distributions
To study the sensitivity of the results on different design parameters, this section looks at

































Figure 5.7.: Performance of Matching Algorithms, Random Preferences
Influence of Tie Lengths For the different maximum lengths of ties, Figure 5.7 shows
that, as before, GA and TA perform quite well. In most cases their performance is better
than the approximation algorithms, and only Király yields better solutions. GATA-MIXED
yields consistently the best performance in the considered scenarios. Overall, the relative
performance differences become smaller with increasing tie lengths. These observations
are confirmed by a statistical analysis applying Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For small max-
imum tie lengths, ψ = 2 and ψ = 5, GA and Király are significantly better than TA, and
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GATA-MIXED is significantly better than GA and Király (p < 0.001). For ψ = 10, the per-
formance of the algorithms is more similar overall. TA is in fact slightly better than GA
(p = 0.001) and yields similar solutions than Király (no statistically significant difference),



































































(b) Performance Relative to Optimum
Figure 5.8.: Comparison of Algorithms for Different Preference Lengths
Influence of Preference Lengths Figure 5.8 shows the results for different average prefer-
ence lengths, both for the percentage of matched users and relative to the optimal solution.
For larger values of l, more users will be deleted from each others’ preference profiles,
thereby shortening the profiles and increasing the probability that some users might be
unmatched in a solution. This is especially reflected in Figure 5.8a, which shows that the
162 Resource Allocation in Social Clouds
percentage of matched users considerably decreases if users have short preference lists. Per
definition of parameter l, the preference length is measured proportionally to the number
of users, which means that for larger problem sizes, the absolute preference lengths in-
crease for the same l. This might explain the findings shown earlier in Figure 5.5, which
showed that with increasing user size the percentage of matched users increases.
In more detail, Table C.5 in Appendix C shows that the absolute number of matched pairs
decreases with decreasing l, which was expected. Additionally, Figure 5.8b shows that with
increasing l the relative performance of the algorithms, compared to the optimal solution
decreases (slightly). Considering the relative performance of the algorithms, Figure 5.8
shows that Király is the best approximation algorithm. GA, TA, and GATA yield solutions
similar to Király, yet often better than other approximation algorithms. As before, GATA-
MIXED outperforms all other algorithms. This increase in solution quality is statistically
significant for smaller values of l (at the level p = 0.01 for l = 0.1 and l = 0.05), yet relatively
small. Especially for larger values of l, i.e., longer preference lists, it seems to be easier
to find large stable matches which makes the differences between algorithms marginal.
However, when users provide the preference ranks of other users manually in larger Social
Clouds, smaller values for l are realistic as users might have time and cognitive limitations








































Figure 5.9.: Algorithm Performance, Asymmetric Problem Instances
Scenarios with Asymmetric Numbers of Users Figure 5.9 shows the performance of the
algorithms relative to the optimal solution for problems where the numbers of requesting
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and providing users are unequal. The overall efficiency of the considered algorithms is bet-
ter than in the case of symmetric problem instances. Furthermore, the higher the difference
in size, the closer the relative performance of the algorithms. This can be expected, as the
maximum number of agents matched is bounded by the number of users of the smaller
side, and the probability to match all such users increases if (relatively) more users of the
second side are present in the market. As a result, all algorithms calculate an optimal solu-
tion in 99% of the cases. Figure 5.9 also shows that, while the performance increase is com-
parably small, the performance of the GA, GATA, and GATA-MIXED heuristics is slightly
better than the approximation algorithms, which confirms the previous findings. In partic-
































Figure 5.10.: Algorithm Performance, Correlated Preferences





RSMA Shift TA GATA GA Király GATA-
MIXED
Mean 0.952 0.978 0.980 0.979 0.983 0.987 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.994
Median 0.962 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
S.D. 0.048 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.028 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.022 0.014
Min 0.500 0.750 0.667 0.500 0.750 0.818 0.818 0.857 0.800 0.857
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Opt. calc. (%) 0.205 0.588 0.618 0.618 0.683 0.690 0.730 0.745 0.721 0.799
Correlated Preferences For correlated preferences, Figure 5.10 shows the relative perfor-
mance ranking of the algorithms over all combinations of problem size, lengths of prefer-
ence lists, and maximum lengths of ties. Similar to the scenario with uncorrelated prefer-
ences, the heuristics perform exceptionally well. As before, GATA-MIXED yields on aver-
age the best solutions of the considered algorithms. Table 5.7 also shows that it has a low
variance in solution quality, and that its worst case solution quality is better than Király and
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the other approximation algorithms. Whereas the general worst-case performance seems
to be similar to the case of uncorrelated preferences, the number of times where the algo-
rithms are able to find an optimal solution is lower. Compared to the findings in Table 5.5,
the percentage of scenarios where an optimal solution was found decreases from up to 86%
to 80% in the best case.
5.5. Summary
This chapter introduced the concept of preference-based resource matching and several al-
gorithms that are used to calculate allocations with certain desired properties. Section 5.1
provided the necessary notation and fundamental theorems, and classified the matching
problems according to preference structures and optimization metrics. Section 5.2 contin-
ued with an overview of related work, and Section 5.3 described the algorithms considered
to calculate a solution for the matching problem. Section 5.4 evaluated the performance of
the proposed heuristics and existing algorithms for various preference structures.
As the complexity to calculate such solutions is, for general preference types, NP-hard, ei-
ther approximation algorithms or heuristics are needed as calculating the optimal solution
might be infeasible. Heuristics provide the flexibility to consider various combinations of
objective functions. To determine their performance relative to existing algorithms, Sec-
tion 5.4 compared and evaluated the performance of the considered algorithms for several
scenarios in order to address research question 2.1. For the scenario of complete prefer-
ences with indifferences, the evaluation showed that depending on the initial solutions, a
genetic algorithm (potentially combined with a Threshold Accepting algorithm) improves
upon the initial solutions, and on average yields similar or better solutions than existing
algorithms. In case of incomplete preferences, the heuristics (especially GATA with mixed
initial solutions) are able to yield better solutions on average than even the best approxima-
tion algorithms concerning the number of matched users, and this average improvement is
also statistically significant. Furthermore, the solutions found by the heuristics outperform
the solutions of approximation algorithms with respect to additional criteria such as wel-
fare or fairness to a substantial degree. This is a particularly important result as platforms
with social contexts, such as Social Clouds, might value welfare and fairness aspects in ad-
dition to the standard set of optimization goals for which approximation algorithms exist
(stability and number of matched pairs). Users of a Social Cloud benefit from the applica-
tion of the proposed heuristics as they are, on average, matched to a higher ranked partner,
and the solution is fairer to both requesting and providing users.
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Overall, this section showed that heuristic algorithms provide a useful, flexible and pow-
erful tool to compute solutions for preference-based matching with a short runtime. Po-
tentially, the solution quality of the heuristics can be even further improved by applying
subsequent optimization steps such as RSMA (requester-optimal-stable-matching). Initial
results indicate that this can be the case for some repetitions and scenarios. A conclusive
study of the combination of the heuristics with existing algorithms (such as improvement
cycles), thus, is an interesting area of further research. Another interesting aspect is the
computational optimization of the algorithms. Especially GAs are considered suitable for
parallelization, which might decrease their runtime and make them even more useful.
In the context of preference-based resource exchange in social contexts, the results are espe-
cially promising. The actual structure of user preferences can be diverse and likely includes
incompleteness and indifferences, especially when users have larger social networks and
cannot provide a definite rank for each single user (or do not want to share with certain
users). For example, in the Social Cloud prototype (Section 2.1.4), the preference inter-
face allows for the specification of “blocked” users with whom sharing is not wanted, and
providing the same rank for several users indicates indifference. The absence of an ex-
plicitly provided rank can either be interpreted as being indifferent or also not wanting to
be matched to these users. The latter decision will most likely affect the allocation, as not
considering many users in the preference ranks leads to short preference lists. The heuris-
tics are, however, well suited to handle such situations, and provide solutions that are on
average closer to the optimal solution than the considered approximation algorithms (see
Section 5.4.4).
Having identified that heuristics provide similar or superior performance to existing algo-
rithms and are adaptable to various different scenarios, the next chapter considers two case
studies on preference-based matching. The first case study considers the effects of strategic
preference manipulation for the different algorithms, both from a system and a user per-
spective. Especially for participating users, this can be interesting as it possibly provides
strategic guidelines of how to act in such a resource allocation market. The second case
study considers the case of dynamic allocation of resources. In such a scenario, resource
supply and demand is not matched in distinct, batch-like allocations, but continuously over
time. As a frequent recalculation of the allocation, or migration of allocated resources might




Incentive Compatibility and Dynamic
Allocation
“It is difficult to advise participants in markets that use stable matching mechanisms when to
behave straightforwardly (i.e. in a way that reveals their true preferences) and when there might be
opportunities to behave strategically, and if so, how.”
(Roth and Rothblum, 1999)
THE solution quality of two-sided matching problems, which was the focus of the lastchapter, is an important consideration in preference-based resource allocation. Yet,
there are other aspects that might be of interest when a two-sided matching approach is
applied in practice. This chapter looks at two of these aspects, namely the manipulation of
preferences and the dynamic allocation of resources.
The first aspect considered in this chapter is preference manipulation. The matching mecha-
nisms studied in the last chapter all require the preference profiles of the participating users
as input for their calculations, and the solution of the respective mechanisms depends on
the profiles submitted by the users. An important observation in this case is that, in gen-
eral, the submitted preference profiles might not be the true preference profiles of the users.
Under the assumption that users want to be matched with a partner as highly ranked as
possible, rational users might have an incentive to manipulate the submitted preference
profiles in order to increase their chance of being matched with a higher-ranked partner.
This is the focus of Section 6.1, which considers the existence and the effects of preference
manipulations for the mechanisms introduced in the previous chapter. In particular, two
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aspects are considered: 1) the degree to which users can benefit (or be worse off) by ma-
nipulating their preferences; and 2) the effect of preference manipulation on the solution
quality of different matching mechanisms.
As the calculation of a solution depends on the submitted preference profiles of all par-
ticipating users, preference manipulation does not only affect the manipulating users, but
other users as well. Furthermore, the matches calculated by the algorithms might be stable
for the submitted preference profiles, but not for the true profiles of the users. The intro-
duction of instability, considering the true profiles of the manipulating users, is therefore
also considered as potential manipulation effect.
Besides studying the effects of preference manipulation on the market, for individual par-
ticipants it might be interesting to know under which circumstances preference manipula-
tion is useful, and what manipulation strategies are most promising. Due to the complex-
ity of the matching problem and the multitude of potential manipulation types, straight-
forward strategy recommendations for participants in different markets do not exist, and
existing results are limited to special circumstances (Roth and Rothblum, 1999). Another
interesting issue is how robust the different mechanisms are against strategic manipulation.
These two aspects are the focus of Section 6.1.3.
In the second part of this chapter, Section 6.2 considers the application of two-sided match-
ing mechanisms in dynamic scenarios, using the prototype of a Social Compute Cloud (see
Section 2.1.4). Matching mechanisms are usually applied in static settings, where users
submit their preference profiles once or only at certain time intervals, and the mechanism
calculates a solution for the given submitted profiles. In (social) resource exchange settings
such as a Social Cloud, the allocation can be more dynamic in the sense that users might en-
ter or leave the market in between the time intervals. This creates new, unallocated supply
and/or demand (either by arriving users, or by freeing allocated resource offers/requests),
which is denoted as intermediate supply and/or demand for the rest of this chapter. In such a
case, the question arises how such intermediate supply and demand can be handled.
For technical and computational reasons, it might not be feasible to recompute the entire
allocation every time a user enters or drops out. For example, users in existing matched
pairs might have agreed that the allocation is valid for a certain time, and a reallocation
might break up such a match. Hence, the second part of this chapter looks at the effects
of dynamic supply and demand in preference-based resource allocation. In particular, Sec-
tion 6.2 considers potential algorithms to match supply and demand, and investigates the
effects of different algorithms for dynamic allocation on the market.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 introduces the concept of preference ma-
nipulation and studies its effects on allocations in preference-based resource matching. Sec-
tion 6.2 discusses and evaluates different algorithms to match intermediary supply and de-
mand. Section 6.3 summarizes the findings and gives an outlook on potential next steps.
6.1. Strategic Manipulation in Resource Allocation
In centralized resource allocation mechanisms, the allocation is determined based on the
information submitted by the participants. In general, this submitted information does not
need to be truthful, i.e., it might not reflect the true valuation or preference of a participant.
Depending on the mechanism, a participant might benefit from sending untruthful infor-
mation, which in turn could lead to an allocation that does not reflect the true preferences
in the market. Untruthful information about preferences can have serious implications in
the real world, for example schools ranked low in the school choice problem have been
closed due to the ranking (see Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009)). Such behavior can also lead to
the emergence of blocking pairs with respect to the true preferences, i.e., if an allocation is
calculated based on submitted preferences it does not necessarily have the same properties,
such as stability, as under the true preferences. This section considers this issue in the con-
text of preference-based two-sided matching. Specifically, after introducing the necessary
concepts and theoretical results, it studies the potential gains and losses of manipulating
users, and compares the robustness of the considered matching mechanism against such
strategic manipulation.
6.1.1. Theoretical Results and Manipulation Strategies
In the economic field of mechanism design, impossibility theorems provide guidance
about which combinations of market goals can be achieved (see e.g. Parkes (2001) for an
overview), and incentive compatibility is one of the most frequently considered properties
of a mechanism. Participants have private information about their true preferences, and re-
veal parts of this information through interaction with the mechanism (e.g., through bids
or submission of preference rankings). However, depending on the market mechanism it
might not be best for them to reveal their true private information. The aspect of incentive
compatibility in this case is defined as follows:
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Definition 8 ( Incentive Compatibility in Two-Sided Matching ). A two-sided matching
mechanism is incentive compatible if submitting the true preference profile is the best strategy in
equilibrium. If this applies for dominant strategies, then the mechanism is said to be strategy-proof.
Note that incentive compatibility in general is defined for any equilibrium concept, such
as Nash, Bayes, or dominant strategy equilibrium. In the context of two-sided matching,
previous work has focused on dominant strategies, in which case strategy-proof would
be the correct term. Adopting the standard of previous literature in this field, unless oth-
erwise stated incentive compatibility will refer to dominant strategies in the subsequent
considerations.
From the viewpoint of a market designer, achieving incentive compatibility (ideally in
dominant strategies) is important for several reasons. On one hand, participants do not
have to calculate complex strategies of how to act on a market, as it is in their best interest
to act based on their true preferences. On the other hand, it guarantees that the solution
quality calculated with submitted preferences is reflecting the true quality, e.g., stable so-
lutions might not necessarily be stable if the private preferences differ from the submitted
ones.
In the case of two-sided matching where participants have private information about their
true preferences, incentive compatibility studies whether it is best for participants to reveal
these true preferences while acting on the market or not. The fundamental result consid-
ering incentive compatibility in two-sided matching was developed by Roth (1982) and
summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1992):
Theorem 4 (Roth, 1982 ). No stable matching mechanism exists for which stating the true prefer-
ences is a dominant strategy for every agent.
This result has serious implications on the design of a two-sided matching mechanism. As
stability is commonly (and empirically) considered the most important property of a two-
sided matching mechanism (see e.g. Roth (2008)), incentive compatibility needs to be sac-
rificed if stability is to be guaranteed. Furthermore, Alcalde and Barberà (1994) show that
strategy proofness is also incompatible with individual rationality and Pareto efficiency.
Considering the DA, Roth and Sotomayor (1992) also show that the DA is strategy-proof
for the proposing side, yet not the accepting side.
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Although this seems to be a rather negative result, the implications of the impossibility
of incentive compatibility for all participants are less clear. As Roth and Rothblum (1999)
noted: “However the existing theoretical results do not generally allow us to address the
considerable demand for practical advice about how to participate in such markets, once
they are established. It is difficult to advise participants in markets that use stable match-
ing mechanisms when to behave straightforwardly (i.e. in a way that reveals their true
preferences) and when there might be opportunities to behave strategically, and if so, how.
This also suggests that there are some gaps in our understanding of why stable matching
mechanisms work so well in practice” (Roth and Rothblum, 1999, p.21). For example, as
one of the few results in the literature, Roth and Rothblum (1999) find that only a small
number of participants have incentives to reveal altered preference rankings. Additionally,
Pini et al. (2011a) show that there can be non-strategy-proof matching mechanisms which
are NP-hard to manipulate, i.e., finding a successful manipulation strategy can be a hard
problem.
Related Work
Due to its practical relevance, e.g. in school choice and college-admission markets, pref-
erence manipulation has been subject of many studies. Most of these focus on preference
manipulation either in the classic DA, or in the adapted mechanism for many-to-one match-
ings.
Considering its strategic properties, the DA is strategy-proof for the proposing side, yet
not strategy proof for the accepting side (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992, p. 90). Moreover,
not putting its most preferred alternative first is a dominated strategy for the users of the
accepting side (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992, p. 105). Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) show that
(again in the case of strict preferences) for any tie breaking rule, there is no mechanism that
is strategy-proof and dominates the DA. Ashlagi and Klijn (2012) consider manipulation
in the DA and show that all weakly beneficial group manipulation strategies of accepting
users are beneficial for all other accepting users and harmful for all proposing users. Fur-
thermore, this is true if users from the accepting side apply a truncation of preferences.
Studying the prevalence of manipulation in experimental settings, Echenique et al. (2009)
show that truncation of preferences for the accepting side in a DA is applied only rarely.
In many-to-one settings, several studies looked at the effects of manipulation in the respec-
tive markets. Under certain conditions, the percentage of users that can successfully ma-
nipulate their preferences in a student-optimal stable matching converges to zero for large
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markets (Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011). Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) discuss the ef-
fect of strategy-proofness on efficiency (measured in average rankings) in the school-choice
problem using date from New York and Boston school districts. Furthermore, Kesten (2012)
studies manipulation strategies in the school choice problems. In particular, he considers
the option for schools to manipulate their submitted capacity (i.e., offering less capacity
than available), and the possibility to pre-arrange matches in which case the involved stu-
dent does not participate in the actual matching procedure. Whereas some of the studied
mechanisms are immune to capacity manipulation, Kesten shows that all studied mecha-
nisms are not immune to pre-arranged matches.
Fixed Strategies
In order to study the implications of a non-achievable incentive compatibility for different
matching algorithms, the manipulation strategies need to be defined. Based on literature
in this field, several strategy types are considered for the subsequent evaluation.
Re-ordering Matching algorithms cannot guarantee that each participant is matched to
its most preferred alternative. Hence, one potential reasoning for this strategy is that if par-
ticipants are not likely to be matched with their most preferred alternative, putting more
preferred alternatives (in their true preferences) in lower ranks might result in a better
match for them. For example, if a participant is on average matched to its third choice,
putting their true first choice at rank 3 might yield a better result for them. However, as
the matching depends on the preferences of the other participants, it is not straightforward
to see whether such a strategy might be useful. Furthermore, for strict and complete pref-
erences Roth and Sotomayor (1992) show that not putting the most preferred alternative
first is a dominated strategy for the DA. The re-ordering or shuffle strategy applies this
reasoning to create a new preference ranking: Given the degree of manipulation k, the
strategy randomly shuffles the first k ranks. This strategy can be either applied alone or in
combination with the truncation strategy.
Truncation Including lower ranked alternatives in one’s preference ranking might in-
crease the chance of being matched to them, as it increases the potential number of partners
one can be matched with. By stating these lower ranked alternatives as unmatchable, a
participant could end up being matched to a more preferred alternative, thus increasing its
benefit. However, stating otherwise acceptable alternatives as unmatchable also increases
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the chance of the participant being unmatched in the final allocation, in case other partici-
pants have a higher ranking in the rankings of the remaining alternatives. This considera-
tion describes the truncation strategy defined by Roth and Rothblum (1999). Given the true
preference ranking of length n of user i, a truncation is defined as the preference ranking
that contains the first k users, k < n, in the same order as the true preferences. Roth and
Rothblum (1999) showed that truncation strategies dominate non-truncation strategies un-
der certain assumptions for the preference rankings, making them an interesting candidate
for the following evaluation.
Truncation strategies involve an inherent trade-off. Truncating to a high degree aims to
avoid being matched to less preferred alternatives, yet simultaneously increases the prob-
ability of remaining unmatched. Roth and Rothblum (1999) showed that for a given pref-
erence set, the number of participants benefiting from truncation is small, yet its behav-
ior under other algorithms or indifferences in preference rankings remain to be explored.
Using analytical models, Ehlers (2008) extends the analysis of Roth and Rothblum (1999)
for priority-based and linear programming mechanisms, and shows that under certain as-
sumptions (symmetric information) the same result about truncation preferences holds.
Manipulation Learning
The previous two strategies are examples of fixed strategies. The downside of evaluat-
ing such strategies is that to be able to evaluate their performance, they would have to
be compared to the theoretically best strategy with the highest gains for the manipulating
users. Finding such an optimal strategy is a combinatorial problem, especially for prefer-
ences with indifferences or incompleteness. For example, for a preference list of length n,
there are n! different re-ordered lists. Hence, a proxy is needed as benchmark. One poten-
tial proxy is the use of learning algorithms which allow the manipulating participants to
(try to) learn good strategies. With such an approach, manipulating participants are more
flexible and not restricted to the provided or pre-specified strategies. It is also a more re-
alistic representation of participants trying to actively game the matching mechanism by
learning and adapting their strategies. Two learning algorithms are used in the following
evaluation.
Evolutionary-based Learning The first is an evolutionary learning algorithm based on a
genetic algorithm. As mentioned earlier, it has been previously shown that GA’s work well
in large search spaces, and the number of potential strategies for preference manipulation
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indeed is considerable. Furthermore, a similar learning algorithm has been successfully
applied for other economic decision scenarios, see e.g. Haas et al. (2013). As a GA, the
learning algorithm is initialized with a starting population of randomly created strategies,
with an equal mix of truncation and re-ordering strategies. Each strategy is represented
by the adjusted preference ranking. It uses standard mutation and crossover operators to
evolve the initial population and selects the best performing strategy after the last evolu-
tion cycle. For crossover, a cycle-crossover operator is used to create new strategies. The
mutation operator randomly applies either re-ordering or truncation, or adds users to the
preference ranking (reverse truncation). The latter option is included in the mutation oper-
ator to allow users to potentially retract from too severe truncation.
Probe and Adjust The second learning algorithm is a simple learning algorithm similar
to reinforcement learning, Probe and Adjust (PA). This type of algorithm has been previ-
ously used in several studies, for example learning in an oligopoly game (Kimbrough and
Murphy, 2009) or learning in strategic contexts (Haas et al., 2013). It is an example of an
adaptive local search learning algorithm. Starting from a given solution, the algorithm
explores the neighborhood of the solution by slightly adjusting the current solution. Af-
ter several rounds of exploration, during which the fitness of the new potential solutions
are probed, the PA selects the best performing solution in the neighborhood (potentially
the current solution) as the new solution. This is repeated for a certain number of ad-
justment rounds, after which the currently best solution is returned. Applied to learning
manipulation strategies, PA starts with a neighborhood of randomly created truncated and
re-ordered strategies, and selects the best performing one. Then, for each of the subse-
quent rounds, the neighborhood of the currently best strategy is created by truncating,
re-ordering, or adding user rankings to the current preferences. The pseudocode of this
learning algorithm is described in Algorithm 6 in Appendix D.
6.1.2. Effects of Preference Manipulation on Matching Outcome
Preference manipulation can have several effects on the outcome of preference-based
matching:
• Potential gains and losses of manipulating users
• Effects on non-manipulating users
• Different solution quality under submitted and true preferences
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Whereas the effects on the users, whether manipulating or not, are intuitive, the third point
is very interesting as well. If manipulating users do not submit their true preferences,
the resulting solution of the matching might, for example, not be stable under the true
preferences. These effects are studied in the following evaluation.
Simulation Specifics
For the simulation-based evaluation, different scenarios are studied. For a given problem
size, the main parameters that are varied are the percentage of manipulating users, and
the type or degree of manipulation. For example, for a problem size of 20 users per side,
the number of manipulating users is varied from 1 to 20. The evaluation only considers
manipulation on one side, and manipulation from both requesting and providing users is
not considered. The rationale behind this is that for the standard DA, manipulation is only
(potentially) beneficial for one side, and in order to be able to compare the results between
algorithms, only one-sided manipulation is considered here. The manipulation type can
be either a fixed strategy (in this section: truncation) or a strategy determined through a
learning process. For truncation strategies, the degree of manipulation defines how much
the preferences are truncated. For example, in a 20x20 scenario with initially complete
preferences, truncation of degree 0.5 means that the truncated preferences have length 10.
Similar to the simulations in the previous chapter, 100 independent repetitions are made
for each scenario to ensure a certain robustness of the findings.
For the GA-learning parameters, the same parametrization as in the previous chapter is
chosen. The population size is 50, the mutation rate 0.2, and the crossover probability
0.6. In total, the learning was evolved for 20 rounds1, and in every round each solution of
the population was evaluated twice to get an estimate of its fitness. For PA-learning, two
settings are studied to examine the effect of the available learning time on the outcome.
In the first setting, each potential solution in the neighborhood is evaluated twice, and 20
rounds of adjustments are simulated. In the second setting, the solutions are evaluated
four times, and 50 adjustment rounds are studied.
The following results involve complete preferences with indifferences (maximum group
size of 2) for non-manipulating users. Obviously, in case of truncation strategies the prob-
lem transforms into a setting with incomplete preferences (with the manipulating users
submitting incomplete preference lists). Complete preferences were chosen because users
1The number of learning rounds is, for a GA, rather small. However, up to 1000 different manipulation
strategies are considered in this setting, and the GA seem to converge to a certain manipulation strategy
after this number of rounds.
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can only remain unmatched if other users manipulate, which makes the comparison with
the baseline case easier where all users are matched. In addition, small indifference groups
potentially improve the benefits from manipulation, as it is easier to switch between the
indifference groups. Hence, this represents an optimistic setting in which benefits from
manipulation can potentially be higher. Starting with incomplete preferences is, of course,
also possible in general.
Manipulation Effects with Truncation Strategies Figure 6.1 shows the average gain or
loss of manipulating and non-manipulating users (measured in absolute rank differences)
for two different problem sizes if they apply truncation strategies and the solution is cal-
culated with GATA. Green colors indicate an average gain, and yellow and red colors an
average loss. Figure 6.1a shows that depending on the number of manipulating users and
the degree of truncation there are scenarios where applying these strategies are, on av-
erage, beneficial for manipulating users. However, the figure also shows two aspects to
applying truncation strategies: on one hand, the average gain is quite low, which makes
the average benefit of manipulation doubtful. On the other hand, especially when the pro-
files are truncated to a high degree, the expected outcome from truncation is an actual loss
(measured in the absolute difference of preference ranks) compared to submitting the true
preferences. This is not surprising, as higher truncation leads to an increased likelihood of
being unmatched in the solution.
Similar results can be seen in Figure 6.1b, which considers the same setting for a 50x50
scenario. Interestingly, in this case truncating the preferences only to a small degree is less
beneficial than in the 20x20 case. As the absolute gain or loss is small, however, this should
not be overemphasized. The benefit of truncation for a medium range of truncation seems
to be consistent over the two studied problem sizes.
Considering the effects on non-manipulating users, Figure 6.2 shows that in most cases,
manipulation of other users has detrimental effects on users that submit their preferences
truthfully. Especially when a large number of users are manipulating, the chances for them
to remain unmatched increases, which also increases the chance of a non-manipulating
user to be unmatched. There are some cases in which manipulation leads to an average
gain, but the very small absolute amount indicates that these gains occur as other solutions
are calculated, which potentially result in a better welfare for all users. This can happen as
GATA is a heuristic and potentially leads to different solutions once it is recalculated.
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(a) 20x20 scenario
(b) 50x50 scenario
Figure 6.1.: Effects of Truncation Strategies on the Manipulating Users, GATA
Additionally, the average gain in ranking for manipulating users has been compared for
several matching algorithms. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the results for different degrees of
truncation and number of manipulating users, respectively. Over all scenarios, i.e., all com-
binations of number of manipulating users and degree of manipulation, the absolute gains
are smallest for GATA. This result is also statistically significant using Wilcoxon signed-
rank test at the level p = 0.001 for the non-normally distributed data. Detailed results for
the interplay of truncation degree and number of manipulating users can be found in Ta-
bles D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D.
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(a) 20x20 scenario
(b) 50x50 scenario
Figure 6.2.: Effects of Truncation Strategies on the Nonmanipulating Users, GATA
Solution Quality under Manipulation Considering the potential introduction of insta-
bility in the solution, Table 6.3 considers this aspect for several problem sizes and algo-
rithms. The table shows that for small degrees of manipulation, i.e., if manipulating users
only truncate the last users in their preference ranking, the resulting solution is still stable.
However, as the degree of truncation increases, the number of blocking pairs that are in-
troduced when the true preferences are considered increases considerably. This effect can
be observed over all matching algorithms, which indicates that it is an inherent property of
user manipulation.
This result is interesting for practical reasons. Firstly, while the matching algorithms still
calculate solutions which are stable under the submitted preferences, they are potentially
unstable under the true preferences if some users manipulate. Hence, there might be op-
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Table 6.1.: Absolute Preference Gain for Truncation Strategies for Different Truncation Degrees,
20x20 Users
Truncation Degree DA RSMA Király Shift GATA
0.95 -5.12 -3.89 -4.49 -4.91 -6.13
0.9 -1.79 -0.58 -0.94 -1.40 -2.70
0.8 0.98 2.10 1.58 1.22 -0.06
0.7 1.84 2.84 2.18 1.76 0.56
0.6 1.87 2.77 2.11 1.63 0.57
0.5 1.74 2.50 1.85 1.42 0.44
0.4 1.39 2.01 1.44 1.10 0.26
0.3 1.10 1.66 1.10 0.81 0.14
0.2 0.72 1.12 0.73 0.55 0.03
0.1 0.30 0.53 0.30 0.21 0.00
Table 6.2.: Absolute Preference Gain for Truncation Strategies for Different Numbers of Manipulat-
ing Users, 20x20 Users
Truncation Degree DA RSMA Király Shift GATA
1 -1.04 .18 -.61 -.23 -1.06
2 -0.53 .08 -.15 -.36 -1.26
4 -0.23 .40 .01 -.12 -1.11
6 -0.03 .87 .32 -.07 -0.91
8 0.21 1.05 .54 .07 -0.70
10 0.67 1.34 .81 .33 -0.57
12 0.78 1.50 .98 .42 -0.44
14 0.67 1.54 .96 .50 -0.53
16 0.85 1.68 1.13 .60 -0.35
18 0.86 1.67 1.19 .72 -0.38
20 1.11 1.85 1.29 .78 -0.28
portunities for users to act on these unstable pairs, which would break up the matching
solution. Secondly, as Knuth (1997) discusses, even a small number of unstable pairs can
have substantial consequences on the market, and allocations that contain blocking pairs
can lead to a failure of the entire market. For example, it can lead to behavior where users
prearrange matches before the actual allocation takes place (see Sönmez (1999); Kagel and
Roth (2000)).
An interesting extension of this observation is to examine which users are involved in
these unstable pairs. Theoretically, if unmatched users realize that they can find other
users which would prefer to be matched with them, there could be an iterative process
of users breaking up and forming new pairs. It is unclear, however, if such an iterative
process would lead to a stable match or not. Hence, it is hard to predict what actual ef-
fects such unstable pairs which were introduced by manipulated preferences have on the
market (Knuth, 1997).
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Table 6.3.: Effects of Manipulation on Stability, Measured in Number of Blocking Pairs
Problem Size Degree Truncation DA RSMA Király Shift GATA
20x20
0.95 45.65 44.92 43.60 42.90 43.28
0.9 23.14 22.31 19.98 19.74 20.52
0.8 8.23 7.58 6.61 5.95 6.48
0.7 2.88 2.65 2.23 1.74 2.11
0.6 1.29 1.10 0.86 0.67 0.79
0.5 0.53 0.46 0.37 0.23 0.28
0.4 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.10 0.14
0.3 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
0.2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
50x50
0.95 104.50 102.35 93.19 93.29 93.75
0.9 30.65 29.37 25.96 23.94 24.71
0.8 7.19 6.70 5.71 3.79 4.13
0.7 2.10 1.86 1.46 0.71 0.86
0.6 0.61 0.48 0.42 0.09 0.14
0.5 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01
0.4 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6.1.3. Robustness of Matching Algorithms against Manipulation
Simulation Specifics
As before, the effects of manipulation are studied with varying parameters for the number
of manipulating users, and the type of manipulation. In this section, the two different learn-
ing procedures (GA-Learning and Probe-and-Adjust-Learning) are used. For complexity
reasons, only one or two manipulating users are considered. As before, for each scenario
100 independent repetitions are made to study the robustness of the results. In addition to
the previously considered algorithms, GATA-MIXED (GATA with starting solutions from
DA and approximation algorithms, see Section 5.4.4) is included in the following evalua-
tion to study the dependency of the results on the GATA starting solutions.
Effectiveness of Manipulation
Previous results for DA suggest that the number of users who can actually benefit from
manipulation is small. Hence, this aspect is considered first. Table 6.4 shows for a given
market setting, how many times manipulating users can actually benefit from manipula-
tion. The table can be separated into three scenarios. The first scenario studies truncation
strategies for different problem sizes and algorithms. The second and third scenarios are a
small number of manipulating users applying GA- or PA-Learning, respectively.
6.1. STRATEGIC MANIPULATION IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 181
Table 6.4.: Manipulation Effectiveness
Scenario Man.
Users
Strategy DA RSMA Király Shift GATA GATA-
MIXED
Probability of Successful Manipulation
20x20
1 GA 0.540 0.540 0.560 0.440 0.436 .570
2 GA 0.560 0.578 0.584 0.460 0.448 .485
1 PA 0.540 0.620 0.550 0.480 0.401 .480
2 PA 0.555 0.610 0.605 0.470 0.448 .555
1-20 Truncation 0.269 0.334 0.287 0.257 0.176 0.271
1 Truncation 0.120 0.205 0.143 0.159 0.117 0.127
2 Truncation 0.182 0.235 0.205 0.191 0.114 0.184
50x50
1-50 Truncation 0.335 0.387 0.342 0.314 0.210 0.337
1 Truncation 0.142 0.194 0.146 0.149 0.130 0.146
2 Truncation 0.172 0.216 0.185 0.175 0.138 0.164
Average Gain in Case of Successful Manipulation
20x20
1 GA 5.23 6.22 5.28 5.84 2.82 5.07
2 GA 3.94 4.51 3.92 3.61 2.12 3.49
1 PA 4.62 6.08 5.09 4.56 2.75 5.04
2 PA 3.09 4.17 3.68 3.10 1.71 2.94
1-20 Truncation 3.01 3.56 3.10 2.80 1.99 3.08
1 Truncation 6.80 8.23 6.91 7.82 5.73 7.73
2 Truncation 4.86 4.66 5.02 4.26 3.21 4.68
50x50
1-50 Truncation 6.92 7.84 6.93 5.78 3.82 6.71
1 Truncation 17.74 18.72 16.89 14.07 8.74 16.86
2 Truncation 12.07 12.05 12.32 9.82 6.76 9.77
The table shows that, averaged over the independent repetitions the probability of success-
ful manipulation, i.e. an actual gain in welfare for the manipulating users, varies with the
manipulation strategy. For both GA- and PA-learning, the actual manipulation is success-
ful in 40%-62% of the cases, depending on the applied matching algorithm. For truncation
strategies, the success probabilities are considerably smaller (between 11% and 39%). In
other words, this means that even for users with the ability to learn and adjust their manip-
ulation strategy, the chances of actually benefiting from such manipulation are comparably
small. Interestingly, the success probability is smallest for GATA. A potential explanation
for this result is that GATA can find multiple solutions of the same or similar quality and
randomly selects one of them. This additional random element could make it harder for
users to learn a successful manipulation strategy.
Another related question is the degree to which they can improve their position in the
cases where manipulation is indeed successful. The second part of Table 6.4 provides the
results for the given scenarios. Interestingly, the potential improvements in case of trun-
cation strategies are higher than for the learning strategies. A likely explanation for this
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behavior is that, in the truncation cases, users might gain considerably if they submit a
highly truncated preference list. However, as the table only shows actual improvements,
not average gains, such heavily truncated strategies might also lead to being unmatched in
other cases (thus potentially leading to lower average gains). In contrast, when users have
to learn a manipulation strategy, they might not learn these extreme truncation strategies
as they potentially involve a higher risk of being unmatched.
Considering the influence of the the small size of indifference groups that are used in this
scenario, it can be expected that the previous results are optimistic in the sense that larger
indifference groups could make it less likely to benefit from manipulation (as the chances
for being matched within the same indifference groups are higher). In total, it can be seen
that users can gain several preference ranks if their manipulation is successful, yet the
probability of a successful manipulation is comparably small. This indicates that even if
there are cases in which (as predicted by theory) manipulation is possible, the likelihood
and incentives of users to actually manipulate are rather small. In particular, they might
not outweigh the risk of being worse off from manipulation.
Robustness Against Learning
Figure 6.3 shows the effects when the manipulating users apply a GA-Learning algorithm
to learn successful manipulation strategies. There are several interesting facts than can be
observed. First, the actual number of benefiting users, as shown in Figure 6.3b, is roughly
similar for the studied allocation mechanisms, yet both GATA and Shift seem to have a
lower probability of successful manipulation. Averaged per user, the likelihood that a ma-
nipulating user is actually benefiting is between 44-58%. Second, Figure 6.3a reveals con-
siderable differences in the profitability of manipulation. Manipulation is less beneficial if
GATA is used as an allocation mechanism, compared to the other algorithms (statistically
significant at the level p = 0.001, using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and accounting for mul-
tiple comparisons). One potential explanation is that due to the high number of random
elements, thus unpredictability, of the GATA mechanisms, it is harder to achieve substan-
tial gains for manipulating users in these settings. Interestingly, GATA-MIXED performs
similarly to the other algorithms and is more beneficial for manipulating users. A potential
explanation for this finding is that the solutions found by GATA-MIXED are structurally
similar to the solutions of the approximation algorithms such as Király, whereas the GATA
solutions are less similar.2
2In other words, the final GATA-MIXED solutions can be similar to the solutions found by the approximation
algorithms as they are, on average, better than DA solutions for scenarios with incomplete preferences, thus
being more likely to be propagated through the evolution rounds of GATA. As the standard GATA uses












































































(b) Number of Benefiting Users, GA-Learning
Figure 6.3.: Average Gain and Number Benefiting Users for GA-Learning, 20x20 users
In particular, manipulation gains are lower for GATA than for Király, which indicates that
the former is more robust against manipulation as the potential gains are lower. This affects
the corresponding trade-off between potential gain and potential loss that a manipulating
user faces, making it less appealing to try preference manipulation.
To compare the robustness of the previous findings, another learning procedure, Probe and
Adjust, is used as well. Figure 6.4 shows the results of this scenario. Compared to the GA-
learning case, PA-learning yields similar results. The number of adjustment rounds does
not have a significant impact on the number of benefiting users. Figures 6.4a and 6.4b show
that the average gain from manipulation is very similar. Furthermore, the results show that
the average gain from manipulation is smallest for GATA. In fact, the average gain in the
GATA case is statistically significantly smaller than the gains for Király and the other al-
gorithms (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.001). GATA-MIXED performs similarly to the
only DA starting solutions, the variety of different propagated solutions might be higher, thus decreasing
predictability and the probability of successful manipulation.
































































































































































(d) Number of Benefiting Users, PA-Learning,
50 Adjustment Rounds
Figure 6.4.: Average Gain and Number Benefiting Users for PA-Learning, 20x20 users
other algorithms and worse than GATA, which again indicates that the solutions found
by GATA-MIXED seem to be more similar to the other approximation algorithms rather
than GATA. The findings are particularly interesting as Király performed best among the
approximation algorithms, and GATA-MIXED yielded the best overall results (see Section
5.4.4). The findings indicate that there is no difference in the strategic properties of Király
and GATA-MIXED, yet GATA is more robust against manipulation (lower gains for ma-
nipulating users). This implies an interesting trade-off between algorithm performance
and strategic considerations.
6.1.4. Discussion
This section considered the effects of preference manipulation for the algorithms presented
in Chapter 5. There are several interesting insights that can be derived from the results.
First, the results in Section 6.1.2 indicate that manipulation through preference truncation
can be beneficial for users, yet the average gains of successful manipulation are rather small
(see Table 6.1). In many cases, manipulation has negative effects on non-manipulating
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users. Furthermore, instability can be introduced through manipulation, indicated by the
number of blocking pairs in Table 6.3. Due to the unpredictable consequences of these
blocking pairs, this can be a potentially serious challenge for the applicability and sustain-
ability of the allocation mechanism in a Social Cloud.
Second, the evaluation in Section 6.1.3 shows that the number of cases in which manipu-
lation actually is successful is rather small (in most cases between 11 and 62%), and that
learning-based algorithms are more successful than pure truncation strategies. This indi-
cates that, while manipulation is possible in such markets, finding a successful manipu-
lation strategy is a non-trivial problem. Comparing different learning algorithms, for the
studied scenarios the average gain from manipulation is smaller for GATA than for the
other algorithms, in particular the best performing approximation algorithm (Király). This
means that users can gain less from manipulating, thereby potentially lowering their incen-
tive to pursue such manipulation. Considering the combined results with respect to perfor-
mance (see Section 5.4.4) and strategic properties, GATA provides similar performance as
the best performing approximation algorithm, and simultaneously is more robust against
manipulation. If performance aspects are of higher importance, GATA-MIXED can be used
as it yields a superior solution quality while retaining similar strategic properties as, e.g.,
Király.
6.2. Dynamic Resource Allocation in a Social Compute Cloud
Commonly, preference-based resource allocation mechanisms assume that all participat-
ing users in a market submit their preference profiles to the mechanism, and a solution is
calculated through a specific algorithm in a batch-like procedure. This only applies if the
allocation happens once, or at certain time intervals in which all users are free and can be
re-matched. Realistic scenarios, however, might be more dynamic. For example, during
two time intervals where the matching is calculated, some users might enter or leave the
market, thereby creating intermediate supply and demand. Another example is if certain
matched users agree to be matched longer than a time period, in which case they might not
be available in the next matching calculation (i.e., they form an “unbreakable” pair).
In such scenarios, the question is how such intermediate demand is handled. For the pur-
pose of this case study, intermediate supply or demand is defined as newly arriving or freed
resource offers or requests that occur when either new users arrive or existing matched
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users leave, thereby creating additional resource offers or requests in the system. As men-
tioned before, breaking current pairs and re-matching all users on the market might not
be feasible for technical (e.g., if a calculation on a machine cannot be interrupted) or com-
plexity reasons (i.e., recalculating the optimal allocation takes too long). The option to
not consider intermediate demand leads to a potentially considerable amount of idle re-
sources, depending on the length of the time intervals. On the other hand, matching only
the available intermediate supply and demand might lead to the creation of blocking pairs,
especially with respect to the currently matched pairs.
This dynamic allocation of resources in a two-sided matching setting is the focus of this
section, which is an extended version of (Caton et al., 2014). Building on the description
of the Social Compute Cloud prototype presented in Chapter 2.1.4, this case study uses
the prototype for the dynamic allocation scenario. The additional heuristics that are used
to match intermediate supply and demand are described in Section 6.2.1. Section 6.2.2
evaluates these mechanisms that can be used to capture intermediate supply and demand.
A discussion of the findings in Section 6.2.3 concludes this case study.
6.2.1. Approaches to Capture Intermediate Supply and Demand
The matching algorithms discussed in related literature are usually assumed to be batch
jobs. In this case, allocations are computed after certain time intervals. For example, eco-
nomic studies of allocation mechanisms in Cloud Computing often assume that allocations
are computed hourly, often referring to Amazon EC2 where users buy resources based on
hourly usage. In the case of a Social Compute Cloud, one can say that the allocation is
calculated every x hours, where x is the predetermined lease period of a compute vessel.
While this type of allocation computation yields good results for the supply and demand
given at the time of the computation, it is unclear what happens in the case of new or
changing supply and demand. For example, users can offer/request new resources or
retract offers/requests in between two calculation intervals. It is clear that if allocations
are only (re)computed at predetermined time intervals, resources will be idle and requests
will be left (or become) unsatisfied. Existing preference-based matching literature does not
consider such settings. Therefore the following solutions for dynamic supply and demand
are proposed.
Disregard The “worst” solution would be to disregard any new incoming supply or
demand until the next time the allocation is computed. In this case, new sup-
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ply/demand would be idle until the next batch allocation, even if there were cor-
responding demand/supply.
Optimal The “optimal” solution would be the immediate rematching of the entire supply
and demand. In this case, no (new) supply would be idle if an allocation was avail-
able, and the resulting allocation would always be stable (given the right algorithms
are used). However, this places additional requirements on the system. Firstly, com-
puting resources (e.g. VM’s) would have to be migratable at any given point in time,
and, secondly, the runtime of the allocation mechanism has to be short. For the im-
plementation of the Social Compute Cloud prototype, this is currently unachievable,
as the underlying framework does not yet support migration. Hence, this approach
should be considered the best benchmark from a system perspective, i.e. with respect
to performance criteria such as stability, welfare, and fairness.
Random Given the intermediate offers and requests at a given time, random allocation
randomly matches offers and requests with the constraint that the matched users
have to be mutually acceptable. As only one constraint is used in the calculation, this
algorithm has a fast runtime, yet cannot guarantee specific properties of the resulting
match (such as stability).
Greedy In greedy allocation, an incoming or freed provider or requester is matched, if
applicable, to a currently unmatched, acceptable requester or provider of the highest
possible rank. It is greedy in the sense that it tries to find the best intermediate match
for the incoming or freed user. Similar as the random allocation, properties such as
stability cannot be guaranteed.
As the Random and Greedy heuristics are applied each time a new offer or request arrives,
or a matched user leaves, they particularly have to have a fast runtime in order to cope
with potentially frequent changes in the system. Note that both Random and Greedy are
likely to yield unstable solutions, i.e., the consumer-provider pairs in the market at the end
of the lease period would not be the pairs that a stable allocation algorithm would yield.
However, if it is assumed that matched pairs cannot be migrated in between two batch allo-
cations, this does not, per se, affect the practical stability in between batch computations.
A final approach is to check if there is a match that would yield a stable solution, yet does
not require other users to be reallocated. It can be argued that this approach would be
subsumed by the above approaches, as the probability of achieving a stable solution is low,
and in the absence of a stable match, another approach would be applied.
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6.2.2. Evaluating the Effects of Dynamic Allocation
To study the applicability of the previously mentioned approaches to match intermediate
supply and demand in a Social Cloud, the following evaluation shows the effects of the
approaches on standard preference-based matching solution characteristics: the number of
matched pairs, stability, welfare, and fairness.
Simulation Specifics
For the evaluation, a Social Cloud with 200 users (100 on each side) with incomplete pref-
erences and indifferences is simulated (with an average preference list length of 50). To
model dynamic supply and demand, real user resource availability distributions derived
from donations and resource availability in SETI@home (Javadi et al., 2009, 2011) are used
in the evaluation. The data from SETI@home represents statistical clusters of users, that
can be used in the simulator to define both when a resource will become available and for
how long, as well as when users will request resources.
Considerations for Stochastic Participation
To study stochastic supply and demand, the four approaches mentioned above are sim-
ulated to study how they support the system with new supply/demand in between two
batch-allocation computations. Intuitively, immediate rematching should yield the best so-
lutions, whereas leaving resources idle should be worst. Random and greedy should be
somewhere in between.
In the simulation, each user is drawn an (un)availability distribution from the SETI@home
distribution, which determines when and how long they will be (un)available. Only avail-
able users are taken into account for resource matching. At time points 155, 265 and 410,
the batch allocation algorithm is run for the current supply/demand.
Figure 6.5 shows that the number of matched users fluctuates over time, and users arrive
and leave from the allocation depending on their (un)availability pattern. It can be seen
that, most of the time, the “optimal” matching yields the highest number of matched pairs,
and both random and greedy yield fewer matched pairs. This can be explained by the lack
of choice that incoming users have: in random and greedy, only the currently unmatched
users are suitable for matching, whereas the “optimal” rematching can consider all avail-
able users at that time. Figure 6.5 also shows the baseline scenario in which allocation only



























Optimal Random Greedy Baseline
Figure 6.5.: Number of Matched Pairs for Intermediate Supply and Demand
happens at pre-determined time intervals. In this case, new requests and offers are only
considered at predetermined time intervals, and if matched users become unavailable, the
corresponding request/offer is freed without being automatically reallocated. Hence, the
baseline scenario depicts the worst case, quasi-static scenario where intermediate demand
is not considered. It can be easily seen in Figure 6.5 that not considering intermediate sup-


























Figure 6.6.: Instability Effects for Intermediate Supply and Demand
Figures 6.6, 6.7a, and 6.7b show the results for stability, welfare, and fairness respectively.
These figures show that the immediate rematching performs well with respect to welfare
(allocating users close to their highest preference) and fairness (balancing the two market




















































(b) Fairness: Welfare Distribution. Negative scores represent solu-
tions more beneficial to consumers.
Figure 6.7.: Comparison of Matching Heuristics for Intermediate Supply and Demand
sides), and always yields stable outcomes. Furthermore, the greedy strategy often pro-
vides better welfare than the random strategy (Figure 6.6), and is computationally as effi-
cient. Whereas the runtime for GATA per allocation is around 10 seconds, both random and
greedy run almost instantly, i.e., take milliseconds to compute. Similar results are obtained
for the number of unstable pairs, which are most often lower for the greedy strategy. Fig-
ure 6.7b shows that both greedy and random strategy are more beneficial for consumers,
indicated by the lower scores, especially compared to the optimal matching. This finding,
along with the fact that greedy can sometimes yield worse results for welfare as well, is not
surprising as it primarily aims to give new, incoming users their highest priority, without
considering the preferences of other users.
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Overall, the results suggest that approaches for the intermediate rematching of sup-
ply/demand are necessary, and that on average the greedy heuristic performs well with
respect to welfare, despite one side being favored in the matching. This is especially inter-
esting if immediate rematching is not technically feasible.
6.2.3. Discussion
Section 6.2.2 shows convincing evidence that dynamic supply and demand between batch
allocation times, caused by leaving and arriving users, has to be considered. While these
results show that the solution quality tends to be very good and even close to optimal it
is clear that continuously running the algorithms might not be feasible due to their com-
putational overhead. Hence, fast heuristics are needed that are able to deal with changing
supply and demand, although these heuristics usually lack the solution quality of the other
algorithms. For small problem sizes, it might still be feasible to run algorithms such as the
GATA in a continuous setting.
One potential strategy to improve both allocation quality and runtime would be to com-
pute an initial solution with a fast algorithm, e.g. DA, and then leverage users’ provided
computational power to improve solution quality. This would give users an incentive to
provide resources for a co-operative infrastructure (Haas et al., 2013).
Another issue with the matching algorithms considered here is that they currently support
only one-to-one matchings, i.e., they do not yet support multi-unit allocations. In some
settings, users might contribute or request multiple units of resources (e.g., several VMs to
run a compute-intensive job). This is particularly interesting if intermediate demand can be
captured by (potentially already matched) users with remaining capacity. This extension is
an area of future work.
6.3. Summary
Besides the pure performance characteristics of the algorithms, there are several other in-
teresting aspects that can be studied in the context of preference-based resource allocation
mechanisms. This chapter presented two case studies, each of which investigating and
highlighting such an aspect. Section 6.1 presented the first case study which considers the
manipulation of preferences and the effects on the allocation and the users. After introduc-
ing existing results and commonly studied manipulation strategies, the evaluation shows
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that users might benefit from manipulation, but the probability of successful manipulation
is rather small. In addition, both manipulating and non-manipulating users face the risk
of being worse off from manipulation. This highlights the essential trade-off that users
have to consider in this context: Weighing the chances of improving one’s outcome versus
potentially increasing the chances of not being allocated.
Considering the difference between matching algorithms, GATA is more robust against
manipulation as the average gains from manipulation are smaller compared to other al-
gorithms, for example Király. This is interesting, as lower (average) gains also provide
lesser incentives for preference manipulation in the first place, especially considering the
potential drawback of being unmatched if manipulation is not successful.
Section 6.2 considered aspects of dynamic allocation in case users arrive or leave in be-
tween the calculation of allocations. This might be relevant if either the re-calculation of
the allocation is infeasible from a time-perspective, or if existing matched pairs cannot be
broken up due to technical reasons. The evaluation shows that even very simple heuristic
algorithms to match such intermediate supply or demand only introduce a small number
of unstable pairs.
The findings have several implications for resource sharing in Social Clouds. First, the
study on incentive compatibility shows that not only do heuristics prove to be robust
against manipulation, the potential benefits that users can achieve with such preference
manipulation is small and often outweighed by potential losses (not being matched, or be-
ing matched to a less preferred partner). This is a promising result as it is in line with the
social philosophy of a Social Cloud: sharing should be voluntary and strategic considera-
tions should be of lesser importance. Second, the dynamic allocation scenario shows that
preference-based matching is also suitable for Social Clouds with fluctuating user partic-
ipation (and thus, resource offers and requests). The type of heuristic used for resource
allocation should depend on the available time and technical considerations (e.g., the fea-
sibility of VM migration). As the effects of leaving new resources idle (i.e., not allocating
them until the next allocation interval) can be severe, the studied heuristics provide the
means to use provided resources in a Social Cloud in an efficient manner. For the par-
ticipating users, the matching of intermediate demand and supply implies that resources
can be allocated and used once available, thereby avoiding cases of not utilized, offered
resources.
These two case studies present a good starting point to investigate further topics of interest.
For example, in the context of preference manipulation, the question of robust strategies is
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important. Given different scenarios and matching algorithms, a manipulation strategy
can be considered robust if it consistently provides good results (improvements to non-
manipulation) in many scenarios. The existence of such robust strategies is a topic for
further research.
In summary, Chapters 5 and 6 showed how heuristics can be used to implement preference-
based resource allocation in Social Clouds. Their flexibility allows for the adjustment to
different scenarios and optimization goals, and users benefit from a similar or improved
performance in comparison to existing matching algorithms. They provide little incentives
to manipulate preference rankings as the respective probability to actually benefit from
manipulation is small. Furthermore, they are able to handle dynamic allocation scenarios
when user participation (and thus, resource offers and requests) is stochastic.
As this thesis focused on one-to-one allocations, the presented work can be extended in
order to adapt the heuristics for many-to-one or many-to-many scenarios, when multiple
resources can be matched to one offer/request. This is particularly interesting if a resource
offer can satisfy several requests, or a request requires a large amount of resources such
that it cannot be covered with one offer (e.g., complex calculations requiring several VMs).
Similar to this work, the comparison of the adapted heuristics with existing mechanisms
for many-to-one allocations, as well as the consideration of incentive compatibility in such







THE types of resources that are shared and exchanged on online platforms is as variedas the platforms themselves. The engineering of such platforms is a complex task,
and several challenges have to be addressed. This includes the technical implementation,
the design of a resource allocation mechanism, the need to provide incentives for user par-
ticipation, and the consideration of potential user behavior and its effects on the platform.
This thesis considered resource sharing through the concept of Social Clouds, where the
exchange of resources involves non-monetary mechanisms on the basis of underlying so-
cial relationships. In such a system, existing direct and indirect connections correspond to
a certain level of trust, which can have various effects on the sharing behavior of users (e.g.,
the relevance of specific incentives, and the applicability of certain allocation mechanisms),
and thus also affects the design of such a platform with its corresponding challenges.
This thesis focused on two coordination challenges in the design of a Social Cloud: user
incentives for participation, and non-monetary allocation mechanisms based on two-sided
matching. As achieving a critical mass of actively participating users is crucial for a sharing
platform, the first part of the thesis focused on the understanding of relevant user incen-
tives and the design of incentive schemes that take into account the social setting of the
platform. In the second part, the thesis analyzed two-sided matching heuristics for the
non-monetary allocation of resources. In particular, it focused on aspects of solution qual-
ity, strategic considerations, and dynamic allocation.
Section 7.1 summarizes the contributions of the thesis. Section 7.2 critically discusses the




The design of coordination mechanisms for Social Clouds, specifically the identification
and study of participation incentives as well as the design of mechanisms for resource al-
location, was the focus of this thesis. Its contributions to the design of a social sharing
platform are threefold: 1) the technical implementation of a simulation tool as complemen-
tary methodology to study such systems; 2) the understanding of relevant incentives for
participation as well as the engineering of incentive schemes; 3) the design of preference-
based matching heuristics as a means to allocate resources on a non-monetary basis. The
three contribution aspects are discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections.
7.1.1. Simulation-based Approach to Study Social Clouds
Social Clouds and other resource sharing concepts are complex systems. Different types of
users (with respect to resource endowment, sharing motivations, preferences, etc.) partici-
pate on such platforms and influence the overall system outcome through their individual
interactions with each other. Due to this complexity, the study of Social Clouds presents
methodological challenges. While analytical modeling and prediction of (dynamic) system
effects might be possible only for small systems, the (prototypical) implementation of the
platform provides the opportunity to receive feedback from real users, their characteristics
and behaviors. Similarly, certain effects such as influence of self-representation on the shar-
ing behavior can be studied through laboratory experiments. However, not all problems
can be addressed with the mentioned methodologies. For example, it can be necessary to
predict effects of rule changes on the system before they are implemented, or stress-tests
need to be run to study scalability behavior.
For these reasons, this thesis advocated the use of a simulation-based approach as com-
plementary methodology for Social Clouds and similar systems. The simulation tool de-
scribed in Chapter 2.2 provides added value to the methodological toolkit for the study
of social sharing systems. It provides functionality to model the relevant aspects of Social
Clouds, ranging from users, underlying relationships and networks, and a variety of al-
location mechanisms, and is easily extendable to capture new scenarios. The usefulness
of the simulation tool and its applicability for Social Cloud scenarios was shown through-
out the thesis. Chapter 4 applied the simulation tool to study effects of different incentive
schemes on (heterogeneous) user types and overall system performance. Chapters 5 and 6
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used the tool to analyze the performance of different two-sided matching mechanisms for
resource allocation.
Due to its architecture and extensibility, the simulation tool is not only usable for Social
Cloud settings, but is also able to capture a variety of other resource sharing scenarios in
the future. However, as mentioned before, such a simulation-based approach can be seen as
complementary methodology and does not replace prototypes, experiments or theoretical
analysis. As simulation results crucially depend on the correct modeling of assumptions of
input parameters, several steps such as verification and validation of the simulation model
as well as sensitivity analyses of the results need to be pursued to ensure the correctness of
simulation studies.
7.1.2. Understanding Incentives for Participation
To achieve a critical mass of participating users, a resource sharing platform such as a
Social Cloud needs to provide appropriate incentives to potential users. This was the focus
of research question 1:
RESEARCH QUESTION 1≺PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTION INCENTIVES What are
relevant user participation incentives for Social Clouds and how can they be leveraged in the design
of tailored participation and contribution schemes?
The first step to address this research question is to analyze how users interact with a Social
Cloud in order to determine different participation stages. As the relevance of certain in-
centives might change over the time of user participation on the platform, research question
1.1 aimed at distinguishing these participation stages and identifying relevant incentives
for the different stages.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.1 ≺INCENTIVE ENGINEERING What are the stages of participa-
tion and the corresponding relevant incentives that users exhibit in Social Clouds?
Three different stages of participation can be identified that are relevant for Social Clouds:
the registration on the platform, the active participation on the platform, and the adherence
to social norms and behavior (see Section 3.2). Through a web survey, relevant incentives
for the first two stages were identified (Section 3.3). For user registration and participa-
tion, a direct invitation from friends, general altruistic traits, and the perceived benefits
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from joining were considered most important, whereas the prospect of monetary compen-
sation was considered least important. In addition, the setting of the sharing scenario,
i.e., whether sharing occurs in private settings between friends or in professional settings
between colleagues, also influenced the relative importance of certain incentives such as
monetary compensation or fun from participation.
Having identified different stages of user participation and the need to potentially empha-
size different incentives in these stages, as a next step this knowledge can be applied to de-
sign incentive schemes for active user participation on the platform. This thesis advocated
the use of the previously mentioned simulation tool as complementary methodology for
the engineering of such incentive schemes. To exemplify the usefulness of the simulation-
based approach, Chapter 4 presented two case studies. The aim of the first case study was
to study the effects of an incentive scheme on different user types, as stated in research
question 1.2.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.2 ≺INCENTIVE SCHEME DESIGN How can a simulation-based
approach be leveraged in the design of incentive schemes for participation?
The simulation tool was used to study a complex Social Cloud scenario where resources
were shared between heterogeneous user groups. The aim of the case study was to analyze
the effects a trading constraint on the users and the system. As an analytical approach was
not feasible due to the number of considered users and their heterogeneity, the (dynamic)
effects of the trading constraint on different user types were studied in Section 4.2. The
simulation revealed interesting effects on the different user types, which were affected dif-
ferently to a substantial degree. In particular, it showed that selfish users suffer most from
the introduction of a participation constraint, while altruistic and other user types generally
are also affected to some degree. The case study also showed that the results are sensitive
with respect to the distribution of user types, which is an important input factor that has to
be considered in the design process of Social Clouds. Overall, the case study showed that
a simulation-based approach can be used to study and predict dynamic effects in Social
Clouds, and to find robust parameters for an incentive scheme by analyzing different user
type distributions.
The second case study in Section 4.3 proposed an economic model how infrastructure re-
sources that are needed to host a Social Cloud can be co-operatively provided by the users
of the platform themselves. In such a scenario, the incentives to provide resources to the in-
frastructure determine the amount of platform resources and thus the applicability of such
7.1. CONTRIBUTION 201
an approach. Therefore, research question 1.3 studied different contribution schemes how
users can provide resources to the infrastructure, and examined how the feasibility of the
approach is determined by the characteristics of the user base.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.3 ≺CO-OPERATIVE INFRASTRUCTURES What are the effects
of different contribution schemes on co-operatively provided infrastructure resources for Social
Clouds?
The contribution schemes distinguished between required contribution (in which case each
user has to provide a certain amount of resources) and voluntary contribution (users choose
their level of contribution according to their specific characteristics). The results for the dif-
ferent contribution schemes showed that schemes with required contribution mostly lead
to a sufficient number of contributed resources and guarantee a high level of platform avail-
ability and performance. In contrast, the applicability of voluntary contribution schemes
largely depends on the characteristics of the underlying user base. For example, in systems
with a high number of selfish users, required contribution schemes are more promising.
The results also showed, however, that the utility for users is higher in case of voluntary
contributions, as they themselves determine their optimal level of resource contribution.
Addressing research question 1, the findings showed that three distinct stages for user
participation in a Social Cloud can be distinguished, and that non-monetary incentives
such as altruism, fun, and expected reciprocity are the most relevant incentives in such a
setting. Additionally, a simulation-based approach can be used to design incentive schemes
and study dynamic effects on the Social Cloud. The presented results are, however, only a
first step for the engineering of incentives for actual Social Clouds. As shown in the case
studies, the effectiveness of a particular incentive scheme depends on the distribution of
user types, hence it is necessary to identify the actual distribution for a given setting. In
addition, it remains a largely open question how incentives can be tailored to individual
users or user groups in Social Clouds.
7.1.3. Heuristics for Preference-based Resource Allocation
The design of resource allocation mechanisms for Social Clouds was the second coordina-
tion challenge addressed by this thesis. Due to the underlying social connections between
users, a preference-based, two-sided matching approach was considered as a means to al-
locate resources through a non-monetary mechanism.
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In preference-based matching, users are split into two sides: users requesting resources,
and users providing resources. Each user specifies a preference ranking with whom of
the other (market) side they want to be matched. Based on these preference rankings, a
two-sided matching algorithm then calculates a solution that determines which users are
matched. The thesis focused on one-to-one matches, i.e., one provider is matched with one
requester. The complexity of calculating a solution depends on both the structure of the
submitted preferences and the desired goals that the solution should satisfy. Preferences
can be categorized in complete and incomplete preferences, depending if all users of the
other side are matched or not, and having indifferences between certain users or not. The
standard goal in preference-based matching is to calculate a stable solution, which means
that no two users can both benefit by bilaterally breaking from the solution and forming a
new pair. Other commonly considered goals are welfare, measuring the rank that the av-
erage user is matched with, and fairness, which considers if welfare is distributed equally
between the two sides.
In the general case where preferences can include either incomplete lists or indifferences,
finding a solution that satisfies the standard goals (e.g., finding a stable solution with best
welfare) is NP-hard for all but a small number of scenarios. Furthermore, for certain combi-
nations of preference structures and goals, approximation algorithms have been developed.
However, the downside of current approximation algorithms is that they are specialized on
a certain set of preference structures and goals, and are not designed to handle other cases.
Furthermore, there are scenarios for which no approximation algorithms exist. Hence, the
focus of this part of the thesis was following research question:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2 ≺RESOURCE ALLOCATION Which types of algorithms provide a
good combination of performance, flexibility, and strategic properties for non-monetary, preference-
based resource allocation?
As this is a multifaceted question and the performance of the considered algorithms can
be studied from different points of view, several other research questions have to be an-
swered first. These questions each consider a specific aspect of algorithm performance or
properties.
Especially in light of social resource sharing platforms, the goals of the platform can be
diverse and change over time. For this reason, and due to the computational complexity
of the underlying problem, heuristic algorithms to calculate a solution to the preference-
based matching were proposed in Chapter 5. Two heuristics were considered to calculate
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solutions for preference-based matching: a Genetic Algorithm (GA) and a Threshold Ac-
cepting (TA) algorithm, as well as the combination of the two. For the applicability of these
heuristics, particularly with respect to the quality of their solutions, research question 2.1
considered the performance of heuristics and existing algorithms in different settings.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.1 ≺PERFORMANCE OF PREFERENCE-BASED MATCHING What
is the performance of heuristics for preference-based matching compared to existing matching mech-
anisms?
For different preference structures (complete and incomplete preferences with indiffer-
ences), the heuristics were compared with existing algorithms for the specific setting, fo-
cusing on standard metrics such as stability, welfare, fairness, and the number of matched
pairs. For complete preferences, depending on the type of solutions with which it is initial-
ized, the GA is able to improve the solution quality of the initial solutions, and in particular
provides better solutions in comparison to the standard algorithms in this case. Similar re-
sults were obtained for the combination of GA and TA. TA alone, however, is not a fitting
heuristic for this scenario as its solution quality is worse than GA (Section 5.4.3). For in-
complete preferences, the relative performance of the heuristics is even better. Both GA
and TA are useful heuristics in this scenario, and their respective solution quality is similar
to the average quality of the best approximation algorithm. Furthermore, the combined
GA and TA algorithm with mixed initial solutions consistently yields significantly better
results than all other algorithms (Section 5.4.4). In addition to increasing the number of
matched pairs, the heuristics also yield solutions with considerably better welfare and fair-
ness properties.
Overall, the results showed that heuristics do not only provide flexibility to cope with var-
ious preference and goal combinations, but also perform similarly or better than existing
algorithms. Combined with a relatively short runtime, heuristics provide an ideal combi-
nation of flexibility, runtime, and solution quality for the calculation of preference-based
matching allocations. For resource sharing in social contexts, both the platform and the
users benefit from the application of the proposed heuristics (through an increased num-
ber of shared resources, and being matched to a more preferred partner, respectively).
Besides solution quality, strategic behavior of users is another important aspect in
preference-based resource matching. Matching mechanisms determine the allocation on
the basis of the submitted preferences. However, if the mechanism is not incentive com-
patible, users might not submit their true preferences. One of the fundamental results in
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preference-based matching states that there can be no algorithm that always yields a stable
solution and for which no user has incentives to manipulate the submitted preferences to
the algorithm (Roth, 1982). In other words, for the algorithms considered in this thesis, at
least some users theoretically can benefit from preference manipulation. The existence of
manipulation has been studied for only a few of the considered algorithms, and the effect
of manipulation considering the heuristics and different scenarios was an open question.
This was the focus of research question 2.2.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.2 ≺INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY What are the effects of preference
manipulation on the manipulating users, non-manipulating users, and the solution quality?
Submitting manipulated preferences has complex effects on the matching solution. It can
be beneficial for the manipulating user by being matched to a more preferred partner, yet
it is also possible that the manipulating user is matched to a less preferred partner or even
remains unmatched. The results of the corresponding evaluation in Section 6.1.2 showed
that preference manipulation can indeed lead to being matched with better partners for the
manipulating users, as predicted by theory. However, the likelihood of a successful manip-
ulation is relatively small (between 40-44% for the combination of GA and TA), and severe
manipulation can lead to the user remaining unmatched. Furthermore, the results showed
that preference manipulation can introduce instability in the solution. For example, a solu-
tion which is stable under the submitted (manipulated) preferences can be unstable under
the true preferences.
The robustness of the heuristics and best performing approximation algorithms was con-
sidered as well. For two scenarios with different numbers of users, the results indicate that
potential (average) gains from manipulation are smallest for the combination of GA and
TA. This indicates that it is harder for manipulating users to find a beneficial manipulation
strategy if heuristic algorithms are used (Section 6.1.3).
The third aspect of algorithm performance in preference-based matching was the study of
their applicability in dynamic allocation scenarios. In contrast to standard preference-based
matching which assumes batch-like calculations of the solution at certain time intervals, in
between these time intervals new users might enter or leave the platform, thereby creating
new (intermediate) supply and demand. Research question 2.3 studied the effects of such
dynamic supply and demand on preference-based matching.
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RESEARCH QUESTION 2.3 ≺DYNAMIC ALLOCATIONS What are options to allocate dy-
namic supply and demand, taking into account potential existing matches?
Section 6.2 showed that not acknowledging this intermediate supply and demand might
leave a considerable amount of resources idle. Depending on the problem size, the runtime
of the algorithms, or technical restrictions considering the migration of data or entire Vir-
tual Machines, it might not be feasible to immediately recalculate the entire solution with
all users that are currently matched. Hence, two additional heuristics were suggested to
cope with such intermediate supply and demand. The evaluation in Section 6.2.2 showed
that these heuristics are able to match the otherwise unutilized resources, yet introduce
some level of instability in the (overall) solution and have varying effects on welfare and
fairness. If the allocation does not have to be calculated instantaneously, the recalculation
with GA and TA leads to the best results. Overall, however, the suggested heuristics for
intermediate allocation are a valid option to match resources in dynamic scenarios.
Summarizing the results, the studied heuristics are superior to existing algorithms consid-
ering their ability to adapt to different preference structures and goal combinations. For
example, the heuristics can be easily adjusted to optimize combinations of goal metrics
that existing algorithms do not or cannot consider. Their performance for commonly con-
sidered metrics is equal or superior to existing algorithms, they offer good characteristics
with respect to strategic behavior of users, and their runtime allows the application in dy-
namic scenarios. Due to this, the heuristics provide benefits for the resource allocation in
Social Clouds. Depending on the setting, the optimization goals of the allocation can be
flexibly adjusted while the resulting solution quality of the allocation remains consistently
high. In particular, the improvements to existing (approximation) algorithms imply bene-
fits for the system and the users (e.g., through better welfare and fairness properties of a
solution).
However, despite these positive results, there are some limitations to the presented ap-
proach. Heuristics, in contrast to exact or approximation algorithms, do not guarantee
certain bounds for solution quality. Although the results in Chapter 5 indicate otherwise,
there might be cases where the worst-case performance of the heuristics is worse than the
lower quality bounds of approximation algorithms. In addition, this thesis considered one-
to-one matching scenarios. The heuristics can be easily adapted for many-to-one scenarios,
yet their performance evaluation in such settings requires further evaluation. Two-sided
matching with complex preference structures such as multiple attributes also remains an
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open topic. These issues are addressed in the next section on open research questions and
future work.
7.2. Future Work
This section critically discusses the assumptions and limitations of this work and presents
an outlook on future work.
7.2.1. User Participation Incentives
Participation Incentives: Feedback from Prototypes and Real Platforms
The identification of different participation stages in Section 3.2 is based on a conceptual
model derived from literature research and a comparison with similar systems and models.
The web-based survey on the relevance of certain incentive types for different users, as
presented in Section 3.3, does not claim to be representative of the actual user population,
which limits the generalizability of the results. Both steps are necessary in the design of
participation incentives for Social Clouds, and the results provided in Chapters 3 and 4
can be considered a first step towards a more comprehensive coverage of this topic. In
particular, the relevance of the incentives studied in the web survey in Chapter 3 have to
be extended to capture users of an actually implemented (prototype) platform, in order to
derive insights for the specific platform.
The results can be extended by using prototype implementations or actual platforms to
gain feedback about user behavior, their participation incentives and other user character-
istics. This can help to both refine the model of participation stages as well as to obtain
useful insights about the importance of the studied incentive types for certain user groups.
The technical prototype implementation of a Social Compute Cloud as presented in Sec-
tion 2.1.4 provides an ideal starting point for such research. As a next step, this prototype
can be made accessible to users with the goal to obtain feedback about the usage and the
relevance of certain participation incentives.
Agreement Design for Social Clouds
The relevant motivations and incentives to exchange and share resource in social settings,
in particular on a non-monetary basis, are different from the primarily monetary-based re-
source exchange systems such as the procurement of services from service providers. In the
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latter case, the details of the exchange are often specified in Service Level Agreements (SLA)
which determine the functional and non-functional properties of the given exchange. That
is, SLAs specify the attributes of the service that is exchanged and the relevant payments.
Also, penalties in case of unsuccessful service provisioning are defined.
In a more social context, the use of standard SLAs and monetary-based penalties might be
detrimental or have serious consequences on the existing relationships between the provid-
ing and consuming users. Hence, a new form of socially-aware SLAs has to be developed
to cope with such situations, and still be able to specify certain properties of the exchanged
resources and services. First steps in this direction have been pursued by Michalk and Haas
(2011), who discuss why social aspects should be considered in the definition of SLAs in
social contexts. Additionally, potential options and details how such agreements can be
represented in a Social Cloud are discussed by Thal (2013).
Sustainable Infrastructures for Social Clouds
The model for co-operative infrastructure provisioning as discussed in Section 4.3 only
considers the trade-off between providing resources to the platform and keeping resources
for other usage. In addition, the sensitivity analyses of the model with respect to different
user characteristics assumed the existence of certain types of utility functions, which might
not necessarily reflect the real user behavior.
An immediate extension, in particular in the context of Social Clouds, is the augmentation
of the model to capture not only the contribution to the platform, but potential resource
sharing between users as well. In this case, users have the option to either reserve re-
sources for own usage, donate them to the infrastructure, or share them with other users
on the platform. Users might also have different preferences and incentives with respect
to these options. To create a necessarily realistic model and evaluation of such a combined
approach, a Social Cloud prototype with said capabilities seems to be the best approach to
evaluate actual user behavior and its effects on the co-operative infrastructure model. A
second extension is a feasibility study of having a sustainable user-contributed infrastruc-
ture for volunteer computing. Usually, the infrastructure for BOINC-like projects is central-
ized, and only the computing jobs are sent and retrieved from clients. However, it might
also be an viable option to host the project infrastructure itself on the client resources.
System Development and User Interface Design
This thesis concentrated on identifying participation incentives for Social Clouds, as well
as algorithms to match offers and requests. In the design of a Social Cloud, there are further
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tasks that require attention. The concepts of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use,
which are the two central constructs of the Technology Acceptance Model (Venkatesh et al.,
2003), are essential in the adoption of new technology, and also new platforms. Hence, one
of the necessary areas of design is the development of good user interfaces. For example,
Seuken et al. (2010) discuss user interface design in the context of P2P storage sharing. In
the context of Social Clouds, the influence of user interfaces on user behavior (e.g., with
respect to specifying sharing preferences) is of particular interest.
7.2.2. Preference-based Resource Allocation
Multi-Attributive Two-Sided Matching
Preference-based matching is a suitable approach to allocate resources on a non-monetary
basis. The considered algorithms in this thesis focus on one-to-one matching, where one
requesting user is matched with one providing user. This model assumes that resources
are either homogeneous, or that a match is only allowed if the provided resource is able to
fulfill the request (e.g., the provided VM satisfies all requirements with respect to compu-
tational power, memory, etc.). This simple representation might not be suitable to capture
more complex scenarios. For example, users providing a certain part of their computer
as VM might be able to split this VM into smaller instances and satisfy multiple smaller
requests simultaneously. A direct extension of the one-to-one model, thus, would be to
capture such many-to-one matching algorithms.
In the case of heterogeneous resources, multiple attributes are often used to characterize
the resources’ properties. For example, a VM can be described by the number of cores, the
provided memory and storage, its availability, etc. In such a scenario, users might have
different preferences for the attributes, i.e., weight the relative importance of the attributes.
If alternatives are ranked differently with respect to the attributes, i.e., the ranking of al-
ternatives is not the same for all attributes, the question arises how a resource allocation
can be found. One approach, in this case, is to aggregate the preference rankings for the at-
tributes into one ranking based on the relative weight for the attributes. Another approach
is to define necessary requirements for the considered attributes that the alternatives have
to fulfill, and rank the alternatives according to the fulfillment of these requirements.
The allocation of seminar slots to students is another example where such a multi-
attributive approach can be useful. In such a scenario, students have a preference for
certain seminars they want to attend, and seminar leaders also have preferences which
students they want to have in the seminar. Diebold et al. (2014) study the application of
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stable matching algorithms on course allocation problems. Decentralized allocation, in this
case, can be quite complex and lead to considerable inefficiencies. For example, to increase
their chances of getting a seminar slot students might apply for many seminars in parallel,
and only accept the slots that they like most, leading to potentially open slots in seminars
where allocated students are not interested in the slot anymore. A centralized allocation
mechanism can help to alleviate this situation. For example, seminar leaders can state their
preferences for students (e.g., grade average, number of relevant lectures attended, etc.),
and students can rank the seminars according to their liking. The centralized mechanism
can then find an allocation that matches students to seminar slots such that the overall
allocation efficiency (e.g., with respect to stability or welfare) is increased compared to de-
centralized allocation. Such an approach can utilize additional constraints, such as the
guarantee that each student is allocated a minimum number of seminar slots. The analysis
of stability and other performance metrics is an interesting case study in such a scenario.
Weighted Preferences
The two-sided matching algorithms considered in this thesis focus on unweighted pref-
erences, i.e., preference rankings represent qualitative priority structures that can be rep-
resented as rank order lists. For example, preference rank 1 denotes the most preferred
alternative, rank 2 the second most preferred alternative, etc. While this is a common as-
sumption in two-sided matching literature, a more quantitative preference representation
can be useful in certain scenarios. For example, Irving et al. (1987) propose weighted pref-
erence lists where, instead of preference ranks, users are ranked according to a numerical
score. Through such a representation, users are able to express preferences in more de-
tails. For example, a users might consider the difference between the two most preferred
alternatives as considerably higher than the difference between the two least preferred al-
ternatives. By providing scores instead of priorities, such a more complex representation is
achievable.
When weighted preferences are considered, several aspects need to be addressed. Pini
et al. (2011b) argue that the performance metrics should be adjusted to capture the new
preference representation. Considering algorithms for finding solutions to the matching
problem, the performance of the studied algorithms needs to be evaluated for such a set-
ting. Although the heuristics can be easily adapted to capture weighted preferences, their
performance with respect to the optimal solution, or in comparison with other algorithms,
are an interesting topic for future research.
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Robust Strategies for Two-Sided Matching
The aim of studying strategic preference manipulation in this thesis was to gain insight
in the potential effects of manipulation as well as the robustness of the considered mecha-
nisms against manipulation. With this foundation, the following interesting question lends
itself: What is a good strategy for manipulation in two-sided preference-based matching
markets? As seen in Chapter 6.1, theoretical results suggest that in certain scenarios trun-
cation of preferences is superior to both random reordering as well as submitting the true
preferences. Yet, this does not answer the question how much the preferences should be
truncated, and how such a strategy depends on the strategies of other, potentially also ma-
nipulating participants. Considering the practical importance of such manipulation, it is
also of interest if there are robust strategies that work well in (many) different settings, thus
providing useful guidelines for participants and market designers alike.
The evaluation in Section 6.1 can be considered a first step in studying such robust strate-
gies. A potential research direction is to apply evolutionary computing to determine suc-
cessful manipulation strategies. Alternatively, a tournament in the spirit of Axelrod’s strat-
egy tournament for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be held, where strategies are played
against each other to determine the most robust strategy (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;
Axelrod, 1997).
Dynamic Preference Rankings and Feedback Integration
The preference-based matching algorithms presented in Chapters 5 and 6 take as input the
preference profiles of participating users. These profiles do not need to be static, and thus
can potentially change over time. For example, in a network with providing and requesting
users, the relative ranking of other users might be influenced by the previous interaction
and sharing experiences as well as the feedback about such past interactions from other
users.
A potential way to rank users in the preferences is to use a trust network with local or global
trust values for the users. These trust networks incorporate the feedback of other users in
addition to own experiences about transactions with other users (see e.g. Petri et al. (2012)
for the use of trust networks in P2P clouds). If users did not interact with certain other users
before, it might be difficult to obtain a preference ranking due to the lack of knowledge
about these other users. By using trust networks and the corresponding trust values, users
might be able to improve the accuracy of their preference rankings over time. Two aspects
are of particular interest in this case. On the one hand, the relative positions of users in
preference rankings can by dynamic and change based on their previous transactions as
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well as user feedback. Hence, it is necessary to study the factors that influence this dynamic
ranking. On the other hand, the feedback itself might not always be reliable itself, or even
be manipulated by maliciously behaving users. The effects of different feedback types on
the resulting solution, thus, is an important topic that requires attention.
Preference Creation and Elicitation
Preference rankings submitted by users are the main input of the two-sided matching al-
gorithms in this thesis. From the perspective of the users and the platform designer, the
creation and elicitation of these preference rankings is an interesting aspect. In a Social
Cloud, the data about the underlying social network and connections between users can
be used in the creation of preference rankings. However, as the representation of connec-
tions is often binary, the interpretation of a user’s social ties for the purposes of allocation is
not immediately clear. There is no single unified methodology for the interpretation of so-
cial ties, and which to use is often context dependent. To create a preference ranking from
the social ties, several methods could be applied either separately or in combination with
one another: 1) ask users to rank their friends; 2) leverage methods from social network
analysis to identify features of social ties that can be used to (artificially) construct prefer-
ences; and 3) use social network and interaction theories to construct a social sharing and
interaction model, and tune this model over time based upon observed interactions within
the social network platform and the Social Cloud. Each of these approaches have their ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and there might be other methods which are not listed above
as well.
The use of user generated lists has the advantages that it is easy to implement, requires
no special permissions (other than access to the list of friends), and should be closest to
capturing the true preferences of the user. However, given the recent trends in social net-
work usage, the average Facebook user currently has 190 friends (Backstrom et al., 2012),
this approach would not scale as more friends joined the Social Cloud, as it cannot be
expected that users rank large numbers of friends. In contrast, the use of computational
methods has the main advantage that these approaches can be scaled as the Social Cloud
grows. The challenge, however, is in the identification of appropriate methods and indica-
tors. These approaches also require more data from the social network platform, and are
thus more invasive into the user’s private sphere, which cannot be understated. A simple
example that can be used in a preference-like manner are constructs like circles in Google+
or relationship lists in Facebook, as these are often created or at least curated by the user,
and represent either specific (sub)groups in the social network and/or relationship types
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that are “similar” in some way. It is also possible to compose more complicated methods
of assessing social ties with the use of indicators to assess the properties of a social tie.
Overall, however, identifying the best implementation(s) for the creation and elicitation of





Additional Material for Incentive Survey
Survey Questions
1) Have you ever shared (provided and/or received) resources online? (Examples for
resources: files, programs, photos, lectures notes, (working) documents, sample solutions,
storage, ...)
◦ Yes ◦ No
2) Over which platforms and/or communication channels have you shared (pro-
videdand/or received) resources? (multiple answers allowed)
◦ Social network (private, e.g. Facebook) ◦ Social network (professional, e.g. Xing)
◦ DropBox ◦ Own server (FTP)
◦ Google Drive ◦Microsoft SkyDrive




3) Which of the following resources have you already shared (provided and/or re-
ceived)online? (multiple answers allowed)
◦ Files ◦ Programs
◦Music ◦ Photos
◦Movies ◦ Lecture Notes
◦ Sample Solutions ◦ (Working) Documents
◦ Storage ◦ Other:
4) With whom have you shared (provided and/or received) resources so far? (multiple
answers allowed)
◦ Family ◦ Friends (real life)
◦ Friends (online) ◦ Friends of Friends
◦ Classmates ◦ Colleagues
◦ Other:
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5) How often do you share (provide and/or receive) resources on average? (multiple
answers allowed)
◦More often than once per day ◦ Once per day
◦ A few times a week ◦ Once per week
◦ A few times a month ◦ Once per month
◦ frequently than once per month ◦ Dependent on certain events
◦ Please specify, if it is dependent on certain events:
6) What are (would be) your reasons for sharing (providing and/or receiving) resources?
(1 = disagree strongly, . . ., 7 = agree strongly)
◦ Direct request ◦ Helpfulness
◦ Own benefit ◦Monetary compensation
◦ Other compensation (e.g. favor) ◦ Prestige / Reputation
◦ Other (please specify):
7) In addition to the resources, which you have already shared, are there any other re-
sources you would like to share if the appropriate technology was available? (Except for
any illegal share activities)
◦ No ◦ Don’t know
◦ Yes, the following:
8) Are you interested in sharing (providing and/or receiving) resources in general? (Ex-
amples for resources could be files, programs, photos, lectures notes, (working) documents,
sample solutions, storage, ...)
◦ No ◦ Don’t know
◦ Yes, the following:
9) Which incentives would be important/crucial for you to register with that network?
(In this case, registration does not imply active usage, only the general access to the net-
work to, for example, see the offered resources. 1 = disagree strongly, . . ., 7 = agree strongly)
◦ Request of closer friends ◦Monetary Compensation
◦ Prestige / Reputation ◦ Curiosity / Fun
◦ Helpfulness / favor ◦ Own benefit
◦ Other (please specify)
10) Please now imagine that you are registered in such a sharing network with friends.
Which incentives would be important/crucial to be an active user, i.e. to actively partici-
pate and share resources? (1 = disagree strongly, . . ., 7 = agree strongly)
◦ Request of closer friends ◦Monetary Compensation
◦ Prestige / Reputation ◦ Curiosity / Fun
◦ Helpfulness / favor ◦ Own benefit
◦ Other (please specify)
11) Please imagine that classmates, colleagues or acquaintances from a professional plat-
form, e.g. Xing, participate in a closed sharing network. Which incentives would now be
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important/crucial for you to register to that network? (In this case, registration does not
imply active usage, only the general access to the network to, for example, see the offered
resources. 1 = disagree strongly, . . ., 7 = agree strongly)
◦ Request of closer friends ◦Monetary Compensation
◦ Prestige / Reputation ◦ Curiosity / Fun
◦ Helpfulness / favor ◦ Own benefit
◦ Other (please specify)
12) Please now imagine that you are already member of such a sharing network with
acquaintances, classmates or colleagues. Which incentives would be important/crucial
to be an active user, i.e. to actively participate and share resources? (1 = disagree strongly,
. . ., 7 = agree strongly)
◦ Request of closer friends ◦Monetary Compensation
◦ Prestige / Reputation ◦ Curiosity / Fun
◦ Helpfulness / favor ◦ Own benefit
◦ Other (please specify)
13) Imagine a scenario where it is possible to provide storage on your hard disk to other
people for storing their data (e.g. backups, documents, photos, etc.) and access it on-
line. You can be sure that there is sufficiently high security so that only the owner of
the data can create, read, update and delete their data and that you are protected from
viruses/malware and legal liability for the data stored on your hard disk. To which
groups would you provide your storage (independent of compensation)? (multiple an-
swers allowed)
◦ Nobody ◦ Relatives
◦ Closer Friends ◦ Friends of Friends
◦ Classmates / Colleagues ◦ Everybody
◦ Other (please specify)
14) Now you would like to store your own (personal) data (backups, documents, photos,
...) on another’s hard disk. The data is encrypted, so that only you can can create, read,
update and delete your data. Which type of relationship must exist between you and the
provider of the storage? (multiple answers allowed)
◦ Relatives ◦ Closer Friends (in real life)
◦ Closer Friends (online) ◦ Friends of Friends
◦ Classmates / Colleagues ◦ Other (please specify)
15) In the previous scenario, "storage" was the resource shared between users. Imagine
now that you share (provide and/or receive) another resource (e.g. photos, lecture notes,
(working) documents,...). Would the group of people with whom you share resources
change?
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◦ No ◦ Yes:
16) Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please
mark as appropriate to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that state-
ment. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one
characteristic applies more strongly than the other.
I see myself as... (1 = disagree strongly, . . ., 7 = agree strongly)
◦ Extroverted, enthusiastic ◦ Critical, quarrelsome
◦ Dependable, self-disciplined ◦ Anxious, easily upset
◦ Open to new experiences, complex ◦ Reserved, quiet
◦ Sympathetic, warm ◦ Disorganized, careless
◦ Calm, emotionally stable ◦ Conventional, uncreative
17) Please choose your age.
◦ < 20 ◦ 20 - 25
◦ 26 - 30 ◦ 31 - 40
◦ 41 - 50 ◦ > 50
◦ Prefer not to say
18) Please choose your gender.
◦ Female ◦Male
19) What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently en-
rolled, mark the previous grade or highest degree received.
◦ Nursery-high school, no diploma ◦ High school diploma
◦ Some college, no degree ◦ Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA, AB,
BS)
◦ Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS,
MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)
◦ Professional degree (for example: MD,
DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
◦ Doctorate degree (for example: PhD,
EdD)
◦ Post-doctoral education
◦ Other (please specify):
20) Please choose your profession.
◦ Trainee ◦ Student
◦ Employee ◦ Self-employed
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Figure A.1.: Incentive Survey Logic


























Platforms Used for Previous Resource Sharing
Seite 7































Types of Previously Shared Resources
Seite 8























Storage Sharing with Different Groups
Seite 10

























Required Relationship Type for Storage Sharing
Seite 11
Figure A.5.: Required Relationships for Sharing Storage
Correlation Tables for Incentive Survey
Ext. Agr. Consc. Emoti. Open.
Ext. 1.000 -0.080 ,190* ,216* ,373**
Agr. -0.080 1.000 0.023 0.031 0.152
Consc. ,190* 0.023 1.000 ,229* 0.104
Emoti. ,216* 0.031 ,229* 1.000 0.114
Open. ,373** 0.152 0.104 0.114 1.000
Req. -0.016 -0.077 ,228* 0.159 0.065
Help. 0.115 0.071 ,188* 0.055 ,199*
Benefit 0.170 0.000 0.045 0.043 0.115
Monet. 0.109 -0.180 0.000 0.044 0.127
Other ,223* -0.092 -0.097 0.165 0.095
Rep. 0.157 0.066 -0.023 -0.018 0.134
Table A.1.: Spearman-Rho Correlation Table for Incentives for Previous Sharing, Part 1
Req. Help. Benefit Monet. Other Rep.
Ext. -0.016 0.115 0.170 0.109 ,223* 0.157
Agr. -0.077 0.071 0.000 -0.180 -0.092 0.066
Consc. ,228* ,188* 0.045 0.000 -0.097 -0.023
Emoti. 0.159 0.055 0.043 0.044 0.165 -0.018
Open. 0.065 ,199* 0.115 0.127 0.095 0.134
Req. 1.000 ,301** ,224* -0.044 0.086 -0.026
Help. ,301** 1.000 0.176 -0.027 0.100 ,349**
Benefit ,224* 0.176 1.000 0.163 ,214* 0.072
Monet. -0.044 -0.027 0.163 1.000 ,317** ,281**
Other 0.086 0.100 ,214* ,317** 1.000 ,508**
Rep. -0.026 ,349** 0.072 ,281** ,508** 1.000
Table A.2.: Spearman-Rho Correlation Table for Incentives for Previous Sharing, Part 2





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Extended Result Tables for Co-operative
Infrastructures
Table B.1.: Simulation Results for Enforced Fixed Contribution
















1 0.799 0.813 0.242 0.231 1.962 1.849
1.1 0.839 0.851 0.266 0.253 2.164 2.022
1.2 0.893 0.908 0.317 0.301 2.561 2.418
1.5 0.960 0.968 0.468 0.444 3.780 3.542
20
1 0.971 0.953 0.145 0.170 2.317 2.218
1.1 0.982 0.969 0.160 0.187 2.554 2.441
1.2 0.992 0.986 0.192 0.224 3.059 2.935
1.5 0.999 0.998 0.288 0.333 4.585 4.352
50
1 1.000 0.999 0.096 0.138 2.846 2.392
1.1 1.000 1.000 0.106 0.151 3.123 2.635
1.2 1.000 1.000 0.127 0.182 3.757 3.165
1.5 1.000 1.000 0.190 0.272 5.636 4.747
100
1 1.000 1.000 0.084 0.147 2.979 2.259
1.1 1.000 1.000 0.092 0.161 3.279 2.481
1.2 1.000 1.000 0.110 0.194 3.939 2.978
1.5 1.000 1.000 0.166 0.290 5.903 4.465
200
1 1.000 0.990 0.094 0.178 2.885 1.974
1.1 1.000 0.993 0.103 0.196 3.174 2.170
1.2 1.000 1.000 0.124 0.236 3.807 2.604
1.5 1.000 1.000 0.185 0.353 5.708 3.909
400
1 1.000 0.990 0.116 0.230 2.568 1.667
1.1 1.000 0.991 0.127 0.253 2.824 1.833
1.2 1.000 1.000 0.153 0.304 3.388 2.199
1.5 1.000 1.000 0.229 0.451 5.086 3.262
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Table B.2.: Simulation Results for Variable Fixed Contribution
















0.1 0.013 0.017 0.206 0.192 0.385 0.371
0.2 0.255 0.283 0.188 0.186 0.686 0.715
0.3 0.198 0.269 0.105 0.121 0.565 0.683
0.4 0.144 0.135 0.046 0.042 0.349 0.324
0.5 0.195 0.166 0.045 0.030 0.414 0.309
20
0.1 0.119 0.230 0.211 0.198 0.637 0.738
0.2 0.505 0.602 0.173 0.175 1.032 1.266
0.3 0.430 0.591 0.102 0.114 0.941 1.273
0.4 0.185 0.261 0.048 0.045 0.561 0.660
0.5 0.219 0.355 0.039 0.041 0.576 0.750
50
0.1 0.231 0.851 0.202 0.209 0.826 1.437
0.2 0.836 0.971 0.179 0.175 1.474 2.437
0.3 0.672 0.896 0.105 0.103 1.286 2.093
0.4 0.262 0.560 0.043 0.046 0.708 1.261
0.5 0.341 0.579 0.041 0.037 0.816 1.253
100
0.1 0.036 0.980 0.204 0.208 0.727 1.713
0.2 0.831 1.000 0.180 0.183 1.295 2.972
0.3 0.631 0.986 0.106 0.104 1.127 2.535
0.4 0.139 0.732 0.047 0.045 0.659 1.472
0.5 0.183 0.735 0.038 0.037 0.675 1.543
200
0.1 0.000 0.987 0.203 0.203 0.522 1.443
0.2 0.296 1.000 0.180 0.181 0.922 2.588
0.3 0.159 0.998 0.107 0.105 0.820 2.243
0.4 0.002 0.801 0.046 0.047 0.471 1.360
0.5 0.003 0.738 0.039 0.038 0.496 1.351
400
0.1 0.000 0.633 0.205 0.204 0.345 1.042
0.2 0.000 1.000 0.180 0.177 0.603 1.810
0.3 0.000 0.988 0.105 0.106 0.532 1.617
0.4 0.000 0.403 0.047 0.047 0.319 0.960
0.5 0.000 0.412 0.038 0.038 0.318 0.955
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Table B.3.: Simulation Results for Voluntary Variable Contribution, Baseline User Distribution


















1.00 0.213 0.181 0.072 0.071 0.602 0.545
1.25 0.049 0.038 0.044 0.044 0.370 0.373
1.50 0.003 0.000 0.029 0.027 0.251 0.212
2.00 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.096 0.103
3.00 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.036 0.032
20
1.00 0.531 0.479 0.075 0.073 1.118 1.028
1.25 0.225 0.147 0.043 0.047 0.700 0.616
1.50 0.036 0.012 0.027 0.027 0.410 0.357
2.00 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.203 0.177
3.00 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.065 0.054
50
1.00 0.914 0.664 0.071 0.070 2.190 1.247
1.25 0.644 0.203 0.042 0.045 1.219 0.763
1.50 0.263 0.010 0.027 0.028 0.804 0.491
2.00 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.012 0.378 0.215
3.00 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.123 0.071
100
1.00 0.993 0.643 0.074 0.074 2.626 1.132
1.25 0.907 0.062 0.044 0.045 1.593 0.697
1.50 0.422 0.000 0.027 0.029 0.959 0.434
2.00 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.441 0.200
3.00 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.144 0.064
200
1.00 0.999 0.138 0.073 0.073 2.244 0.817
1.25 0.911 0.000 0.044 0.043 1.350 0.486
1.50 0.175 0.000 0.028 0.028 0.849 0.308
2.00 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.398 0.145
3.00 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.125 0.046
400
1.00 0.999 0.000 0.074 0.073 1.656 0.538
1.25 0.447 0.000 0.044 0.044 0.984 0.319
1.50 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.028 0.609 0.202
2.00 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.285 0.092
3.00 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.090 0.030
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Table B.4.: Simulation Results for Voluntary Variable Contribution, Selfish User Distribution


















1.00 0.650 0.593 0.176 0.168 1.512 1.313
1.25 0.403 0.376 0.118 0.114 0.933 0.867
1.50 0.306 0.238 0.092 0.089 0.778 0.681
2.00 0.134 0.106 0.061 0.056 0.521 0.462
3.00 0.025 0.015 0.040 0.040 0.334 0.313
20
1.00 0.934 0.902 0.173 0.174 2.769 2.269
1.25 0.818 0.725 0.117 0.113 1.835 1.486
1.50 0.639 0.558 0.087 0.089 1.337 1.164
2.00 0.454 0.349 0.064 0.064 0.999 0.859
3.00 0.139 0.069 0.038 0.039 0.594 0.502
50
1.00 1.000 0.997 0.175 0.176 5.169 3.002
1.25 0.997 0.953 0.111 0.111 3.368 1.962
1.50 0.988 0.896 0.092 0.090 2.721 1.638
2.00 0.927 0.576 0.064 0.064 1.938 1.108
3.00 0.639 0.117 0.040 0.039 1.172 0.690
100
1.00 1.000 1.000 0.176 0.177 6.154 2.747
1.25 1.000 0.974 0.114 0.113 3.993 1.736
1.50 1.000 0.880 0.090 0.089 3.212 1.390
2.00 0.994 0.435 0.063 0.063 2.229 0.971
3.00 0.864 0.017 0.039 0.040 1.385 0.619
200
1.00 1.000 1.000 0.176 0.172 5.490 1.915
1.25 1.000 0.890 0.115 0.112 3.549 1.243
1.50 1.000 0.482 0.091 0.090 2.821 0.999
2.00 0.998 0.007 0.063 0.063 1.928 0.703
3.00 0.798 0.000 0.040 0.038 1.207 0.426
400
1.00 1.000 0.983 0.175 0.176 3.853 1.277
1.25 1.000 0.040 0.113 0.114 2.495 0.840
1.50 1.000 0.000 0.089 0.090 1.996 0.660
2.00 0.992 0.000 0.063 0.063 1.398 0.460
3.00 0.162 0.000 0.040 0.039 0.886 0.288
Appendix C.
Extended Results for Preference-based
Matching
Example for Preference Encoding and Genetic Operators of the
Genetic Algorithm
Example: Encoding, Crossover Operator, and Mutation Operator
Chromosome 1: (〈i2, j1〉 , 〈i1, j3〉 , 〈i4, j2〉 , 〈i5, j5〉 , 〈i3,∅〉 , 〈∅, j4〉)
Chromosome 2: (〈i2, j3〉 , 〈i1, j1〉 , 〈i4, j5〉 , 〈i5, j2〉 , 〈i3,∅〉 , 〈∅, j4〉)
After cycle crossover starting with the first gene:
New Chromosome 1: (〈i2, j1〉 , 〈i1, j3〉 , 〈i4, j5〉 , 〈i5, j2〉 , 〈i3,∅〉 , 〈∅, j4〉)
New Chromosome 2: (〈i2, j3〉 , 〈i1, j1〉 , 〈i4, j2〉 , 〈i5, j5〉 , 〈i3,∅〉 , 〈∅, j4〉)
Mutation operator, example for selecting two matched pairs and switching two users:
〈i2, j1〉 , 〈i1, j3〉 → 〈i2, j3〉 , 〈i1, j1〉
Mutation operator, example for selecting a mutation cycle:
〈∅, j4〉 , 〈i1, j3〉 , 〈i3,∅〉 → 〈i1, j4〉 , 〈i3, j3〉
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S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.83 (2.74,2.91) 2.65 (2.58,2.74) 2.53 (2.61) 0.00 2.55 2.54
F 0.73 (0.67,0.80) 0.44 (0.41,0.53) 0.43 (0.16) 0.00 0.44 0.41
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.27 (1.97,2.61) 2.10 (1.79,2.52) 1.74 (1.82) 0.00 1.75 1.75
F 0.63 (0.42,0.92) 0.40 (0.29,0.52) 0.28 (0.07) 0.00 0.30 0.30
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 1.67 (1.22,2.27) 1.50 (1.17,2.06) 1.14 (1.16) 0.00 1.14 1.14
F 0.40 (0.12,0.88) 0.26 (0.10,0.45) 0.08 (0.04) 0.00 0.08 0.08
20x20
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 4.27 (4.15,4.40) 3.92 (3.82,4.01) 3.79 (3.88) 0.00 3.85 3.79
F 1.42 (1.24,1.61) 0.61 (0.60,0.60) 0.58 (0.21) 0.00 0.74 0.57
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 3.59 (3.11,4.23) 3.18 (2.77,3.69) 2.73 (2.84) 0.00 2.81 2.80
F 1.36 (0.78,2.28) 0.57 (0.38,0.74) 0.37 (0.07) 0.00 0.48 0.47
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.84 (2.08,3.82) 2.39 (1.89,3.00) 1.76 (1.86) 0.00 1.84 1.84
F 1.11 (0.36,2.33) 0.46 (0.33,0.69) 0.25 (0.04) 0.00 0.26 0.26
50x50
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 7.79 (7.35,8.19) 6.54 (6.40,6.69) 6.39 (6.48) 0.00 6.76 6.48
F 3.94 (3.11,4.69) 0.85 (0.77,0.94) 0.77 (0.37) 0.00 1.95 0.78
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 6.91 (5.76,8.52) 5.67 (5.23,6.18) 5.21 (5.34) 0.00 5.56 5.46
F 3.71 (1.59,6.32) 0.82 (0.59,1.12) 0.57 (0.06) 0.00 1.33 0.98
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 5.91 (4.50,8.06) 4.58 (4.01,5.22) 3.92 (4.07) 0.00 4.29 4.27
F 3.44 (1.23,6.47) 0.73 (0.53,1.12) 0.45 (0.05) 0.00 0.85 0.81
100x100
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 12.31 (11.26,13.44) 9.37 (9.18,9.57) 9.18 (9.29) 0.00 10.35 9.36
F 7.66 (5.95,9.39) 1.01 (0.88,1.05) 0.85 (0.27) 0.00 4.25 1.07
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 11.59 (9.35,14.56) 8.60 (8.13,9.10) 8.11 (8.27) 0.00 8.99 8.53
F 7.66 (3.76,11.89) 0.99 (0.73,1.32) 0.74 (0.08) 0.00 2.79 1.20
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 10.30 (7.69,13.99) 7.33 (6.75,7.95) 6.69 (6.86) 0.00 7.63 7.25
F 7.11 (2.55,12.04) 0.95 (0.59,1.30) 0.57 (0.07) 0.00 2.61 1.05
200x200
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 20.51 (17.70,23.70) 13.61 (13.34,13.87) 13.34 (13.48) 0.00 16.36 16.31
F 15.09 (11.01,19.33) 1.15 (0.96,1.15) 0.96 (0.18) 0.00 8.92 8.76
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 19.53 (15.17,24.99) 12.66 (12.16,13.17) 12.16 (12.33) 0.00 14.64 14.64
F 14.93 (8.24,21.88) 1.12 (0.89,1.50) 0.88 (0.11) 0.00 7.29 7.43
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 18.10 (13.27,24.10) 11.36 (10.78,11.97) 10.76 (10.95) 0.00 13.15 13.10
F 14.29 (6.90,21.72) 1.12 (1.01,1.45) 1.00 (0.11) 0.00 6.90 6.69
Table C.1.: Complete Preferences, Welfare Optimization
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S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.82 (2.78,2.83) 2.73 (2.75,2.70) 2.76 (2.61) 2.75 2.77 2.77
F 0.74 (0.59,0.92) 0.42 (0.27,0.57) 0.10 (0.16) 0.25 0.11 0.11
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.27 (2.17,2.30) 2.19 (2.23,2.42) 2.47 (1.82) 2.41 2.39 2.38
F 0.64 (0.19,1.14) 0.36 (0.02,1.02) 0.00 (0.07) 0.02 0.00 0.00
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 1.68 (1.53,1.33) 1.57 (1.54,1.94) 1.94 (1.16) 1.82 1.95 1.88
F 0.40 (0.03,0.33) 0.23 (0.00,0.76) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 0.00 0.00
20x20
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 4.29 (4.19,4.40) 4.08 (4.06,4.12) 3.98 (3.88) 4.24 4.04 4.02
F 1.43 (1.13,1.91) 0.58 (0.29,0.92) 0.14 (0.21) 1.15 0.28 0.18
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 3.59 (3.29,4.16) 3.35 (3.29,3.85) 3.25 (2.84) 3.54 3.37 3.40
F 1.33 (0.41,2.79) 0.55 (0.01,2.01) 0.01 (0.07) 0.54 0.03 0.03
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.82 (2.49,3.01) 2.59 (2.50,3.11) 2.71 (1.86) 3.10 2.72 2.66
F 1.09 (0.09,1.98) 0.46 (0.00,1.69) 0.00 (0.04) 0.03 0.00 0.00
50x50
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 7.78 (7.38,7.93) 6.77 (6.71,6.91) 6.55 (6.48) 7.74 6.87 6.65
F 3.92 (3.03,4.33) 0.62 (0.12,1.40) 0.35 (0.37) 3.73 1.54 0.25
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 6.92 (5.97,8.93) 5.93 (5.81,6.91) 5.62 (5.34) 6.91 5.94 5.87
F 3.71 (1.13,6.95) 0.64 (0.01,3.84) 0.02 (0.06) 3.57 0.52 0.15
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 5.94 (4.77,9.31) 4.87 (4.77,5.96) 4.59 (4.07) 5.82 4.92 4.88
F 3.47 (0.60,8.26) 0.60 (0.01,3.69) 0.01 (0.05) 2.77 0.14 0.04
100x100
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 12.26 (11.26,12.68) 9.58 (9.54,9.88) 9.36 (9.29) 12.38 10.48 9.53
F 7.58 (5.78,8.34) 0.50 (0.08,1.81) 0.23 (0.27) 7.80 4.14 0.33
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 11.60 (9.36,15.59) 8.84 (8.71,9.97) 8.56 (8.27) 11.33 9.22 8.79
F 7.66 (3.30,12.96) 0.54 (0.01,4.60) 0.03 (0.08) 7.27 2.61 0.35
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 10.30 (7.77,20.30) 7.56 (7.49,8.86) 7.30 (6.86) 10.15 7.90 7.49
F 7.11 (2.11,19.20) 0.52 (0.01,4.72) 0.02 (0.07) 6.89 1.98 0.25
200x200
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 20.46 (17.77,20.12) 13.81 (13.77,13.93) 13.60 (13.48) 20.48 16.41 16.33
F 15.01 (11.00,14.56) 0.88 (0.18,1.67) 0.13 (0.18) 15.01 8.74 8.70
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 19.50 (15.14,29.27) 12.87 (12.83,13.10) 12.64 (12.33) 19.53 14.80 14.78
F 14.90 (8.10,26.51) 0.88 (0.06,2.11) 0.04 (0.11) 14.98 7.42 7.42
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 18.02 (13.35,43.24) 11.58 (11.51,11.90) 11.38 (10.95) 17.90 13.27 13.24
F 14.20 (6.91,42.15) 0.87 (0.06,2.70) 0.03 (0.11) 14.06 6.85 6.68
Table C.2.: Complete Preferences, Fairness Optimization
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S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 3.85 (3.74,3.95) 3.74 (3.67,3.81) 3.64 (3.70) 0.00 3.64 3.64
F 0.50 (0.44,0.60) 0.38 (0.36,0.38) 0.34 (0.12) 0.00 0.34 0.34
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 3.32 (3.05,3.68) 3.22 (3.00,3.60) 2.99 (3.05) 0.00 2.99 2.99
F 0.36 (0.22,0.62) 0.26 (0.18,0.36) 0.18 (0.06) 0.00 0.18 0.18
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.98 (2.71,3.42) 2.89 (2.68,3.29) 2.68 (2.69) 0.00 2.68 2.68
F 0.24 (0.06,0.50) 0.16 (0.06,0.27) 0.05 (0.02) 0.00 0.05 0.05
20x20
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 6.93 (6.79,7.08) 6.70 (6.62,6.80) 6.58 (6.67) 0.00 6.63 6.58
F 0.92 (0.73,1.09) 0.41 (0.36,0.46) 0.37 (0.08) 0.00 0.43 0.37
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 6.31 (5.89,6.84) 6.08 (5.79,6.49) 5.75 (5.85) 0.00 5.78 5.75
F 0.73 (0.37,1.30) 0.38 (0.28,0.48) 0.29 (0.03) 0.00 0.29 0.29
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 5.73 (5.22,6.43) 5.49 (5.13,5.96) 5.05 (5.12) 0.00 5.08 5.05
F 0.57 (0.20,1.33) 0.28 (0.16,0.42) 0.12 (0.03) 0.00 0.14 0.12
50x50
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 14.82 (14.43,15.25) 14.08 (13.92,14.25) 13.91 (14.02) 0.00 14.18 13.91
F 2.46 (1.79,3.20) 0.62 (0.57,0.64) 0.59 (0.05) 0.00 1.28 0.59
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 14.05 (13.26,15.18) 13.33 (12.97,13.75) 12.95 (13.08) 0.00 13.17 12.95
F 2.23 (0.95,4.04) 0.57 (0.44,0.76) 0.43 (0.03) 0.00 0.86 0.43
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 13.16 (12.23,14.53) 12.40 (11.97,12.89) 11.86 (12.00) 0.00 12.06 11.86
F 1.96 (0.69,3.89) 0.51 (0.36,0.70) 0.29 (0.02) 0.00 0.55 0.29
100x100
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 27.68 (26.72,28.83) 25.93 (25.71,26.18) 25.73 (25.85) 0.00 26.39 25.73
F 4.88 (3.17,6.70) 0.68 (0.56,0.77) 0.52 (0.06) 0.00 2.48 0.52
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 26.92 (25.49,28.88) 25.14 (24.76,25.56) 24.81 (24.96) 0.00 25.37 24.81
F 4.85 (2.25,7.75) 0.70 (0.56,0.79) 0.53 (0.04) 0.00 1.94 0.53
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 25.68 (24.12,27.81) 23.93 (23.44,24.46) 23.45 (23.64) 0.00 24.04 23.45
F 4.31 (1.52,7.23) 0.64 (0.51,0.85) 0.44 (0.02) 0.00 1.57 0.44
Table C.3.: Complete and Correlated Preferences, Welfare Optimization
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S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 3.83 (3.76,3.90) 3.81 (3.80,3.77) 3.84 (3.70) 3.83 3.82 3.84
F 0.50 (0.35,0.66) 0.28 (0.14,0.41) 0.07 (0.12) 0.08 0.08 0.07
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 3.34 (3.27,3.58) 3.28 (3.30,3.45) 3.48 (3.05) 3.48 3.45 3.48
F 0.37 (0.07,0.81) 0.23 (0.01,0.65) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 0.00 0.00
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 2.97 (2.87,3.31) 2.93 (2.92,3.18) 3.12 (2.69) 3.06 3.10 3.12
F 0.23 (0.01,0.65) 0.15 (0.00,0.50) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 0.00 0.00
20x20
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 6.93 (6.84,7.02) 6.82 (6.81,6.80) 6.82 (6.67) 6.86 6.82 6.82
F 0.90 (0.61,1.22) 0.33 (0.14,0.60) 0.04 (0.08) 0.17 0.11 0.04
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 6.31 (6.19,6.73) 6.20 (6.22,6.39) 6.24 (5.85) 6.37 6.22 6.24
F 0.73 (0.08,1.60) 0.31 (0.00,1.10) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 0.00 0.00
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 5.73 (5.55,6.39) 5.60 (5.61,5.92) 5.84 (5.12) 5.96 5.71 5.84
F 0.58 (0.02,1.50) 0.25 (0.00,0.95) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 0.00 0.00
50x50
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 14.80 (14.47,15.21) 14.27 (14.24,14.44) 14.21 (14.02) 14.70 14.28 14.21
F 2.43 (1.55,3.28) 0.29 (0.02,1.31) 0.02 (0.05) 1.94 0.83 0.02
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 14.05 (13.52,15.08) 13.53 (13.51,14.01) 13.48 (13.08) 14.07 13.54 13.48
F 2.23 (0.49,4.07) 0.30 (0.00,2.19) 0.00 (0.03) 1.04 0.13 0.00
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 13.17 (12.52,14.46) 12.61 (12.55,13.18) 12.62 (12.00) 13.30 12.76 12.62
F 1.99 (0.25,3.90) 0.29 (0.00,2.15) 0.00 (0.02) 0.13 0.00 0.00
100x100
2
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 27.67 (26.74,28.78) 26.19 (26.15,26.53) 26.08 (25.85) 27.49 26.51 26.08
F 4.87 (2.92,6.70) 0.29 (0.01,1.88) 0.02 (0.06) 4.51 2.24 0.02
5
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 26.91 (25.59,28.87) 25.42 (25.36,25.88) 25.34 (24.96) 26.81 25.54 25.34
F 4.85 (1.88,7.85) 0.28 (0.01,2.52) 0.01 (0.04) 4.38 1.49 0.01
10
S 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00,0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 25.65 (24.27,27.83) 24.22 (24.23,24.68) 24.12 (23.64) 25.55 24.42 24.12
F 4.26 (1.16,7.35) 0.26 (0.01,2.21) 0.00 (0.02) 2.88 0.78 0.00
Table C.4.: Complete and Correlated Preferences, Fairness Optimization
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0.5 9.71 9.32 9.37 9.48 9.58 9.39 9.57 9.58 9.61 9.58 9.66
0.7 8.80 8.32 8.56 8.51 8.64 8.52 8.69 8.68 8.69 8.67 8.74
0.9 5.48 5.27 5.44 5.42 5.48 5.46 5.46 5.48 5.48 5.46 5.48
0.95 3.70 3.64 3.68 3.70 3.70 3.66 3.69 3.69 3.70 3.70 3.70
5
0.5 9.93 9.24 9.74 9.67 9.84 9.65 9.83 9.86 9.87 9.89 9.90
0.7 9.33 8.34 9.00 8.88 9.17 8.97 9.09 9.10 9.17 9.11 9.25
0.9 5.62 5.34 5.54 5.54 5.59 5.56 5.58 5.59 5.56 5.58 5.61
0.95 3.75 3.68 3.74 3.74 3.75 3.75 3.74 3.75 3.74 3.73 3.75
10
0.5 10.00 9.37 9.98 9.91 9.98 9.97 9.99 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 9.35 8.36 9.18 8.98 9.28 9.20 9.21 9.27 9.27 9.23 9.30
0.9 5.77 5.44 5.75 5.73 5.76 5.74 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.77
0.95 3.43 3.34 3.40 3.43 3.43 3.42 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.42 3.43
20x20
2
0.5 19.85 19.57 19.66 19.61 19.74 19.57 19.78 19.75 19.67 19.75 19.82
0.7 19.36 18.39 18.61 18.70 18.83 18.50 18.83 18.88 18.76 18.84 19.05
0.9 14.88 14.01 14.38 14.46 14.73 14.44 14.49 14.71 14.56 14.60 14.80
0.95 10.42 10.04 10.28 10.34 10.38 10.19 10.34 10.41 10.33 10.34 10.40
5
0.5 20.00 19.56 19.80 19.86 19.98 19.78 19.98 20.00 19.97 20.00 20.00
0.7 19.97 18.41 19.34 19.21 19.58 19.34 19.49 19.67 19.65 19.66 19.76
0.9 15.81 14.22 15.28 15.26 15.64 15.33 15.42 15.59 15.38 15.52 15.72
0.95 11.04 10.44 10.91 10.95 11.01 10.93 11.00 10.99 10.94 10.99 11.04
10
0.5 20.00 19.55 19.97 19.95 20.00 19.93 20.00 19.99 19.99 19.99 20.00
0.7 19.94 18.55 19.87 19.62 19.92 19.86 19.88 19.93 19.87 19.93 19.94
0.9 15.82 14.21 15.52 15.24 15.69 15.48 15.53 15.59 15.55 15.58 15.77
0.95 11.09 10.44 11.06 10.99 11.04 11.04 11.03 11.06 11.03 11.04 11.09
50x50
2
0.5 50.00 49.94 49.95 49.90 49.94 49.94 50.00 50.00 49.95 50.00 50.00
0.7 49.94 49.28 49.44 49.37 49.52 49.28 49.68 49.76 49.44 49.75 49.80
0.9 46.87 44.27 44.91 44.99 45.63 44.96 45.21 45.64 45.14 45.56 45.91
0.95 40.61 37.96 39.16 39.31 39.85 39.13 39.02 39.83 39.34 39.54 40.11
5
0.5 50.00 49.91 49.96 49.97 50.00 49.95 50.00 50.00 49.98 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 49.21 49.50 49.56 49.93 49.61 49.96 50.00 49.67 50.00 49.99
0.9 49.35 44.22 46.83 46.42 47.90 46.96 46.59 47.99 47.69 48.03 48.10
0.95 42.84 37.70 41.00 40.52 41.69 41.05 40.13 41.70 41.53 41.67 41.97
10
0.5 50.00 49.91 50.00 50.00 50.00 49.98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 49.26 49.98 49.88 50.00 49.92 50.00 50.00 49.99 50.00 50.00
0.9 49.60 44.38 48.80 47.59 49.00 48.81 47.21 48.84 49.10 49.04 49.24
0.95 43.20 37.78 41.98 40.86 42.49 42.14 40.44 42.24 42.48 42.38 42.78
100x100
2
0.5 100.00 100.00 99.99 99.99 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00
0.7 100.00 99.74 99.78 99.86 99.91 99.81 99.96 99.96 99.76 99.96 99.99
0.9 99.04 95.59 96.16 96.11 96.89 96.18 96.67 97.10 96.36 97.07 97.31
0.95 94.04 88.36 89.84 90.06 91.17 89.70 89.67 91.09 90.44 90.80 91.47
5
0.5 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.7 100.00 99.80 99.92 99.87 99.99 99.92 100.00 100.00 99.94 100.00 100.00
0.9 99.98 95.77 97.10 97.52 98.68 97.74 98.07 98.83 98.72 98.96 99.02
0.95 98.44 88.08 93.14 92.74 95.36 93.81 91.32 95.24 95.51 95.54 95.74
10
0.5 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.7 100.00 99.79 100.00 99.94 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.9 99.98 95.84 99.52 98.54 99.78 99.63 98.53 99.74 99.79 99.86 99.87
0.95 98.89 88.11 97.20 94.15 97.56 97.26 92.39 97.07 98.07 97.74 98.10
Table C.5.: Incomplete Preferences, 10x10 - 100x100 Users
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0.5 - 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00
0.7 - 199.98 199.98 199.98 199.99 199.99 200.00 200.00 199.98 200.00 200.00
0.9 - 197.88 198.06 198.07 198.50 198.23 198.59 199.07 197.99 199.07 199.17
0.95 - 191.40 192.60 192.43 193.87 192.50 192.78 194.09 192.92 193.93 194.27
5
0.5 - 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00
0.7 - 199.99 199.99 199.99 199.99 199.98 200.00 200.00 199.99 200.00 200.00
0.9 - 197.99 198.73 198.55 199.52 198.76 199.46 199.67 199.26 199.71 199.86
0.95 - 191.42 194.13 194.89 197.85 195.40 194.67 197.44 197.56 197.65 197.94
10
0.5 - 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00
0.7 - 199.98 200.00 199.99 200.00 199.99 200.00 200.00 199.99 200.00 200.00
0.9 - 197.88 199.72 199.16 199.87 199.80 199.87 199.90 199.95 199.93 199.95
0.95 - 191.33 199.00 196.60 199.50 199.00 195.35 199.25 199.63 199.54 199.65
500x500
2
0.5 - 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
0.7 - 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
0.9 - 499.68 499.78 499.66 499.75 499.75 499.94 499.99 499.69 499.99 499.99
0.95 - 496.81 497.28 496.90 497.84 497.13 497.72 498.67 497.06 498.67 498.73
5
0.5 - 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
0.7 - 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
0.9 - 499.69 499.88 499.73 499.97 499.89 500.00 500.00 499.80 500.00 500.00
0.95 - 496.73 498.32 497.50 499.32 497.97 498.70 499.14 498.36 499.09 499.45
10
0.5 - 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
0.7 - 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
0.9 - 499.72 499.94 499.83 500.00 499.94 500.00 500.00 499.94 500.00 500.00
0.95 - 496.80 498.87 498.39 499.94 499.39 499.24 499.94 499.86 499.89 499.95
Table C.6.: Incomplete Preferences, 200x200 - 500x500 Users
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0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 9.88 9.83 9.87 9.87 9.88 9.88 9.87 9.87 9.87 9.87 9.88
0.95 9.19 9.08 9.17 9.13 9.19 9.14 9.18 9.18 9.18 9.18 9.19
5
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 9.95 9.93 9.94 9.95 9.95 9.94 9.95 9.95 9.94 9.95 9.95
0.95 9.29 9.16 9.28 9.26 9.28 9.27 9.28 9.29 9.28 9.29 9.29
10
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 9.97 9.92 9.96 9.97 9.97 9.96 9.97 9.96 9.97 9.96 9.97
0.95 9.29 9.17 9.28 9.29 9.29 9.27 9.29 9.29 9.29 9.29 9.29
10x100
2
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.95 9.96 9.94 9.96 9.95 9.95 9.95 9.96 9.96 9.96 9.96 9.96
5
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.95 9.94 9.93 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94
10
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.95 9.91 9.90 9.91 9.91 9.91 9.91 9.91 9.91 9.91 9.91 9.91
20x50
2
0.5 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.9 19.87 19.71 19.83 19.80 19.83 19.86 19.83 19.87 19.86 19.87 19.87
0.95 17.78 17.31 17.60 17.61 17.76 17.59 17.71 17.75 17.64 17.75 17.78
5
0.5 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.9 19.87 19.64 19.85 19.86 19.86 19.83 19.87 19.87 19.87 19.87 19.87
0.95 18.23 17.56 18.14 18.05 18.19 18.09 18.17 18.21 18.16 18.21 18.22
10
0.5 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.9 19.84 19.59 19.82 19.84 19.84 19.83 19.84 19.84 19.83 19.84 19.84
0.95 18.08 17.34 18.01 17.93 18.06 18.00 18.04 18.07 18.03 18.07 18.08
20x100
2
0.5 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.9 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.95 19.88 19.85 19.86 19.87 19.88 19.85 19.87 19.88 19.86 19.88 19.88
5
0.5 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.9 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.95 19.88 19.81 19.88 19.87 19.88 19.88 19.88 19.88 19.88 19.88 19.88
10
0.5 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.9 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.95 19.91 19.87 19.91 19.91 19.91 19.90 19.91 19.91 19.91 19.91 19.91
Table C.7.: Incomplete Preferences, Asymmetric Sides, 10x50 - 20x100 Users
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0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 9.89 9.87 9.87 9.89 9.89 9.88 9.89 9.89 9.87 9.89 9.89
0.95 9.24 9.13 9.18 9.21 9.23 9.17 9.24 9.23 9.18 9.22 9.24
5
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 9.94 9.90 9.93 9.93 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.94 9.93 9.94 9.94
0.95 9.09 8.98 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09
10
0.5 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.7 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
0.9 9.95 9.91 9.95 9.94 9.95 9.95 9.95 9.95 9.95 9.95 9.95
0.95 9.29 9.15 9.28 9.29 9.29 9.28 9.29 9.29 9.29 9.29 9.29
50x100
2
0.5 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.9 50.00 49.97 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.95 49.45 48.82 49.21 49.12 49.34 49.32 49.26 49.43 49.29 49.43 49.45
5
0.5 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.9 50.00 49.98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.95 49.65 48.81 49.56 49.51 49.63 49.59 49.63 49.65 49.62 49.65 49.65
10
0.5 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.9 50.00 49.99 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.95 49.65 48.80 49.60 49.59 49.63 49.59 49.65 49.65 49.63 49.65 49.65
Table C.8.: Incomplete Preferences, Asymmetric Sides, 50x10 and 50x100 Users
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0.5 9.76 9.23 9.41 9.44 9.52 9.43 9.61 9.61 9.63 9.57 9.70
0.7 8.76 8.24 8.38 8.52 8.60 8.43 8.59 8.63 8.65 8.64 8.74
0.9 5.41 5.29 5.33 5.37 5.41 5.37 5.41 5.41 5.40 5.39 5.41
0.95 3.58 3.55 3.56 3.58 3.58 3.55 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.58
5
0.5 9.99 9.29 9.79 9.71 9.93 9.79 9.94 9.93 9.93 9.95 9.97
0.7 9.08 8.19 8.81 8.68 8.90 8.75 8.90 8.93 8.98 8.91 9.03
0.9 5.62 5.35 5.58 5.57 5.61 5.50 5.62 5.61 5.62 5.58 5.62
0.95 3.65 3.55 3.60 3.64 3.65 3.63 3.64 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65
10
0.5 9.97 9.28 9.85 9.77 9.94 9.85 9.97 9.95 9.95 9.93 9.95
0.7 9.18 8.32 8.93 8.78 9.06 8.96 9.12 9.05 9.10 9.04 9.15
0.9 5.74 5.47 5.66 5.67 5.72 5.65 5.72 5.73 5.73 5.73 5.73
0.95 3.44 3.39 3.42 3.44 3.44 3.43 3.44 3.44 3.44 3.44 3.44
20x20
2
0.5 19.96 19.48 19.51 19.58 19.72 19.60 19.82 19.77 19.67 19.75 19.87
0.7 19.34 18.33 18.55 18.54 18.75 18.52 18.84 18.90 18.78 18.81 19.00
0.9 15.00 14.29 14.63 14.72 14.89 14.58 14.82 14.88 14.75 14.85 14.96
0.95 11.12 10.68 10.90 10.94 11.06 10.95 11.04 11.09 10.98 10.98 11.11
5
0.5 20.00 19.42 19.80 19.84 19.95 19.78 19.97 19.98 19.94 19.98 20.00
0.7 19.87 18.30 19.29 19.17 19.58 19.14 19.45 19.67 19.53 19.65 19.77
0.9 15.65 14.36 15.06 15.03 15.36 15.17 15.29 15.39 15.15 15.28 15.54
0.95 10.83 10.29 10.65 10.68 10.80 10.67 10.74 10.82 10.74 10.77 10.83
10
0.5 20.00 19.42 20.00 19.95 19.99 19.99 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
0.7 19.92 18.33 19.61 19.39 19.68 19.56 19.70 19.78 19.72 19.76 19.87
0.9 15.61 14.06 14.99 15.04 15.41 15.10 15.14 15.33 15.16 15.28 15.52
0.95 10.92 10.38 10.71 10.75 10.87 10.69 10.83 10.90 10.83 10.86 10.90
50x50
2
0.5 50.00 49.83 49.91 49.85 49.89 49.84 49.98 49.99 49.89 49.99 49.99
0.7 49.93 49.01 49.25 49.14 49.41 49.15 49.53 49.60 49.27 49.57 49.69
0.9 46.85 43.94 44.67 44.66 45.24 44.62 44.98 45.48 44.87 45.34 45.70
0.95 39.62 37.43 38.26 38.54 38.99 38.29 38.43 39.03 38.36 38.80 39.24
5
0.5 50.00 49.81 49.92 49.92 49.96 49.94 50.00 50.00 49.93 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 48.96 49.54 49.46 49.84 49.48 49.92 49.96 49.73 49.95 49.98
0.9 48.87 43.80 46.43 46.03 47.37 46.58 46.04 47.22 47.13 47.27 47.65
0.95 41.56 37.49 39.69 39.65 40.58 39.50 39.45 40.63 40.05 40.36 40.94
10
0.5 50.00 49.79 50.00 49.98 50.00 49.98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
0.7 50.00 48.99 49.94 49.83 50.00 49.96 50.00 50.00 49.99 50.00 50.00
0.9 49.19 43.89 47.87 46.53 48.14 47.95 46.58 48.11 48.13 48.22 48.54
0.95 41.63 37.17 39.74 39.60 40.74 40.06 39.47 40.70 40.19 40.58 41.14
100x100
2
0.5 100.00 99.95 99.95 99.96 99.99 99.94 99.99 99.99 99.94 99.99 100.00
0.7 99.99 99.61 99.60 99.61 99.71 99.68 99.95 99.96 99.59 99.96 99.97
0.9 99.15 94.88 95.40 95.71 96.29 95.52 96.10 96.66 95.57 96.51 96.87
0.95 93.26 87.08 88.55 88.70 89.93 88.46 88.46 90.10 88.98 89.74 90.47
5
0.5 100.00 99.98 99.98 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.97 100.00 100.00
0.7 100.00 99.60 99.85 99.77 99.97 99.83 100.00 100.00 99.89 100.00 100.00
0.9 99.94 94.72 96.98 97.02 98.51 97.42 97.06 98.57 98.31 98.61 98.74
0.95 97.71 87.08 92.10 91.93 94.35 92.72 90.35 93.86 93.94 93.91 94.75
10
0.5 100.00 99.97 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.7 100.00 99.58 99.97 99.89 99.99 99.98 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.9 99.99 94.90 99.41 98.16 99.68 99.43 97.92 99.64 99.71 99.69 99.82
0.95 98.26 87.06 95.02 92.72 95.92 94.93 91.05 95.38 95.85 95.62 96.41
Table C.9.: Incomplete and Correlated Preferences
Appendix D.
Extended Results for Preference
Manipulation
Pseudocode of Probe-and-Adjust Learning
Algorithm 6: Pseudocode of Probe and Adjust
Data: True Preference Profile
Result: Manipulated Preference Profile
1 begin
2 Create initial neighborhood from true preference profile;
3 for j← 1to explorationRounds do
4 randomly select preferences from neighborhood;
5 submit these preferences to the matching algorithm, and save outcome;
6 end
7 for i← 1to steps do
8 create neighborhood based on current preference profile;
9 for j← 1to explorationRounds do
10 randomly select preferences from neighborhood;
11 submit these preferences to the matching algorithm, and save outcome;
12 end
13 select best performing preferences as new current profile;
14 end
15 return current best (manipulated) preference profile;
16 end
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Truncation Degree DA RSMA Király Shift GATA
1
0.95 -8.83 -6.52 -8.06 -7.19 -8.52
0.9 -4.59 -2.68 -3.43 -2.77 -4.10
0.8 -0.23 1.22 0.53 1.20 -0.05
0.7 0.43 2.05 1.15 1.38 0.42
0.6 0.57 2.06 1.02 1.36 0.52
0.5 0.75 1.80 0.91 1.29 0.53
0.4 0.49 1.33 0.72 1.00 0.24
0.3 0.51 1.21 0.52 0.65 0.22
0.2 0.37 0.90 0.38 0.58 0.14
0.1 0.14 0.47 0.14 0.18 0.05
2
0.95 -7.86 -6.40 -6.81 -7.12 -8.40
0.9 -4.78 -3.31 -3.44 -3.65 -4.92
0.8 0.23 1.12 0.86 0.89 -0.51
0.7 1.53 2.20 1.84 1.57 0.32
0.6 1.55 2.20 1.66 1.40 0.28
0.5 1.52 1.92 1.59 1.25 0.35
0.4 1.09 1.30 1.19 0.88 0.18
0.3 0.81 1.10 0.84 0.67 0.16
0.2 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.35 0.00
0.1 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.13 -0.04
4
0.95 -6.98 -6.03 -6.13 -6.30 -7.68
0.9 -2.95 -2.02 -1.94 -2.18 -3.77
0.8 0.51 1.65 1.21 0.86 -0.57
0.7 1.60 2.38 1.73 1.58 0.23
0.6 1.58 2.33 1.67 1.40 0.23
0.5 1.47 2.05 1.48 1.31 0.34
0.4 1.08 1.47 0.98 0.94 0.17
0.3 0.83 1.31 0.75 0.66 0.14
0.2 0.43 0.60 0.30 0.41 -0.13
0.1 0.12 0.31 0.06 0.18 -0.05
6
0.95 -6.05 -4.85 -4.94 -5.66 -6.83
0.9 -2.21 -0.75 -1.27 -1.64 -3.13
0.8 0.61 1.89 1.33 0.82 -0.23
0.7 1.66 2.84 1.97 1.52 0.29
0.6 1.63 2.63 1.89 1.37 0.42
0.5 1.50 2.35 1.59 1.15 0.34
0.4 1.04 1.79 1.18 0.80 0.14
0.3 0.81 1.44 0.82 0.57 0.01
0.2 0.53 0.89 0.45 0.33 -0.06
0.1 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.06 -0.05
8
0.95 -5.29 -3.98 -4.62 -5.21 -6.27
0.9 -1.74 -0.44 -0.94 -1.54 -2.70
0.8 0.86 2.16 1.64 0.99 -0.16
0.7 1.80 2.85 2.15 1.55 0.62
0.6 1.82 2.73 2.10 1.44 0.51
0.5 1.59 2.45 1.75 1.23 0.36
0.4 1.27 1.89 1.35 0.93 0.23
0.3 1.01 1.49 1.03 0.70 0.12
0.2 0.61 0.91 0.67 0.45 0.16
0.1 0.16 0.45 0.25 0.12 0.13
10
0.95 -4.30 -3.25 -3.68 -4.37 -5.46
0.9 -1.03 -0.04 -0.51 -1.26 -2.43
0.8 1.22 2.21 1.68 1.23 -0.06
0.7 2.13 3.02 2.39 1.92 0.62
0.6 2.15 2.94 2.30 1.73 0.67
0.5 1.98 2.64 2.00 1.40 0.45
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Truncation Degree DA RSMA Király Shift GATA
10
0.4 1.76 2.18 1.60 1.07 0.24
0.3 1.38 1.85 1.22 0.85 0.09
0.2 0.91 1.30 0.84 0.57 0.11
0.1 0.47 0.49 0.31 0.19 0.10
12
0.95 -3.82 -2.87 -3.28 -4.06 -5.17
0.9 -0.85 0.23 -0.17 -0.93 -1.99
0.8 1.46 2.42 1.97 1.35 0.01
0.7 2.26 3.20 2.61 1.89 0.84
0.6 2.26 3.10 2.52 1.75 0.78
0.5 2.04 2.73 2.06 1.46 0.44
0.4 1.69 2.30 1.65 1.13 0.35
0.3 1.41 1.94 1.26 0.87 0.22
0.2 0.97 1.39 0.89 0.59 0.06
0.1 0.35 0.58 0.27 0.19 0.04
14
0.95 -3.96 -2.72 -3.35 -3.96 -5.17
0.9 -0.74 0.44 0.04 -0.62 -2.02
0.8 1.29 2.41 1.90 1.35 0.04
0.7 2.08 3.08 2.43 1.96 0.59
0.6 2.12 3.01 2.42 1.77 0.67
0.5 1.91 2.74 2.08 1.49 0.38
0.4 1.54 2.30 1.64 1.20 0.22
0.3 1.21 1.92 1.25 0.90 0.01
0.2 0.91 1.48 0.91 0.66 0.00
0.1 0.34 0.68 0.34 0.26 -0.04
16
0.95 -3.29 -2.21 -2.90 -3.49 -4.83
0.9 -0.49 0.57 0.23 -0.47 -1.70
0.8 1.51 2.60 2.00 1.49 0.30
0.7 2.23 3.14 2.56 1.94 0.73
0.6 2.25 3.17 2.52 1.85 0.76
0.5 2.08 2.92 2.19 1.60 0.57
0.4 1.68 2.46 1.73 1.26 0.38
0.3 1.32 2.01 1.41 0.92 0.24
0.2 0.87 1.46 1.03 0.60 0.07
0.1 0.36 0.68 0.54 0.30 0.02
18
0.95 -3.19 -2.21 -2.96 -3.46 -4.79
0.9 -0.35 0.70 0.44 -0.26 -1.62
0.8 1.53 2.56 2.06 1.59 0.25
0.7 2.14 3.15 2.57 2.01 0.66
0.6 2.17 3.13 2.57 1.96 0.69
0.5 2.04 2.85 2.30 1.75 0.53
0.4 1.75 2.44 1.90 1.44 0.35
0.3 1.31 1.97 1.51 1.05 0.20
0.2 0.84 1.37 0.99 0.73 -0.06
0.1 0.38 0.70 0.48 0.38 -0.03
20
0.95 -2.71 -1.77 -2.68 -3.22 -4.36
0.9 0.01 0.96 0.68 -0.03 -1.29
0.8 1.79 2.82 2.21 1.63 0.36
0.7 2.43 3.32 2.64 2.06 0.83
0.6 2.42 3.22 2.60 1.96 0.76
0.5 2.24 3.01 2.40 1.72 0.57
0.4 1.89 2.62 1.94 1.47 0.37
0.3 1.47 2.08 1.53 1.06 0.14
0.2 1.05 1.50 1.07 0.77 0.01
0.1 0.52 0.81 0.50 0.39 -0.16
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